Friday, August 23, 2013

Why We 3-Bet


For once I won't bore people with a discussion of a specific hand and would instead like to bore people by discussing the practice of preflop 3-betting, or re-raising the initial preflop raiser. Before I do so, please note that I don't pretend to be the originator of any of these ideas and you could probably find a more sophisticated explanation elsewhere, so...thanks for reading anyway. :p

Why We 3-Bet

We generally want to 3-bet our opponents for one or more of five reasons:

1) To get value from worse hands when we have a strong hand.
2) To steal money from players who fold often to 3-bets.
3) To discourage players from stealing our blinds or button.
4) To take the betting lead or "initiative" in the hand, which allows us to represent a stronger hand on the flop and continue applying pressure.
5) For "balance," i.e. to show that we can raise without a big hand so that our bigger hands can get paid off and it's more difficult for our opponents to read us. 

For obvious reasons, if we're holding a premium hand like AA it makes sense to raise to get more money in the pot with the best hand. While it's sometimes appropriate to just flat call with a big hand, the notion of "not wanting to scare away hands" is misguided and misses the main purpose of raising--to indicate a big hand. If a player only flat calls with big hands and raises everything else, they are playing an extremely exploitable game, as it allows observant opponents to effectively take premium hands out of their range when they raise.

Regarding #2 and #3, if a player raises frequently and folds to a sufficient percentage of 3-bets, our 3-bet is immediately a profitable play, not factoring in any subsequent action if our opponent calls. Our formula for determining profitability should look something like this:

(size of the pot)*(frequency with which opponent folds) - (size of our raise)*(frequency with which opponent calls)

So let's say we're playing $.50/$1.00 and are in the big blind and it folds around to the button, who raises to $3 and the small blind folds. Let's say we know that our opponent folds to 3-bets 65%
of the time. We're holding any two cards in the big blind and are trying to decide if it's profitable to 3-bet. If we make a standard 3-bet to $9, the size of the pot is $4.50 due to the blinds (including ours) and the size of the raise is $8 (because our $1 blind is considered part of the pot). So let's plug that information in to see the expected value from our play:

($4.50)*(.65) - ($8)*(.35)
$2.925 - $2.80
EV = $0.13

Looked at another way, if we want to discover how often the opponent needs to fold for it to be a break even play, we can set it up like this (sorry if my rudimentary math is off):

4.5x = 8
x = 1.7777778
1.778 / 2.778 = .64

In other words, given the scenario above the button needs to fold 1.778 times for every one time he or she calls, or 64% of the time in order for the 3-bet to be profitable by itself.

If we're playing live or playing on Bovada (as I do), there's no access to real-time stats. Instead, it's necessary to estimate the likelihood of a fold based on our image and the villain's tendencies. If a player likes to steal from the button, but has to worry about being 3-bet frequently from the big blind, they'll be less likely to attempt future steals and we're in effect protecting our blind now and later. Finally, for the same reason that we want to raise our big hands (to get value), we need to 3-bet at least some weaker hands so that our opponent can't put us on an an extremely narrow range when we do.


3-Betting Range

I won't argue that there is an ideal 3-betting range because that depends on the type of player one is as well as opponent skill and table dynamics. That said, I can use my own limited data set to illustrate how one might look at a 3-betting range. Over a sample size of about 15.5k hands at $.50/$1.00, I'm 3-betting 6.91% of the time that I have the option. That doesn't sound like a lot, but using Equilab I can get a good idea of exactly which hands I'm 3-betting:

















If I were player who hand an extremely narrow 3-bet range of QQ+ and AK that would represent only 2.56% of all potential hands. Instead, my 3-betting range looks something like this:

Raising for value almost all of the time: AA, KK, QQ, AK
Raising for value the majority of the time: AQ, JJ
Sometimes raising for value: AJ, KQ, TT (and occasionally 99, and AT)
Raising as a bluff: QJ, JT, T9, 98, and some other connectors and gappers (e.g. 97) depending on how likely my opponent is to fold.

That doesn't mean I'm always 3-betting hands like JT and 98--against some players I'd do it frequently and against others I never would.

While it's certainly feasible to 3-bet a much wider range than this, given the generally low quality of play on Bovada and the fact that players are random and there's therefore no "history" that can exist between players, this is about as wide a range as I see being necessary. Regardless of where you're playing, if you can find the right circumstances and know your opponents and your own image, expanding your 3-betting range can be an important change to your game and new source of profit.

In a subsequent post, I'll talk a bit more about looking for ways to improve our 3-betting hand selection and identifying possible leaks.

Sunday, August 18, 2013

Respecting the Process, Not the Results

Pardon the delay, I've been moving the last week or so and have had spotty internet and as a result haven't played much. Plus laziness.

I don't know who coined the phrase, but something that's been uttered many times by far better poker players than myself is, "Be process-oriented, not results-oriented." I'm unsure if the ad still runs, but when you see Doyle Brunson on TV saying that it's not about winning or losing, it's about making the right play, that's what he's talking about. Part of one's evolution as a poker player is looking at how a hand was played and not deciding that the play was correct or incorrect based on whether the hand was won, but whether one's logic was good at the time. The following is a hand where one might be tempted to second-guess the process based on the results, but I believe to do so would be a mistake:

Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($104.20 in chips)
Seat 2: Dealer ($163.49 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($130.65 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($68.50 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($183.45 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Jh Jd]
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
UTGplus1: folds
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: raises $13.50 to $14
Big Blind: folds

We're playing 5-handed and are first to act holding JJ. We make a standard raise and get 3-bet large by the small blind. The villain makes it almost 5 times our initial raise, which is not always a tell, but in my experience often indicates some form of a hand that feels scared and/or vulnerable, particularly out of position. This tends to mean either a mid-pocket pair or AT+ sort of hand. Folding would be an atrociously tight play and raising is a legitimate option, but we have the ability to play a strong hand in position against a range that we have already narrowed down a lot, so we elect to call.

Donzo: calls $11
Dealer: folds
*** FLOP *** [6h 4d 4s]
Small Blind: checks

The flop comes 644 rainbow and the villain checks. If our range analysis is correct, the only hands that are a concern are 66, QQ, the small chance of KK or AA, and the very small chance that the villain was getting tricky holding a 4. We therefore bet to get value from 77-TT as well as a lighter calling A high, and also to get those same hands with substantial equity due to over cards to fold. We bet a little over half pot and the villain calls.

Donzo: bets $17
Small Blind: calls $17
*** TURN *** [6h 4d 4s] [Kc]
Small Blind: bets $22

The turn brings a K and the villain makes a very strange bet of $22 into about $66, or 1/3 pot. There are several possible rationales for this:

1) The villain check/called the flop with AK and is betting small to get value from 77-QQ hands that were betting the flop.
2) The villain has a hand in the 77-QQ range and is making a blocking bet with the expectation of folding to a raise and probably shutting down on the river in the event of a call.
3) The villain called with a hand like AT-AQ and is now deciding to turn the hand into a bluff because there aren't that many kings in our range.

In the moment, it's difficult to know what to make of the bet or how much weight to give to each of the preceding three possibilities. As the bet is so small and we only need to have the best hand 20% of the time for it to be a profitable call ((($22 / ($66+22+22)) = 20%), we elect to do so with the intent of evaluating the river.

Donzo: calls $22
*** RIVER *** [6h 4d 4s Kc] [Qs]
Small Blind: checks

The river brings a Q, a pretty terrible card, and the villain checks. Because the villain didn't bet the river, that makes it fairly unlikely that he or she has QQ or AK (unless they're paranoid that we hit QQ) and if they are holding 77-TT it's going to be almost impossible to get value from a value bet. In the event that the villain has AJ/AT they're obviously also folding and AQ has now gotten there. Without a stronger read on the villain, we can't expect them to make a fold with AQ or a call with 77-TT and therefore check behind. The villain shows AQ for the rivered pair.

Donzo: checks
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Small Blind: shows [As Qh] (two pair, Queens and Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Jh Jd] (Two pair)
Small Blind collected $108 from pot

While in hindsight we might consider whether we could have represented a K with a bet on the river to get AQ to fold, that is far too specific a read given the information we had available at the time and it might not have worked anyway.

The important takeaway is that we bet when we were ahead, called when we were ahead (and a raise would've been counter-productive), and checked behind when we couldn't get value from worse. In other words, we did everything right and the villain hit a 6-outer on the river. No biggie. Next hand.