Facing Check-Raises and Examining Continuance Ranges

A powerful-yet-underused play at micro/small stakes is the check-raise. I'll talk about employing check-raises at some point in the future, but for now I'll talk about responding to them. For many amateurs, being check-raised is a thoroughly unpleasant experience that puts them off their game and propels them toward mistakes in both the current and ensuing hands. When facing a check-raise, it's important to review board texture, villain tendencies, and any other game implications. Here's a brief example from a hand I played on Sunday:

Seat 1: Big Blind ($23.79 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG ($41.54 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus1 ($74.20 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($51.80 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($74.36 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [4s 3h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [2h 2c 6c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $2

The action folds around to us and we're holding 43 on the button. We make a standard raise hoping to steal, but also prepared to play the hand in position. The big blind calls and the flop is pretty dry with 226 and two clubs. The big blind checks and we bet $2 because A) we have 4 high and can't win this hand unless we improve, B) we have a gut shot straight draw, and C) that flop misses almost all of the big blind's calling range.

Big Blind: raises $5 to $5

The villain check-raises and we're left with a decision. The most obvious play is to fold, as we are guaranteed to be way behind no matter what the villain has and we could simply write it off as a continuation bet that didn't work. Calling is a legitimate option, as it indicates a lot of strength, implying that we have either a 2, a 6, an overpair, or at worst a flush draw. If we call, it's with the intent to bluff the turn (assuming the villain checks). Finally, we can re-raise in order to get the villain to fold out all of their bluffs that were bluffing us on the flop, as well as the occasional underpair to the 6. Whereas it might be appropriate to call here with just ace high for value, as that would be ahead of much of the villain's bluffing range, our 43 can only function as a bluff if we don't improve.

We unfortunately don't have any stats or other reads on the villain and therefore can't say how often he/she check-raises. Consequently, our decision has to be based on how the board connects with the villain's range and how it connects with our perceived range.

Our Perceived Range
Using Hold Em Manager 2 (which I'll discuss in a future post), I can isolate my stats for just the session in which I was playing. For the amount of time I'd sat at the table, I'd been raising on the button 50% of the time. If the villain had been paying attention, he/she is likely to notice that and consequently assume that I'm opening an extremely wide range of hands on the button. Furthermore, because the board is so dry the villain has to expect us to be betting with most of our bluffs. As a result, our post-bet perceived range on the flop is huge, which means we must expect the villain's check-raise to be a bluff a substantial percentage of the time.

Villain's Continuance Range
For the sake of argument, let's say that the villain was calling preflop with ATC (any two cards). Let's also say that the villain check-raises his/her entire range on the flop. If that's the case, and we're attempting to discern the viability of a raise, we need to determine the villain's continuance range, or the hands with which they would continue in the hand in the face of a re-raise from us. To do that, we can use Equilab to separate all the combinations of hands that fit that criteria. If we say that the villain continues with quads, a boat, any 2, any 6, any overpair, or a flush draw, that makes up about 30% of all possible hands. In other words, unless the villain has the capacity for a 4bet flop bluff, which is a very aggressive and rarely-seen play at these stakes, they are folding 70% of their hands to a raise. 

However, remember that those numbers are based on the assumption that the villain called with ATC and is playing all the "continuing" hands for a check-raise followed by a call. In reality, the villain's continuance range is almost certainly lower than 30% because even after accounting for a smaller total number of original hands from which to select, if you look at the image above you'll see that there are a lot more combinations of hands with a 2 than we would expect all but the loosest villain to play, e.g. T2, 72, etc. Furthermore, the villain is less likely to call a re-raise with a weak 6 than with a 2, overpair, or flush draw. Finally, the villain would probably just check-call with some of their bigger hands (trip 2s, a boat, etc), especially knowing that I'm bluffing a significant portion of the time, as they wouldn't want me to fold all my air. 

Armed with the above information, we need to determine the profitability of a raise. After the villain's check-raise, the pot stands at $10.25. We raise to $10.50, which is the equivalent of betting $8.50 (because our $2 is already out there) into $10.25 (the pot including our $2 and the villain's $5 raise). If we do a little basic math, we'll see that we need our bluff to work 45.33% of the time to be profitable:

($8.50) / ($8.50+$10.25)
($8.50) / ($18.75) = 45.33%

If our evaluation of the villain's continuance range is even remotely in the ballpark, and they're folding over 45.33% of their hands, then it's a profitable raise. The villain does fold, and we take down the hand with 4 high.

Donzo: raises $8.50 to $10.50
Big Blind: folds

To phrase the idea of bet profitability more simply, think of a hand in which there's a $100 pot on the river and the action is on us holding nothing. If we bet $100 (the size of the pot), we need our bluff to work 50% of the time to break even, as 50% of the time the villain will call and we'll lose our $100 bet and 50% of the time the villain will fold and we'll win the $100 in the pot.

Estimating a villain's continuance range can be a difficult task in the moment, but in fairly clear cut situations like the one I've outlined here, having a healthy grasp of the likelihood of a fold is crucial to maximizing profit.

Big Hands and Keeping a Clear Head

One of the biggest challenges for amateur players is maintaining an emotionless approach when picking up a huge hand. I cannot count how many times I've seen someone pick up a premium hand and play with little to no regard for the actions of the other players at the table. Playing live gives some insight into the mental state of these players and their thought process goes something like this:

To piggyback on my post from Tuesday, if and when they end up losing their loss is often followed by a lamentation about one or more of A) their terrible luck, B) the inconceivable play of their opponent(s), and C) how they had "no choice" but to play the hand the way they did. "C" is where large amounts of money are needlessly lost. To demonstrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 1: Donzo ($50.85 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($39.82 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($70.73 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($52.99 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($68.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50.50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Ah]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus1: calls $1.50
UTGplus2: calls $1.50
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $1.25
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [3s 7d 4c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $4.50
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $4.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds

We're dealt aces UTG and make a standard 3x raise. Four people call, which is more than we're hoping to see, but we're still the overwhelming favorite heading into the flop.

The flop comes 374 rainbow (all different suits) and the blinds check to us. Although this is a low flop that initially looks ideal, it's actually not great for our hand because A) there are no larger pairs that could have hit, meaning hands that pair the board are going to have a hard time paying us off, B) there are no potential flush draws, and C) there are only gut shot straight draws, as 56 already has a straight on the flop. That said, we're still usually going to have the best hand and want to bet to get value from hands like A7, a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45), and inferior overpairs to the board. We bet $4.50 into $7.50 for 60% pot and get one caller.

*** TURN *** [3s 7d 4c] [2s]
Donzo: bets $8.50
UTGplus2: raises $17 to $17

Unless the villain floated us with A5 or 22 (or inexplicably was in the hand with 72), the turn is effectively a blank. We again bet for value and are quickly min-raised.

At this point it's helpful to talk about the Baluga Whale Theorem. If you don't want to click the link, it's the idea that when faced with a turn raise, the strength of single pair hands must be seriously reevaluated. When an opponent just calls the flop and raises the turn, they're saying "my hand was strong enough on the flop that I wasn't scared of anything and was willing to let another card come so that I could win more money from you firing a second barrel." It is of course possible that some villains will float with air on the flop and raise the turn, but that's generally a more sophisticated play and not one that you see often at lower limits. Do some players know the Baluga Whale Theorem and use it to bluff? Absolutely, and it's something I expect to see more as I move up in stakes.

Furthermore, if a player is on a draw and is inclined toward playing draws more aggressively, the likelihood of a raise happening on the flop is much greater because A) there is less money invested on the flop than the turn, making a bluff attempt less costly, and B) a raise on the flop, if called, has a strong chance to induce a check on the turn from the original bettor (particularly if the original bettor is first to act), leading to the option for a free card for the raiser.

So, to return to our hand and our villain, what are the reasonable hands for him/her to have? If we consider the hands that had us beat on the flop, there are 9 possible set combinations and 16 straight combinations. Let's also include the 1 combination of A7 of spades, as that's a hand that might've originally called for value, but wants to turn the hand into a bluff now that we've fired a second barrel. If we assume that the villain is only raising those hands and we plug them into Equilab, we have an atrocious 7.5% equity with one card to come. But what if they're sometimes raising worse overpairs for value? If we add 88-KK into the villain's range, our equity skyrockets to 58.6%. But if we just take a moment to review the preflop action, we will see how unlikely most of those hands are. The villain is in the cutoff and there was a caller prior to the action getting to him/her. While a flat call with a big pocket pair sometimes happens in response to just the original raiser, it's something one rarely sees when a third person is involved in a pot, not to mention the dealer and blinds who have yet to act. Consequently, the likelihood of KK or QQ is slim to none, as is the likelihood of JJ or TT, although I'll leave a slightly possibility for those to the arbitrary tune of 25% of the time. 99 and 88 are believable calling hands both preflop and on the flop, but what would the purpose of the turn raise be? Value raising my extremely specific UTG betting range of A7, or just hoping for a tilted call with AK? It doesn't make much sense, but allowing the possibility that the villain also plays those hands that way 25% of the time, and factoring in our removal of KK and QQ and the reduced likelihood of JJ and TT, we come up with equity of 24%.

The last factors to take into account are the raise size and pot odds. As the villain min-raised, we are getting excellent pot odds of 17%. However, considering the strength indicated by the villain's line, we are looking at a strong-to-inevitable chance of facing an all-in on the river. That means that we're not actually looking at calling $8.50 to win $42, we're calling $36.35 (our current stack size) to win $69.85 (what the pot will be after the villain's shove for my remaining $27.85 after I call $8.50). That gives us odds of 34%. If our above range assignment is accurate (or close to it), we don't have the right odds to make the call and should therefore fold, which I did.

Donzo: folds
*** SUMMARY ***
Seat 3: UTGplus2 showed [3d 3h] and won ($31.85)

The villain didn't show at the time, but we can see now that he/she had 33 for a flopped set. Does that mean that the villain will NEVER have a worse hand? No, but the point is to determine how likely that is, and without a read that the villain is extremely aggressive or willing to raise lighter for value, we can't assume that they're taking that line with only a single pair. And because we didn't allow ourselves to become emotionally invested in our aces and left our brain in the "On" position, we were able to escape the hand losing only 29 big blinds instead of 100.

Avoiding the Blame Game and Taking the Opportunity to Learn

A hallmark of the fish's mindset is the belief that everyone is terrible and the only reason they are losing money is because no one except them knows how to play poker. The most vocal complaints usually come after losing a hand in which their opponent either A) called preflop with a weak hand that then outdrew them or B) called a bet on the river with a weaker hand than they "should" have. The irony of accusing players of being "too bad to beat" is usually lost on these types. Rather than simplifying their game against a player that "can't fold" and taking most bluffs off the table, they instead insist on playing a tone deaf game that doesn't take into account differing circumstances, such as calling station opponents or the implausibility of the "story" they're telling with their bet(s). I love seeing players freak out in such a way, both because it's amusing and because it reveals them for the inferior players that they are. These players are determined to make sure you know that they know how to play, it's everyone else's fault for being too stupid to know what they're supposed to do.

Watch the best players in the world--guys like Ivey, Galfond, Dwan--and you'll notice that they never complain about the way their opponent plays a hand. When they lose, if they say anything at all it's usually "nice hand" and then they move on. I can think of three reasons that all aspiring poker players should emulate that approach:

1) You won't look like a whiny asshole and will demonstrate that you have the confidence to allow your play to speak for itself.

2) The act of getting upset about a hand is by definition an aggravation of one's emotions, so the more one allows oneself to get upset or vocal or complain, the more likely it is to put you in a tilted or sub-optimal state of mind for playing.

3) If a player is insistent that the fault lies with the other player for how they played the hand, then that player is depriving him/herself of the chance to learn something. Rather than saying to oneself, "could I have played that hand differently?" the player is too absorbed with preserving their ego to use the experience as an opportunity to get better.

To illustrate reason #3, let's look at a hand I played last week (my explanation of how I played the hand will be brief):

Seat 1: Small Blind ($60.81 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($53.30 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($61.60 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($63.86 in chips)
Seat 6: Dealer ($32.43 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2d 5h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.50
Dealer: calls $0.50
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: checks
*** FLOP *** [3c 7h 3h]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: checks
Dealer: checks
*** TURN *** [3c 7h 3h] [5c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $1.50
Dealer: folds
Donzo: calls $1.50
*** RIVER *** [3c 7h 3h 5c] [Kh]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $4.75
Donzo: calls $4.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [4c Qc] (a pair of Threes)
Donzo: shows [2d 5h] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo collected $13.55 from pot

We're dealt 52 in the big blind and we see a free flop 3-handed. The 373 flop is dry and everyone checks. The turn gives us a 5 and also puts a club flush draw out there. We check again and the villain bets the size of the pot. The other player folds and we call. Although it's possible that the villain was slow-playing trip 3s or has a better 5, they're most likely betting either a club flush draw or air. The river brings the K and a third heart. We check and the villain again bets the size of the pot. While it's a scary card, it's important to remember that the villain didn't bet on the flop, which, if he/she were holding two hearts, is almost a mandatory bet on such an otherwise dry board. Consequently, a flush is extremely unlikely. It's possible that the K hit a part of the villain's bluffing range, but it still missed most of his air hands. We make the call and the villain shows Q4 of clubs for a missed flush.

After I called, the villain and I had a brief chat...

Villain: Really?
Me: Yes, really.
Villain: When I die, I'm going to ask God if people cheated at online poker, or if they were really just that bad.
Me: Then you're asking the wrong question.

My meaning was probably lost on the player, but what he should be asking God (or himself) is, "Why didn't I try to figure out what I did wrong in poker, rather than blaming anyone but myself?" Instead, the villain's thought process amounted to, "He only had a pair of fives, how the hell could he call me with a K and three hearts out there?!?!?!"

Don't play the blame game and don't be a whiny player. Always, always, always try to learn something.

Premium Hands and Not Being Ruled By Fear

When many amateurs pick up a premium hand, they don't know any other way to play it than "fast," i.e. raising at every opportunity and/or betting large whenever possible. In reality, it is a slightly different manifestation of the fear I talked about in this post. Players are afraid that if they have to make a post-flop decision they will make the wrong one and don't want to deal with the discomfort of such a decision. Therefore, they raise, period. While such "fast playing" is sometimes the best way to play a big hand, it is not always the most profitable. As an example, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 2: Donzo ($62.87 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($47.27 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($71.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qh Qd]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus2: raises $4.75 to $4.75
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds

We're playing 4-handed and are dealt QQ in the cutoff (to the right of the button) and make a standard 3x raise. The button (identified above as UTGplus2 because it was technically a dead button) 3-bets us to $4.75 and the blinds fold. At this point we need to figure out our best course of action. Unless we have a crazy read and know that this player is only 3-betting AA and KK, there's no way we can fold here, particularly 4-handed. A raise is a definite possibility for a few reasons:

1) The villain's range is inherently wider because of the fact that we're raising from the cutoff, which means the villain knows our range is wider than it would be from an earlier position, and therefore their 3-betting range should be wider.

2) We want to get maximum value for our big hand and the villain may not be able to fold a strong-but-inferior hand.

3) We are content to potentially fold out some hands that are behind, but have significant equity against us, particularly as we are out of position.

However, some of those reasons are exactly why we shouldn't raise. If the villain is raising with a hand like, say, T9 or AJ, we don't want those hands to fold. By just calling out of position, we can appear the reluctant/passive player and present the opportunity for the villain to bluff with all hands that miss. We definitely want to avoid folding out hands like 99-JJ, which are way behind us but will find some of the same flops attractive/non-scary. Even if we assign a fairly conservative range of 99+ and AJ+ (leaving out plausible hands like KQ, JT, or T9), our equity against the villain's range is about 61%. If we were to raise, the plausible calling/re-raising range shrinks to about 51%, a virtual coin flip. With that in mind, we just call.

Donzo: calls $3.25
*** FLOP *** [8h 2h 8s]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $10.25

The flop is excellent for us, as it all but assures we have the best hand so long as our opponent doesn't have AA or KK (or an aggressively played mid-range hand like 98). We could bet here to get value out of hands like the aforementioned 99-JJ, but then we've caused all the ace high hands (and potential other missed hands) to fold. Instead we check, and the villain bets the size of the pot. This is interesting for two reasons: 1) it's a large bet on an extremely dry board; except for the flush draw, there is no reason for the villain to be concerned about all the combinations to which we might hypothetically be drawing. In other words, if the villain had KK or AA, he virtually assures I'm folding everything from which he wants to get value, except for 99-QQ, and is therefore not extracting maximum value. While there are some players who bet the size of the pot just as a regular matter of course, they are in the minority. 2) If I call, there will be about $31 in the pot and the villain will have $32 remaining, meaning that I may need to deal with an all-in on the turn or river. While there is some concern that this could be an aggressively-played KK or AA, we should be happy about the spot we're in and likely prepared to call such an all-in depending on the card(s) that come.

Donzo: calls $10.25
*** TURN *** [8h 2h 8s] [4c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $32.27 and is all-in

We check and, as anticipated, the villain moves all-in. While it's a large, potentially intimidating bet, the important thing to remember is that nothing has changed--the villain is still making a large bet on a dry board and the likelihood of him holding a hand like AK, AQ, or a random worse hand is still the same, as our actions have done nothing to indicate that we have a hand as strong as QQ. We call and the villain shows AK.

Donzo: calls $32.27
*** RIVER *** [8h 2h 8s 4c] [6s]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qh Qd] (two pair, Queens and Eights)
UTGplus2: shows [Ac Kh] (a pair of Eights)
Donzo collected $93.29 from pot

If we had re-raised preflop, the villain likely would have shoved, and we'd have called and been a slight favorite with 57% equity. Instead, because we were prepared to deal with a somewhat difficult decision, we gave the villain the opportunity to bluff off his entire stack and got it all-in with the villain drawing to 6 outs on the river, giving us 86% equity.

Will the villain show up with AA or KK sometimes? Of course. But again, we should be happy with our decision regardless of the outcome, if our logic is good.

Calling Light and Feeling Slightly Awesome

It's crucial for poker players to avoid making a big play--whether a call, raise, or fold--for the sake of proving that they're capable of making such plays and/or looking cool. However, if one can make such a play AND have a good reason for doing so, every now and then it's ok to pat yourself on the back about it. For example, I felt pretty good about the following hand from a few days ago (please note I moved up in stakes to $0.25/$0.50):

Seat 2: Dealer ($50 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($49.55 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($50.10 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($15.60 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus1 ($18.44 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2s 2c]
UTG: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: folds
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: calls $0.50
*** FLOP *** [3c 7c 6h]
Donzo: checks
UTG: bets $2.25

We're playing 5-handed and the villain min raises from UTG, which doesn't tell us a lot about their range except they don't have complete trash like Q4 or 93. As it only costs us $.50 to see the flop and we're holding a pair, a call is perfectly appropriate. The flop hits a low-mid range pretty hard, but also misses a ton of hands. I check and the villain bets the pot. At this point the villain could have everything from a straight to complete air, but remember that they are figuring that this flop missed most of my hands as well. Importantly, I also have a note on this player (based on a few dozen hands) that he/she may make pot size bets in spots where other players have indicated weakness. I call with the intention of re-evaluating on the turn.

Donzo: calls $2.25
*** TURN *** [3c 7c 6h] [9h]
Donzo: checks
UTG: checks

We check and the villain checks behind, which is important because it removes a TON of possible hands from his/her range. There are now two potential flush draws on the board and if we were drawing to the straight with 89, we've picked up top pair as well. As a result, if the villain had a strong hand like 45 (for the flopped straight), 67, a set, or a pocket pair larger than 99, he/she would want to bet for value on the turn as well. The check also reduces the likelihood of a 7, which might still want to go for value with only one overcard.

*** RIVER *** [3c 7c 6h 9h] [7d]
Donzo: checks
UTG: bets $6.75

The river pairs the 7 and we check, as the only reason to bet would be to get the villain to fold a 6, 3, 44, or 55, which is unlikely to work. The villain again bets the size of the pot, same as on the flop. At this point the villain's range is polarized between a strong hand or a bluff. They likely either have a 7 that they checked behind on the turn because they were scared of the 9 or a straight, or they don't have anything. Up to this point in the hand, our actions have indicated that we have a weak pair, ace high, or a missed draw. As a result, the villain has a reasonable expectation that we will fold many of those hands to a large bet. There is a small chance that the villain is value betting extremely thin with a 6 or 3, but in all likelihood those hands would be checked behind as well.

I put all of the above together and make the call. The villain shows A4 for ace high and a missed gutshot.

Donzo: calls $6.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTG: shows [Ah 4d] (a pair of Sevens)
Donzo: shows [2s 2c] (two pair, Sevens and Twos)
Donzo collected $19.25 from pot

While it's tempting to say "forget it, there's too much out there that beats me," if we take some time to logically construct our opponent's range based on their actions, we can make a call that looks ridiculous at first glance, but is actually supported by good logic. Only then do we get to brush that dirt off our shoulders and feel like a badass mofo. ;)

Recognizing Mistakes Despite Winning

Even for players who know that aptitude in poker cannot be tied to winning any particular hand or session, it's easy to forgo self-examination when making money. But it's crucial to examine hands where we made money, but played sub-optimally, to see if we could do something different in a similar situation in the future. To illustrate, let's look at a hand that I won, but involved a big mistake:

Seat 1: UTG ($38.10 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($36.01 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($42.17 in chips)
Seat 5: Donzo ($32.20 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($18.20 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ks Ah]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
Dealer: folds
Donzo: raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind: folds
UTGplus1: raises $5 to $5.25
Donzo: raises $13.72 to $14.72
UTGplus1: calls $9.47

We're dealt AK in the small blind and raise the only limper for value. Surprisingly, the limper 3-bets for over 5x my bet. While I'm a little concerned about AA or KK, we're still ahead or flipping with most of the villain's range. I 4-bet for a little under 3x and the villain calls.

*** FLOP *** [Qh Ad 8c]

We flop the ace and it's our action first. At the time, my thought process was something along the lines of "I've been playing aggressively and if I had been bluffing and an ace flopped I would bet, therefore I should also bet with my made hands for balance." This was the completely wrong line of thinking for a couple of reasons:

1) Anonymous Players. On Bovada, there are no player names--players only have the designation of Player 1, Player 2, etc. What that means is that (so far as I know) no one can have any stats or notes on the player other than what they've noted during that session. So while I might run into this player again, I won't know it because they'll be indicated as "Player ___." Therefore, there is little benefit to worrying about "meta game" considerations whereby it would be useful for my opponents to know I will bet or bluff in the same spot.

2) The villain's calling range that we can beat is extremely narrow and possibly non-existent. Unless the villain has reason to think that I'm a player willing to 4-bet and then shove with nothing, he/she is probably not going to call a shove with worse than an ace here. AK is never folding, we're crushed by AQ, and worse aces like AJ or AT would have to put serious thought into calling a raise here, as those hands are effectively bluff catchers, as is any (improbable) weaker ace. As for plausible hands that beat us, we are crushed by the one combination of AA in the deck as well as QQ and 88. Any other pocket pair is almost certainly folding (unless the villain is capable of making a very light call down for a lot of money, which is unlikely at these stakes) as are oddly-played hands with a Q (KQ, QJ, QT, etc). So we're left with a couple of worse hands that might call and everything else folding.

Unfortunately, I didn't go through all of that in my head at the time. All I was thinking was "blah blah, meta game, blah blah." I bet and the the villain folded:

Donzo: bets $17.48 and is all-in
UTGplus1: folds
Uncalled bet ($17.48) returned to Donzo
Donzo: shows [Ks Ah]
Donzo collected $28.21 from pot

In other words, I did exactly what I spoke against doing a couple posts ago: I made a bet that virtually ensured all worse hands would fold and all better hands would call.

Plenty of people would be happy to take down a 112 big blind pot with AK out of position. My point is that we shouldn't be. We should always look for ways that we could have played a hand differently, whether we won or not.

Tricky Spots and Timing Tells

Few things in NLHE are less fun than being put to a decision knowing you're either crushed or slightly ahead of your opponent. At such times my inclination is usually to fold and "wait for a better spot." While that is often the correct course of action, there are times when a call or raise with a made hand is the most profitable choice. Let's look at a hand I played last week where I was faced with just such a decision:


Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($24.03 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($20.33 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($28.97 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($15.79 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($72.39 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
UTGplus1: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Jd]
Donzo: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: calls $0.75
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2s 6s Ad]
Donzo: bets $1.50
UTGplus1: raises $6.85 to $6.85

I'm UTG with AJ and raise to 4x due to the UTG+1 player (hereafter "villain") who posted their blind out of position. The villain calls and everyone else folds. The flop is good for me, as I flop top pair and am usually going to have the best hand. I bet $1.50 and it takes the villain less than a second to raise to $6.85. At this point, I'm going to say that there are a couple of different probable ranges for the villain to have. If we give the villain a range of two pair, a set, and any flush draw (including flush draws with a gutshot straight draw), Equilab tells us that our equity is 54%. If we expand the villain's range to include AK and AQ, our equity drops to 40%. I'm more inclined to drop AK and AQ out of the villain's range considering the lack of a 3bet, but it's not inconceivable.

We're now faced with what is essentially an all-in decision. I say that because if we call the villain's raise of $6.85, after rake we'll be looking at a pot of around $15 and the villain will have about $16 behind, leaving enough for roughly a pot-size bet on the turn, which considering the raise on the flop we have to expect on the turn the majority of the time. Therefore, in a vacuum, we might be inclined to fold here.

However, let's take a look at the raise again, which is notable for a couple of reasons. First, the size of the raise is large; the villain has made it about 4.5x my bet. Second, the raise was put in extremely quickly. What that means is that the villain had already made the decision about what to do prior to me putting in my bet. They had their mouse cursor waiting to hit the "pot" button to make a pot-size raise and then clicked raise.

Timing Tells

So, what do those two pieces of information tell us? In my experience, a rapidly executed, large raise is usually the online version of aggressive table talk and false bravado. It's saying (loudly), "I am so strong here that I was ready to raise you instantly, so you'd better fold if you know what's good for you." Of course we all know poker players are a bunch of liars, so to quote Mike Caro, as players we should "figure out what your opponent wants you to do and disappoint them." If we're right about the range indicated by the size and speed of the raise, this increases the likelihood of a flush draw, combo draw, or pair+draw, while still allowing for a number of combinations of stronger made hands that are afraid to let draws chase. Consequently, I decide to shove all-in to get value out of all the hands I'm beating here, while still acknowledging and being fine with the fact that sometimes the villain will have me crushed. It's important to note that I am raising almost exclusively for value here, not as a bluff, as I expect the villain to call close to 100% of the time with all his/her hands. While it's possible that the villain would fold to a shove holding AK or AQ, the aggression of the flop raise and possibility that I could also be on a draw makes that highly unlikely.

Donzo: raises $21.40 to $22.90
UTGplus1: raises $0.13 to $23.03 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $0.13
*** TURN *** [2s 6s Ad] [4s]
*** RIVER *** [2s 6s Ad 4s] [4h]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [7s As] (a flush, Ace high)
Donzo: shows [Ac Jd] (two pair, Aces and Jacks)
UTGplus1 collected $46.41 from pot

I shove all-in, the villain calls and shows an ace with a flush draw and turns the 4 of spades for the flush. Going back to Equilab, my equity at the time of the shove was 52%, giving me the slight edge in EV. But again, the correctness (or incorrectness) of the decision lies with the pre-conclusion analysis.

Resisting the Urge to Bet for Information

"I wanted to see where I was at" is a phrase I hear from a lot of amateur players. This is typically after the conclusion of a hand in which they were holding a medium to strong pocket pair, an overcard came on the flop (often an ace), and they bet. Whether the player realizes it or not, this is fear talking--fear of uncertainty, fear of the unknown, fear of being forced to make a decision. When someone bets "for information," what they're usually doing is attempting to absolve themselves of the burden of thinking. They're saying to themselves, "If I bet and get called here, I can then confidently check/fold in my knowledge that the the other player paired that overcard." The problem is that "betting for information" in that scenario is burning money. Whenever a bet is made, we should be aware of what the bet's purpose is. Are we betting to get value from worse hands? Are we betting to get better hands to fold? A combination of both? Or just to "take it down?" To illustrate, let's look at a hand I played last week (I'm using a different export format for the hand history, hopefully it's a little easier to read):


Seat 1: Small Blind ($24.75 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($32.75 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($22.18 in chips)
Seat 4: UTGplus1 ($30.37 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus2 ($15.81 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($38.29 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [9c 9d]
UTG: calls $0.25
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
UTGplus2: calls $0.25
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1.25
UTG: calls $1.25
UTGplus1: calls $1.25
UTGplus2: folds
*** FLOP *** [5c Ac 3h]
Big Blind: checks
UTG: checks
UTGplus1: checks

Preflop is straightforward, as I'm dealt 99 on the button and there are three limpers when it gets to me. In retrospect I should've made it 7-8x instead of 6x, but I get three callers and the flop comes A53 with two clubs. It checks around to me and we're presented with a situation like I described above. So if we were going to bet, what is the purpose of our bet?

1) Value. I can reasonably expect to be called by flush draws and perhaps sometimes a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45). There is perhaps a chance that some players might call one street with 66-88, but in a 4-way pot at these stakes it's unlikely.

2) Bluff. My profitable bluffing range is EXTREMELY narrow here. Since no one raised preflop, I have no way of putting anyone on a pocket pair better than JJ (and probably no better than TT). No one is ever folding a set or two pair here and is probably not folding any ace, as all weak aces without a 3 or 5 give the player a wheel draw in addition to their pair. So we're left with the only superior hands that fold to us being TT and perhaps A6-A8 from a tight player.

3) Both for Value and as a Bluff. This sounds contradictory, but sometimes what you are doing with one or more opponents is betting to get value from part of their range (e.g. a flush draw) while bluffing the part of their range that beats you (e.g. TT). However, in this hand both ranges are too narrow to make this apply.

4) To Take It Down. Sometimes in a multiway pot we have reason to believe we have the best hand and that most inferior hands are going to fold to a bet, but our hand is vulnerable enough that we would prefer to bet to take it down now rather than risk another scary card coming. I am wary of this line of thinking because it often goes hand in hand with the "fear" of not knowing how to handle an uncertain situation, but it's sometimes an appropriate play. In this hand, all players checking indicates some weakness, but isn't enough information to conclude that no one is slow playing or that their ranges are heavily weighted toward hands that have a lot of equity against us.

I decide to check behind thinking that I probably have the best hand, but am prepared to re-evaluate on the turn.


Donzo: checks
*** TURN *** [5c Ac 3h] [9s]
Big Blind: bets $3.92
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds

Jackpot on the turn, as the 9 gives us the 2nd nuts and the big blind leads out for about 2/3 pot. Both other players fold and now we're left to ponder the villain's range and how to extract maximum value. The big blind leading the turn into three other players probably means that they flopped big and were slow playing. A5, A3, or a set of 5's or 3's is most likely, with a possibility of 53 and A9 as well. There's also a modest chance of something like a flopped flush draw that thinks the 9 probably didn't help anyone and is attempting to take down the pot.

We could just call here, but raising makes sense for two reasons:

1) We want to get value from the small number of flush draws in the villain's range while they're still drawing.

2) Our line looks extremely weak and it's almost impossible for the villain to put us on 99. Checking behind on the flop has essentially told our opponent that we didn't flop a strong ace, two pair, or a set, and a flush draw probably would've warranted a continuation bet as well. Consequently, unless we played A9 skittishly or were getting tricky with 55 or 33 (unlikely in a 4-way pot), the villain almost has to think we're bluffing here. I raise with the expectation that the villain will usually shove all-in, which is precisely what happens.


Donzo: raises $10.34 to $10.34
Big Blind: raises $20.91 to $31.25 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $20.91
*** RIVER *** [5c Ac 3h 9s] [Ks]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Big Blind: shows [5h 3d] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo: shows [9c 9d] (three of a kind, Nines)
Donzo collected $66.85 from pot

The villain had 53 for a flopped two pair. To return the original point, if we'd bet the flop we'd have been called or raised by a better hand and gotten the other hands (which were QJ and T8) to fold, accomplishing the exact opposite of what we want: getting better hands to fold and worse hands to call. Instead, not betting emotionally and instead checking allowed us to control the hand and cash in (with a bit of help from Luck).

Optimistic Overweighting

I want to talk about an important phenomenon I call "optimistic overweighting." Whether they realize it or not, this is something that almost every poker player does and some do it constantly, to the detriment of their game. By optimistic overweighting, I'm referring to the practice of believing your opponent has more bluffs in his or her range than they actually do. To illustrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 2: Small Blind [ME] ($32.09 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($20.96 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($11.64 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($28.33 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Small Blind  [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd Ah]
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [4s 9h]
UTG : Card dealt to a spot [Jh 5h]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [Qc 5c]
UTG : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.25
Small Blind  [ME] : Raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.75

Preflop is pretty standard, we're 4-handed and the dealer limps on the button, so I raise to 4x for value and get called.


*** FLOP *** [9d Tc Ac]
Small Blind  [ME] : Bets $1.50
Dealer : Calls $1.50

Flop is perfectly fine, as I flop top pair and the board has a lot of potential draws in addition to inferior aces. The 9 and T are slightly concerning, as they fill in A9 and AT, which would have been good hands from which to extract value, but those hands are still a small part of the villain's range. I bet $1.50 into $2 and get called. 


*** TURN *** [9d Tc Ac] [2d]
Small Blind  [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $2.62
Small Blind  [ME] : Calls $2.62

I don't like my check here. I sometimes will check the turn after betting the flop because it's a line that says "I took a stab at it and you didn't fold, so now I'm showing weakness." Such a line can often get you a second street of value on the river when a bet on the turn might have persuaded a lower limit player to fold what had been an optimistic hand on the flop. However, in retrospect there are still a ton of draws on the turn, including some suited straight draws and suited aces with diamonds that picked up flush draws with the 2, that I should have bet again for value. In any event, the villain bets about 1/2 pot after I check. This doesn't give me much information, as they could be betting any of their draws, a set, or two pair. It does reduce the likelihood of a weak ace with or without a flush draw, as those hands will usually get checked behind if the villain isn't spewy. I assigned the villain a range of any club draw, a set that isn't 22, any open ended straight draw (OESD) or double belly buster draw, any two pair (although I took out about 2/3 of the combinations of 92 and T2 because those are less likely), and any ace high diamond draw.



*** RIVER *** [9d Tc Ac 2d] [9c]
Small Blind  [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $5.24

The 9 brings in the club flush and creates a bit of a pickle. On one hand the flush has come in, which was the most logical hand to which the villain could be drawing. On the other hand the villain has missed all of their straight draws. To figure out the best course of action, I went back to Equilab to take out all combinations that had just an A (with the exception of AK) as well as A2 and T2 on account of getting counterfeited (since those hands would almost certainly check behind). That leaves us with a range of AA, 99, TT, AT, a flush, or a missed straight draw. There are a total of 44 missed straight draws and 71 made hands that beat us. Taken as a straight percentage, that means we beat 38% of the combinations that could logically be betting here. As the villain bet $5.24 into about $9.50 after rake, we need to win a little over 26% of the time for our call to be profitable. Since the villain has 38% bluffs in his/her range, that should make this an easy call, right?

Weighting the Range

Not so fast. The call is only correct if we are right in thinking that the villain is equally likely to bet all of those missed draws as to value bet all those made hands. Against all but the most aggressive opponents, this is not the case. Sometimes they are going to bet their missed draws and sometimes they're going to check behind. The key is figuring out how often they bet those draws. So if our target percentage to make the call is 26%, that means that the villain needs to be bluffing with 26% of their total range, or 30 combinations: (44+71)*(.26) = 29.9 combinations

We then take that number of combinations and divide it by the total number of missed draws: 29.9/44 = 68%. Therefore, if the villain is bluffing about 2/3 of the time with a missed straight draw, we call. If they are bluffing less often than that, we fold.

So how often is the villain bluffing with a missed draw? Well that's where things get tricky. Playing on Bovada, there is no ability to save notes due to playing with random players, so it's difficult to know how aggressive your opponents are at betting draws. Furthermore, there's no HUD to use for tracking players, so I don't have stats on this opponent's aggression level. The best we can do is extrapolate based on the tendencies shown up to this point at the table as well as any other information. In that vein, there are two pieces of information that I neglected to adequately factor into my decision. First, that I had lost a hand to this villain earlier in the session in which he/she was making a modest bet for value. Second, I have yet to see this villain bet or raise without a strong hand.

If I had taken the time to lay it out in those explicit terms, I might have decided to fold. As it is, I called and the villain showed Q5 of clubs for a rivered flush. That said, I started this post with the intent of showing what a bad decision I made, but after running through the numbers it's not as bad as I thought. Without access to solid stats it's difficult to say definitely how good or bad the call was, but the important takeaway is that it's useful to play with ranges to figure out how likely it is that your opponent is bluffing on the river and what circumstances are necessary to make a profitable call.