A play often employed by professionals (and one I don't use enough) is "floating" (i.e. calling with air) to bluff a later street. If done selectively and intelligently, it can turn profit out of seemingly nothing, make it extremely difficult for opponents to put you on a hand, and discourage future aggression. Here's a hand from a few days ago where I floated with essentially nothing and accomplished at least two of the above goals:
Seat 1: Small Blind ($142.65 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($87 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($32.40 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($109.85 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.90 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6h 8h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Small Blind: raises $9.50 to $10
Big Blind: folds
We're dealt 86 of hearts on the button and it folds around to us. Unless the blinds are calling stations, this is a hand we should normally be opening and we do so. The villain in the small blind raises to $10 and the big blind folds. This is the third opening raise out of my last four that the villain has 3bet (re-raised) me. And while that's a small sample size, chances are good that they're raising a reasonably wide range because I'm opening a wide range. Consequently, while a fold is a perfectly acceptable option as we're only holding 8 high, we have the choice to play a versatile hand in position against an aggressive villain. A re-raise is also valid, but if we face a shove we're always going to have to fold, plus our raise is less likely to be given credence due to the aforementioned couple hands we'd recently folded to the villain's raises, as the likelihood that we are raising "in frustration" inevitably comes into play. A call, on the other hand, keeps the pot size more manageable while allowing us to play the hand in position and indicate we're willing to see a flop.
Donzo: calls $7
*** FLOP *** [5c 9s Ac]
Small Blind: bets $12.50
The flop comes A95 with two clubs and the villain bets $12.50 into $21, or about 60% of the pot. At this point we have absolutely nothing except a gut shot straight draw to the 7. The most obvious choice here is to fold, considering how far behind most of the villain's range we are. However, if this villain is as loose as our limited sample size has led us to believe, we have to think that they're betting most of their preflop 3betting range here. We might therefore be inclined to use our position to raise, but again, if hypothetically we're holding a strong hand here like AJ+ or a set or two pair, we want to keep all his weaker hands in the pot. Therefore, a raise by definition keeps more bluffs in our range and might compel the villain to either call or re-raise. A call, by contrast, effectively indicates our range to be a flush draw, a pair, or better. Factoring in the recent history with the villain, a call is paradoxically the more "passive" and yet stronger play. We call, with the intent to bluff the turn if the villain checks (and possibly raise a second bet).
Donzo: calls $12.50
*** TURN *** [5c 9s Ac] [2d]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a blank 2 and the villain checks. As we'd planned, we bet $30 into $46 and the villain quickly folds.
Donzo: bets $30
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($30) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $44 from pot
In this example, our play accomplished exactly what we were hoping for despite the fact that we were drawing to four outs on the turn. Furthermore, for the rest of the session the villain didn't re-raise me, as he/she probably decided that there was less profit in it than they originally thought. It's important to realize that sometimes the above play isn't going to
work and that players should not just start floating flops left and
right. But if used sparingly, it can be a valuable tool against the right kind of villain.
Showing posts with label range. Show all posts
Showing posts with label range. Show all posts
Sunday, July 28, 2013
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
When a Bet Is Both a Bluff AND for Value
As I discussed awhile ago in this post, when we make a bet we should have an understanding of why we're betting. This generally means that we are either betting to get our opponent to call with a worse hand or fold a better hand. Sometimes, though, we can make a bet that serves both functions at once and ends up being profitable as a result. Here's a hand I played last week where that was the case:
Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:
Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66
Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.
*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight.
The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.
In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.
Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot
Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine. But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D
Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:
Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66
Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.
*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight.
The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.
In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.
Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot
Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine. But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Facing Check-Raises and Examining Continuance Ranges
A powerful-yet-underused play at micro/small stakes is the check-raise. I'll talk about employing check-raises at some point in the future, but for now I'll talk about responding to them. For many amateurs, being check-raised is a thoroughly unpleasant experience that puts them off their game and propels them toward mistakes in both the current and ensuing hands. When facing a check-raise, it's important to review board texture, villain tendencies, and any other game implications. Here's a brief example from a hand I played on Sunday:
Seat 1: Big Blind ($23.79 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG ($41.54 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus1 ($74.20 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($51.80 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($74.36 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [4s 3h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [2h 2c 6c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $2
The action folds around to us and we're holding 43 on the button. We make a standard raise hoping to steal, but also prepared to play the hand in position. The big blind calls and the flop is pretty dry with 226 and two clubs. The big blind checks and we bet $2 because A) we have 4 high and can't win this hand unless we improve, B) we have a gut shot straight draw, and C) that flop misses almost all of the big blind's calling range.
Big Blind: raises $5 to $5
The villain check-raises and we're left with a decision. The most obvious play is to fold, as we are guaranteed to be way behind no matter what the villain has and we could simply write it off as a continuation bet that didn't work. Calling is a legitimate option, as it indicates a lot of strength, implying that we have either a 2, a 6, an overpair, or at worst a flush draw. If we call, it's with the intent to bluff the turn (assuming the villain checks). Finally, we can re-raise in order to get the villain to fold out all of their bluffs that were bluffing us on the flop, as well as the occasional underpair to the 6. Whereas it might be appropriate to call here with just ace high for value, as that would be ahead of much of the villain's bluffing range, our 43 can only function as a bluff if we don't improve.
We unfortunately don't have any stats or other reads on the villain and therefore can't say how often he/she check-raises. Consequently, our decision has to be based on how the board connects with the villain's range and how it connects with our perceived range.
Our Perceived Range
Using Hold Em Manager 2 (which I'll discuss in a future post), I can isolate my stats for just the session in which I was playing. For the amount of time I'd sat at the table, I'd been raising on the button 50% of the time. If the villain had been paying attention, he/she is likely to notice that and consequently assume that I'm opening an extremely wide range of hands on the button. Furthermore, because the board is so dry the villain has to expect us to be betting with most of our bluffs. As a result, our post-bet perceived range on the flop is huge, which means we must expect the villain's check-raise to be a bluff a substantial percentage of the time.
Villain's Continuance Range
For the sake of argument, let's say that the villain was calling preflop with ATC (any two cards). Let's also say that the villain check-raises his/her entire range on the flop. If that's the case, and we're attempting to discern the viability of a raise, we need to determine the villain's continuance range, or the hands with which they would continue in the hand in the face of a re-raise from us. To do that, we can use Equilab to separate all the combinations of hands that fit that criteria. If we say that the villain continues with quads, a boat, any 2, any 6, any overpair, or a flush draw, that makes up about 30% of all possible hands. In other words, unless the villain has the capacity for a 4bet flop bluff, which is a very aggressive and rarely-seen play at these stakes, they are folding 70% of their hands to a raise.
However, remember that those numbers are based on the assumption that the villain called with ATC and is playing all the "continuing" hands for a check-raise followed by a call. In reality, the villain's continuance range is almost certainly lower than 30% because even after accounting for a smaller total number of original hands from which to select, if you look at the image above you'll see that there are a lot more combinations of hands with a 2 than we would expect all but the loosest villain to play, e.g. T2, 72, etc. Furthermore, the villain is less likely to call a re-raise with a weak 6 than with a 2, overpair, or flush draw. Finally, the villain would probably just check-call with some of their bigger hands (trip 2s, a boat, etc), especially knowing that I'm bluffing a significant portion of the time, as they wouldn't want me to fold all my air.
Armed with the above information, we need to determine the profitability of a raise. After the villain's check-raise, the pot stands at $10.25. We raise to $10.50, which is the equivalent of betting $8.50 (because our $2 is already out there) into $10.25 (the pot including our $2 and the villain's $5 raise). If we do a little basic math, we'll see that we need our bluff to work 45.33% of the time to be profitable:
($8.50) / ($8.50+$10.25)
($8.50) / ($18.75) = 45.33%
If our evaluation of the villain's continuance range is even remotely in the ballpark, and they're folding over 45.33% of their hands, then it's a profitable raise. The villain does fold, and we take down the hand with 4 high.
Donzo: raises $8.50 to $10.50
Big Blind: folds
To phrase the idea of bet profitability more simply, think of a hand in which there's a $100 pot on the river and the action is on us holding nothing. If we bet $100 (the size of the pot), we need our bluff to work 50% of the time to break even, as 50% of the time the villain will call and we'll lose our $100 bet and 50% of the time the villain will fold and we'll win the $100 in the pot.
Estimating a villain's continuance range can be a difficult task in the moment, but in fairly clear cut situations like the one I've outlined here, having a healthy grasp of the likelihood of a fold is crucial to maximizing profit.
Seat 1: Big Blind ($23.79 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG ($41.54 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus1 ($74.20 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($51.80 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($74.36 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [4s 3h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [2h 2c 6c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $2
The action folds around to us and we're holding 43 on the button. We make a standard raise hoping to steal, but also prepared to play the hand in position. The big blind calls and the flop is pretty dry with 226 and two clubs. The big blind checks and we bet $2 because A) we have 4 high and can't win this hand unless we improve, B) we have a gut shot straight draw, and C) that flop misses almost all of the big blind's calling range.
Big Blind: raises $5 to $5
The villain check-raises and we're left with a decision. The most obvious play is to fold, as we are guaranteed to be way behind no matter what the villain has and we could simply write it off as a continuation bet that didn't work. Calling is a legitimate option, as it indicates a lot of strength, implying that we have either a 2, a 6, an overpair, or at worst a flush draw. If we call, it's with the intent to bluff the turn (assuming the villain checks). Finally, we can re-raise in order to get the villain to fold out all of their bluffs that were bluffing us on the flop, as well as the occasional underpair to the 6. Whereas it might be appropriate to call here with just ace high for value, as that would be ahead of much of the villain's bluffing range, our 43 can only function as a bluff if we don't improve.
We unfortunately don't have any stats or other reads on the villain and therefore can't say how often he/she check-raises. Consequently, our decision has to be based on how the board connects with the villain's range and how it connects with our perceived range.
Our Perceived Range
Using Hold Em Manager 2 (which I'll discuss in a future post), I can isolate my stats for just the session in which I was playing. For the amount of time I'd sat at the table, I'd been raising on the button 50% of the time. If the villain had been paying attention, he/she is likely to notice that and consequently assume that I'm opening an extremely wide range of hands on the button. Furthermore, because the board is so dry the villain has to expect us to be betting with most of our bluffs. As a result, our post-bet perceived range on the flop is huge, which means we must expect the villain's check-raise to be a bluff a substantial percentage of the time.
Villain's Continuance Range
For the sake of argument, let's say that the villain was calling preflop with ATC (any two cards). Let's also say that the villain check-raises his/her entire range on the flop. If that's the case, and we're attempting to discern the viability of a raise, we need to determine the villain's continuance range, or the hands with which they would continue in the hand in the face of a re-raise from us. To do that, we can use Equilab to separate all the combinations of hands that fit that criteria. If we say that the villain continues with quads, a boat, any 2, any 6, any overpair, or a flush draw, that makes up about 30% of all possible hands. In other words, unless the villain has the capacity for a 4bet flop bluff, which is a very aggressive and rarely-seen play at these stakes, they are folding 70% of their hands to a raise.
However, remember that those numbers are based on the assumption that the villain called with ATC and is playing all the "continuing" hands for a check-raise followed by a call. In reality, the villain's continuance range is almost certainly lower than 30% because even after accounting for a smaller total number of original hands from which to select, if you look at the image above you'll see that there are a lot more combinations of hands with a 2 than we would expect all but the loosest villain to play, e.g. T2, 72, etc. Furthermore, the villain is less likely to call a re-raise with a weak 6 than with a 2, overpair, or flush draw. Finally, the villain would probably just check-call with some of their bigger hands (trip 2s, a boat, etc), especially knowing that I'm bluffing a significant portion of the time, as they wouldn't want me to fold all my air.
Armed with the above information, we need to determine the profitability of a raise. After the villain's check-raise, the pot stands at $10.25. We raise to $10.50, which is the equivalent of betting $8.50 (because our $2 is already out there) into $10.25 (the pot including our $2 and the villain's $5 raise). If we do a little basic math, we'll see that we need our bluff to work 45.33% of the time to be profitable:
($8.50) / ($8.50+$10.25)
($8.50) / ($18.75) = 45.33%
If our evaluation of the villain's continuance range is even remotely in the ballpark, and they're folding over 45.33% of their hands, then it's a profitable raise. The villain does fold, and we take down the hand with 4 high.
Donzo: raises $8.50 to $10.50
Big Blind: folds
To phrase the idea of bet profitability more simply, think of a hand in which there's a $100 pot on the river and the action is on us holding nothing. If we bet $100 (the size of the pot), we need our bluff to work 50% of the time to break even, as 50% of the time the villain will call and we'll lose our $100 bet and 50% of the time the villain will fold and we'll win the $100 in the pot.
Estimating a villain's continuance range can be a difficult task in the moment, but in fairly clear cut situations like the one I've outlined here, having a healthy grasp of the likelihood of a fold is crucial to maximizing profit.
Friday, June 21, 2013
Big Hands and Keeping a Clear Head
One of the biggest challenges for amateur players is maintaining an emotionless approach when picking up a huge hand. I cannot count how many times I've seen someone pick up a premium hand and play with little to no regard for the actions of the other players at the table. Playing live gives some insight into the mental state of these players and their thought process goes something like this:
To piggyback on my post from Tuesday, if and when they end up losing their loss is often followed by a lamentation about one or more of A) their terrible luck, B) the inconceivable play of their opponent(s), and C) how they had "no choice" but to play the hand the way they did. "C" is where large amounts of money are needlessly lost. To demonstrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:
Seat 1: Donzo ($50.85 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($39.82 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($70.73 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($52.99 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($68.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50.50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Ah]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus1: calls $1.50
UTGplus2: calls $1.50
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $1.25
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [3s 7d 4c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $4.50
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $4.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
We're dealt aces UTG and make a standard 3x raise. Four people call, which is more than we're hoping to see, but we're still the overwhelming favorite heading into the flop.
The flop comes 374 rainbow (all different suits) and the blinds check to us. Although this is a low flop that initially looks ideal, it's actually not great for our hand because A) there are no larger pairs that could have hit, meaning hands that pair the board are going to have a hard time paying us off, B) there are no potential flush draws, and C) there are only gut shot straight draws, as 56 already has a straight on the flop. That said, we're still usually going to have the best hand and want to bet to get value from hands like A7, a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45), and inferior overpairs to the board. We bet $4.50 into $7.50 for 60% pot and get one caller.
*** TURN *** [3s 7d 4c] [2s]
Donzo: bets $8.50
UTGplus2: raises $17 to $17
Unless the villain floated us with A5 or 22 (or inexplicably was in the hand with 72), the turn is effectively a blank. We again bet for value and are quickly min-raised.
At this point it's helpful to talk about the Baluga Whale Theorem. If you don't want to click the link, it's the idea that when faced with a turn raise, the strength of single pair hands must be seriously reevaluated. When an opponent just calls the flop and raises the turn, they're saying "my hand was strong enough on the flop that I wasn't scared of anything and was willing to let another card come so that I could win more money from you firing a second barrel." It is of course possible that some villains will float with air on the flop and raise the turn, but that's generally a more sophisticated play and not one that you see often at lower limits. Do some players know the Baluga Whale Theorem and use it to bluff? Absolutely, and it's something I expect to see more as I move up in stakes.
Furthermore, if a player is on a draw and is inclined toward playing draws more aggressively, the likelihood of a raise happening on the flop is much greater because A) there is less money invested on the flop than the turn, making a bluff attempt less costly, and B) a raise on the flop, if called, has a strong chance to induce a check on the turn from the original bettor (particularly if the original bettor is first to act), leading to the option for a free card for the raiser.
So, to return to our hand and our villain, what are the reasonable hands for him/her to have? If we consider the hands that had us beat on the flop, there are 9 possible set combinations and 16 straight combinations. Let's also include the 1 combination of A7 of spades, as that's a hand that might've originally called for value, but wants to turn the hand into a bluff now that we've fired a second barrel. If we assume that the villain is only raising those hands and we plug them into Equilab, we have an atrocious 7.5% equity with one card to come. But what if they're sometimes raising worse overpairs for value? If we add 88-KK into the villain's range, our equity skyrockets to 58.6%. But if we just take a moment to review the preflop action, we will see how unlikely most of those hands are. The villain is in the cutoff and there was a caller prior to the action getting to him/her. While a flat call with a big pocket pair sometimes happens in response to just the original raiser, it's something one rarely sees when a third person is involved in a pot, not to mention the dealer and blinds who have yet to act. Consequently, the likelihood of KK or QQ is slim to none, as is the likelihood of JJ or TT, although I'll leave a slightly possibility for those to the arbitrary tune of 25% of the time. 99 and 88 are believable calling hands both preflop and on the flop, but what would the purpose of the turn raise be? Value raising my extremely specific UTG betting range of A7, or just hoping for a tilted call with AK? It doesn't make much sense, but allowing the possibility that the villain also plays those hands that way 25% of the time, and factoring in our removal of KK and QQ and the reduced likelihood of JJ and TT, we come up with equity of 24%.
The last factors to take into account are the raise size and pot odds. As the villain min-raised, we are getting excellent pot odds of 17%. However, considering the strength indicated by the villain's line, we are looking at a strong-to-inevitable chance of facing an all-in on the river. That means that we're not actually looking at calling $8.50 to win $42, we're calling $36.35 (our current stack size) to win $69.85 (what the pot will be after the villain's shove for my remaining $27.85 after I call $8.50). That gives us odds of 34%. If our above range assignment is accurate (or close to it), we don't have the right odds to make the call and should therefore fold, which I did.
Donzo: folds
*** SUMMARY ***
Seat 3: UTGplus2 showed [3d 3h] and won ($31.85)
The villain didn't show at the time, but we can see now that he/she had 33 for a flopped set. Does that mean that the villain will NEVER have a worse hand? No, but the point is to determine how likely that is, and without a read that the villain is extremely aggressive or willing to raise lighter for value, we can't assume that they're taking that line with only a single pair. And because we didn't allow ourselves to become emotionally invested in our aces and left our brain in the "On" position, we were able to escape the hand losing only 29 big blinds instead of 100.
To piggyback on my post from Tuesday, if and when they end up losing their loss is often followed by a lamentation about one or more of A) their terrible luck, B) the inconceivable play of their opponent(s), and C) how they had "no choice" but to play the hand the way they did. "C" is where large amounts of money are needlessly lost. To demonstrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:
Seat 1: Donzo ($50.85 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($39.82 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($70.73 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($52.99 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($68.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50.50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Ah]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus1: calls $1.50
UTGplus2: calls $1.50
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $1.25
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [3s 7d 4c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $4.50
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $4.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
We're dealt aces UTG and make a standard 3x raise. Four people call, which is more than we're hoping to see, but we're still the overwhelming favorite heading into the flop.
The flop comes 374 rainbow (all different suits) and the blinds check to us. Although this is a low flop that initially looks ideal, it's actually not great for our hand because A) there are no larger pairs that could have hit, meaning hands that pair the board are going to have a hard time paying us off, B) there are no potential flush draws, and C) there are only gut shot straight draws, as 56 already has a straight on the flop. That said, we're still usually going to have the best hand and want to bet to get value from hands like A7, a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45), and inferior overpairs to the board. We bet $4.50 into $7.50 for 60% pot and get one caller.
*** TURN *** [3s 7d 4c] [2s]
Donzo: bets $8.50
UTGplus2: raises $17 to $17
Unless the villain floated us with A5 or 22 (or inexplicably was in the hand with 72), the turn is effectively a blank. We again bet for value and are quickly min-raised.
At this point it's helpful to talk about the Baluga Whale Theorem. If you don't want to click the link, it's the idea that when faced with a turn raise, the strength of single pair hands must be seriously reevaluated. When an opponent just calls the flop and raises the turn, they're saying "my hand was strong enough on the flop that I wasn't scared of anything and was willing to let another card come so that I could win more money from you firing a second barrel." It is of course possible that some villains will float with air on the flop and raise the turn, but that's generally a more sophisticated play and not one that you see often at lower limits. Do some players know the Baluga Whale Theorem and use it to bluff? Absolutely, and it's something I expect to see more as I move up in stakes.
Furthermore, if a player is on a draw and is inclined toward playing draws more aggressively, the likelihood of a raise happening on the flop is much greater because A) there is less money invested on the flop than the turn, making a bluff attempt less costly, and B) a raise on the flop, if called, has a strong chance to induce a check on the turn from the original bettor (particularly if the original bettor is first to act), leading to the option for a free card for the raiser.
So, to return to our hand and our villain, what are the reasonable hands for him/her to have? If we consider the hands that had us beat on the flop, there are 9 possible set combinations and 16 straight combinations. Let's also include the 1 combination of A7 of spades, as that's a hand that might've originally called for value, but wants to turn the hand into a bluff now that we've fired a second barrel. If we assume that the villain is only raising those hands and we plug them into Equilab, we have an atrocious 7.5% equity with one card to come. But what if they're sometimes raising worse overpairs for value? If we add 88-KK into the villain's range, our equity skyrockets to 58.6%. But if we just take a moment to review the preflop action, we will see how unlikely most of those hands are. The villain is in the cutoff and there was a caller prior to the action getting to him/her. While a flat call with a big pocket pair sometimes happens in response to just the original raiser, it's something one rarely sees when a third person is involved in a pot, not to mention the dealer and blinds who have yet to act. Consequently, the likelihood of KK or QQ is slim to none, as is the likelihood of JJ or TT, although I'll leave a slightly possibility for those to the arbitrary tune of 25% of the time. 99 and 88 are believable calling hands both preflop and on the flop, but what would the purpose of the turn raise be? Value raising my extremely specific UTG betting range of A7, or just hoping for a tilted call with AK? It doesn't make much sense, but allowing the possibility that the villain also plays those hands that way 25% of the time, and factoring in our removal of KK and QQ and the reduced likelihood of JJ and TT, we come up with equity of 24%.
The last factors to take into account are the raise size and pot odds. As the villain min-raised, we are getting excellent pot odds of 17%. However, considering the strength indicated by the villain's line, we are looking at a strong-to-inevitable chance of facing an all-in on the river. That means that we're not actually looking at calling $8.50 to win $42, we're calling $36.35 (our current stack size) to win $69.85 (what the pot will be after the villain's shove for my remaining $27.85 after I call $8.50). That gives us odds of 34%. If our above range assignment is accurate (or close to it), we don't have the right odds to make the call and should therefore fold, which I did.
Donzo: folds
*** SUMMARY ***
Seat 3: UTGplus2 showed [3d 3h] and won ($31.85)
The villain didn't show at the time, but we can see now that he/she had 33 for a flopped set. Does that mean that the villain will NEVER have a worse hand? No, but the point is to determine how likely that is, and without a read that the villain is extremely aggressive or willing to raise lighter for value, we can't assume that they're taking that line with only a single pair. And because we didn't allow ourselves to become emotionally invested in our aces and left our brain in the "On" position, we were able to escape the hand losing only 29 big blinds instead of 100.
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
Avoiding the Blame Game and Taking the Opportunity to Learn
A hallmark of the fish's mindset is the belief that everyone is terrible and the only reason they are losing money is because no one except them knows how to play poker. The most vocal complaints usually come after losing a hand in which their opponent either A) called preflop with a weak hand that then outdrew them or B) called a bet on the river with a weaker hand than they "should" have. The irony of accusing players of being "too bad to beat" is usually lost on these types. Rather than simplifying their game against a player that "can't fold" and taking most bluffs off the table, they instead insist on playing a tone deaf game that doesn't take into account differing circumstances, such as calling station opponents or the implausibility of the "story" they're telling with their bet(s). I love seeing players freak out in such a way, both because it's amusing and because it reveals them for the inferior players that they are. These players are determined to make sure you know that they know how to play, it's everyone else's fault for being too stupid to know what they're supposed to do.
Watch the best players in the world--guys like Ivey, Galfond, Dwan--and you'll notice that they never complain about the way their opponent plays a hand. When they lose, if they say anything at all it's usually "nice hand" and then they move on. I can think of three reasons that all aspiring poker players should emulate that approach:
1) You won't look like a whiny asshole and will demonstrate that you have the confidence to allow your play to speak for itself.
2) The act of getting upset about a hand is by definition an aggravation of one's emotions, so the more one allows oneself to get upset or vocal or complain, the more likely it is to put you in a tilted or sub-optimal state of mind for playing.
3) If a player is insistent that the fault lies with the other player for how they played the hand, then that player is depriving him/herself of the chance to learn something. Rather than saying to oneself, "could I have played that hand differently?" the player is too absorbed with preserving their ego to use the experience as an opportunity to get better.
To illustrate reason #3, let's look at a hand I played last week (my explanation of how I played the hand will be brief):
Seat 1: Small Blind ($60.81 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($53.30 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($61.60 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($63.86 in chips)
Seat 6: Dealer ($32.43 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2d 5h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.50
Dealer: calls $0.50
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: checks
*** FLOP *** [3c 7h 3h]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: checks
Dealer: checks
*** TURN *** [3c 7h 3h] [5c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $1.50
Dealer: folds
Donzo: calls $1.50
*** RIVER *** [3c 7h 3h 5c] [Kh]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $4.75
Donzo: calls $4.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [4c Qc] (a pair of Threes)
Donzo: shows [2d 5h] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo collected $13.55 from pot
We're dealt 52 in the big blind and we see a free flop 3-handed. The 373 flop is dry and everyone checks. The turn gives us a 5 and also puts a club flush draw out there. We check again and the villain bets the size of the pot. The other player folds and we call. Although it's possible that the villain was slow-playing trip 3s or has a better 5, they're most likely betting either a club flush draw or air. The river brings the K and a third heart. We check and the villain again bets the size of the pot. While it's a scary card, it's important to remember that the villain didn't bet on the flop, which, if he/she were holding two hearts, is almost a mandatory bet on such an otherwise dry board. Consequently, a flush is extremely unlikely. It's possible that the K hit a part of the villain's bluffing range, but it still missed most of his air hands. We make the call and the villain shows Q4 of clubs for a missed flush.
After I called, the villain and I had a brief chat...
Villain: Really?
Me: Yes, really.
Villain: When I die, I'm going to ask God if people cheated at online poker, or if they were really just that bad.
Me: Then you're asking the wrong question.
My meaning was probably lost on the player, but what he should be asking God (or himself) is, "Why didn't I try to figure out what I did wrong in poker, rather than blaming anyone but myself?" Instead, the villain's thought process amounted to, "He only had a pair of fives, how the hell could he call me with a K and three hearts out there?!?!?!"
Don't play the blame game and don't be a whiny player. Always, always, always try to learn something.
Watch the best players in the world--guys like Ivey, Galfond, Dwan--and you'll notice that they never complain about the way their opponent plays a hand. When they lose, if they say anything at all it's usually "nice hand" and then they move on. I can think of three reasons that all aspiring poker players should emulate that approach:
1) You won't look like a whiny asshole and will demonstrate that you have the confidence to allow your play to speak for itself.
2) The act of getting upset about a hand is by definition an aggravation of one's emotions, so the more one allows oneself to get upset or vocal or complain, the more likely it is to put you in a tilted or sub-optimal state of mind for playing.
3) If a player is insistent that the fault lies with the other player for how they played the hand, then that player is depriving him/herself of the chance to learn something. Rather than saying to oneself, "could I have played that hand differently?" the player is too absorbed with preserving their ego to use the experience as an opportunity to get better.
To illustrate reason #3, let's look at a hand I played last week (my explanation of how I played the hand will be brief):
Seat 1: Small Blind ($60.81 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($53.30 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($61.60 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($63.86 in chips)
Seat 6: Dealer ($32.43 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2d 5h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.50
Dealer: calls $0.50
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: checks
*** FLOP *** [3c 7h 3h]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: checks
Dealer: checks
*** TURN *** [3c 7h 3h] [5c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $1.50
Dealer: folds
Donzo: calls $1.50
*** RIVER *** [3c 7h 3h 5c] [Kh]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $4.75
Donzo: calls $4.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [4c Qc] (a pair of Threes)
Donzo: shows [2d 5h] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo collected $13.55 from pot
We're dealt 52 in the big blind and we see a free flop 3-handed. The 373 flop is dry and everyone checks. The turn gives us a 5 and also puts a club flush draw out there. We check again and the villain bets the size of the pot. The other player folds and we call. Although it's possible that the villain was slow-playing trip 3s or has a better 5, they're most likely betting either a club flush draw or air. The river brings the K and a third heart. We check and the villain again bets the size of the pot. While it's a scary card, it's important to remember that the villain didn't bet on the flop, which, if he/she were holding two hearts, is almost a mandatory bet on such an otherwise dry board. Consequently, a flush is extremely unlikely. It's possible that the K hit a part of the villain's bluffing range, but it still missed most of his air hands. We make the call and the villain shows Q4 of clubs for a missed flush.
After I called, the villain and I had a brief chat...
Villain: Really?
Me: Yes, really.
Villain: When I die, I'm going to ask God if people cheated at online poker, or if they were really just that bad.
Me: Then you're asking the wrong question.
My meaning was probably lost on the player, but what he should be asking God (or himself) is, "Why didn't I try to figure out what I did wrong in poker, rather than blaming anyone but myself?" Instead, the villain's thought process amounted to, "He only had a pair of fives, how the hell could he call me with a K and three hearts out there?!?!?!"
Don't play the blame game and don't be a whiny player. Always, always, always try to learn something.
Friday, June 14, 2013
Premium Hands and Not Being Ruled By Fear
When many amateurs pick up a premium hand, they don't know any other way to play it than "fast," i.e. raising at every opportunity and/or betting large whenever possible. In reality, it is a slightly different manifestation of the fear I talked about in this post. Players are afraid that if they have to make a post-flop decision they will make the wrong one and don't want to deal with the discomfort of such a decision. Therefore, they raise, period. While such "fast playing" is sometimes the best way to play a big hand, it is not always the most profitable. As an example, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:
Seat 2: Donzo ($62.87 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($47.27 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($71.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qh Qd]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus2: raises $4.75 to $4.75
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
We're playing 4-handed and are dealt QQ in the cutoff (to the right of the button) and make a standard 3x raise. The button (identified above as UTGplus2 because it was technically a dead button) 3-bets us to $4.75 and the blinds fold. At this point we need to figure out our best course of action. Unless we have a crazy read and know that this player is only 3-betting AA and KK, there's no way we can fold here, particularly 4-handed. A raise is a definite possibility for a few reasons:
1) The villain's range is inherently wider because of the fact that we're raising from the cutoff, which means the villain knows our range is wider than it would be from an earlier position, and therefore their 3-betting range should be wider.
2) We want to get maximum value for our big hand and the villain may not be able to fold a strong-but-inferior hand.
3) We are content to potentially fold out some hands that are behind, but have significant equity against us, particularly as we are out of position.
However, some of those reasons are exactly why we shouldn't raise. If the villain is raising with a hand like, say, T9 or AJ, we don't want those hands to fold. By just calling out of position, we can appear the reluctant/passive player and present the opportunity for the villain to bluff with all hands that miss. We definitely want to avoid folding out hands like 99-JJ, which are way behind us but will find some of the same flops attractive/non-scary. Even if we assign a fairly conservative range of 99+ and AJ+ (leaving out plausible hands like KQ, JT, or T9), our equity against the villain's range is about 61%. If we were to raise, the plausible calling/re-raising range shrinks to about 51%, a virtual coin flip. With that in mind, we just call.
Donzo: calls $3.25
*** FLOP *** [8h 2h 8s]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $10.25
The flop is excellent for us, as it all but assures we have the best hand so long as our opponent doesn't have AA or KK (or an aggressively played mid-range hand like 98). We could bet here to get value out of hands like the aforementioned 99-JJ, but then we've caused all the ace high hands (and potential other missed hands) to fold. Instead we check, and the villain bets the size of the pot. This is interesting for two reasons: 1) it's a large bet on an extremely dry board; except for the flush draw, there is no reason for the villain to be concerned about all the combinations to which we might hypothetically be drawing. In other words, if the villain had KK or AA, he virtually assures I'm folding everything from which he wants to get value, except for 99-QQ, and is therefore not extracting maximum value. While there are some players who bet the size of the pot just as a regular matter of course, they are in the minority. 2) If I call, there will be about $31 in the pot and the villain will have $32 remaining, meaning that I may need to deal with an all-in on the turn or river. While there is some concern that this could be an aggressively-played KK or AA, we should be happy about the spot we're in and likely prepared to call such an all-in depending on the card(s) that come.
Donzo: calls $10.25
*** TURN *** [8h 2h 8s] [4c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $32.27 and is all-in
We check and, as anticipated, the villain moves all-in. While it's a large, potentially intimidating bet, the important thing to remember is that nothing has changed--the villain is still making a large bet on a dry board and the likelihood of him holding a hand like AK, AQ, or a random worse hand is still the same, as our actions have done nothing to indicate that we have a hand as strong as QQ. We call and the villain shows AK.
Donzo: calls $32.27
*** RIVER *** [8h 2h 8s 4c] [6s]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qh Qd] (two pair, Queens and Eights)
UTGplus2: shows [Ac Kh] (a pair of Eights)
Donzo collected $93.29 from pot
If we had re-raised preflop, the villain likely would have shoved, and we'd have called and been a slight favorite with 57% equity. Instead, because we were prepared to deal with a somewhat difficult decision, we gave the villain the opportunity to bluff off his entire stack and got it all-in with the villain drawing to 6 outs on the river, giving us 86% equity.
Will the villain show up with AA or KK sometimes? Of course. But again, we should be happy with our decision regardless of the outcome, if our logic is good.
Seat 2: Donzo ($62.87 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($47.27 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($71.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qh Qd]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus2: raises $4.75 to $4.75
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
We're playing 4-handed and are dealt QQ in the cutoff (to the right of the button) and make a standard 3x raise. The button (identified above as UTGplus2 because it was technically a dead button) 3-bets us to $4.75 and the blinds fold. At this point we need to figure out our best course of action. Unless we have a crazy read and know that this player is only 3-betting AA and KK, there's no way we can fold here, particularly 4-handed. A raise is a definite possibility for a few reasons:
1) The villain's range is inherently wider because of the fact that we're raising from the cutoff, which means the villain knows our range is wider than it would be from an earlier position, and therefore their 3-betting range should be wider.
2) We want to get maximum value for our big hand and the villain may not be able to fold a strong-but-inferior hand.
3) We are content to potentially fold out some hands that are behind, but have significant equity against us, particularly as we are out of position.
However, some of those reasons are exactly why we shouldn't raise. If the villain is raising with a hand like, say, T9 or AJ, we don't want those hands to fold. By just calling out of position, we can appear the reluctant/passive player and present the opportunity for the villain to bluff with all hands that miss. We definitely want to avoid folding out hands like 99-JJ, which are way behind us but will find some of the same flops attractive/non-scary. Even if we assign a fairly conservative range of 99+ and AJ+ (leaving out plausible hands like KQ, JT, or T9), our equity against the villain's range is about 61%. If we were to raise, the plausible calling/re-raising range shrinks to about 51%, a virtual coin flip. With that in mind, we just call.
Donzo: calls $3.25
*** FLOP *** [8h 2h 8s]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $10.25
The flop is excellent for us, as it all but assures we have the best hand so long as our opponent doesn't have AA or KK (or an aggressively played mid-range hand like 98). We could bet here to get value out of hands like the aforementioned 99-JJ, but then we've caused all the ace high hands (and potential other missed hands) to fold. Instead we check, and the villain bets the size of the pot. This is interesting for two reasons: 1) it's a large bet on an extremely dry board; except for the flush draw, there is no reason for the villain to be concerned about all the combinations to which we might hypothetically be drawing. In other words, if the villain had KK or AA, he virtually assures I'm folding everything from which he wants to get value, except for 99-QQ, and is therefore not extracting maximum value. While there are some players who bet the size of the pot just as a regular matter of course, they are in the minority. 2) If I call, there will be about $31 in the pot and the villain will have $32 remaining, meaning that I may need to deal with an all-in on the turn or river. While there is some concern that this could be an aggressively-played KK or AA, we should be happy about the spot we're in and likely prepared to call such an all-in depending on the card(s) that come.
Donzo: calls $10.25
*** TURN *** [8h 2h 8s] [4c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $32.27 and is all-in
We check and, as anticipated, the villain moves all-in. While it's a large, potentially intimidating bet, the important thing to remember is that nothing has changed--the villain is still making a large bet on a dry board and the likelihood of him holding a hand like AK, AQ, or a random worse hand is still the same, as our actions have done nothing to indicate that we have a hand as strong as QQ. We call and the villain shows AK.
Donzo: calls $32.27
*** RIVER *** [8h 2h 8s 4c] [6s]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qh Qd] (two pair, Queens and Eights)
UTGplus2: shows [Ac Kh] (a pair of Eights)
Donzo collected $93.29 from pot
If we had re-raised preflop, the villain likely would have shoved, and we'd have called and been a slight favorite with 57% equity. Instead, because we were prepared to deal with a somewhat difficult decision, we gave the villain the opportunity to bluff off his entire stack and got it all-in with the villain drawing to 6 outs on the river, giving us 86% equity.
Will the villain show up with AA or KK sometimes? Of course. But again, we should be happy with our decision regardless of the outcome, if our logic is good.
Monday, June 10, 2013
Recognizing Mistakes Despite Winning
Even for players who know that aptitude in poker cannot be tied to winning any particular hand or session, it's easy to forgo self-examination when making money. But it's crucial to examine hands where we made money, but played sub-optimally, to see if we could do something different in a similar situation in the future. To illustrate, let's look at a hand that I won, but involved a big mistake:
Seat 1: UTG ($38.10 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($36.01 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($42.17 in chips)
Seat 5: Donzo ($32.20 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($18.20 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ks Ah]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
Dealer: folds
Donzo: raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind: folds
UTGplus1: raises $5 to $5.25
Donzo: raises $13.72 to $14.72
UTGplus1: calls $9.47
We're dealt AK in the small blind and raise the only limper for value. Surprisingly, the limper 3-bets for over 5x my bet. While I'm a little concerned about AA or KK, we're still ahead or flipping with most of the villain's range. I 4-bet for a little under 3x and the villain calls.
*** FLOP *** [Qh Ad 8c]
We flop the ace and it's our action first. At the time, my thought process was something along the lines of "I've been playing aggressively and if I had been bluffing and an ace flopped I would bet, therefore I should also bet with my made hands for balance." This was the completely wrong line of thinking for a couple of reasons:
1) Anonymous Players. On Bovada, there are no player names--players only have the designation of Player 1, Player 2, etc. What that means is that (so far as I know) no one can have any stats or notes on the player other than what they've noted during that session. So while I might run into this player again, I won't know it because they'll be indicated as "Player ___." Therefore, there is little benefit to worrying about "meta game" considerations whereby it would be useful for my opponents to know I will bet or bluff in the same spot.
2) The villain's calling range that we can beat is extremely narrow and possibly non-existent. Unless the villain has reason to think that I'm a player willing to 4-bet and then shove with nothing, he/she is probably not going to call a shove with worse than an ace here. AK is never folding, we're crushed by AQ, and worse aces like AJ or AT would have to put serious thought into calling a raise here, as those hands are effectively bluff catchers, as is any (improbable) weaker ace. As for plausible hands that beat us, we are crushed by the one combination of AA in the deck as well as QQ and 88. Any other pocket pair is almost certainly folding (unless the villain is capable of making a very light call down for a lot of money, which is unlikely at these stakes) as are oddly-played hands with a Q (KQ, QJ, QT, etc). So we're left with a couple of worse hands that might call and everything else folding.
Unfortunately, I didn't go through all of that in my head at the time. All I was thinking was "blah blah, meta game, blah blah." I bet and the the villain folded:
Donzo: bets $17.48 and is all-in
UTGplus1: folds
Uncalled bet ($17.48) returned to Donzo
Donzo: shows [Ks Ah]
Donzo collected $28.21 from pot
In other words, I did exactly what I spoke against doing a couple posts ago: I made a bet that virtually ensured all worse hands would fold and all better hands would call.
Plenty of people would be happy to take down a 112 big blind pot with AK out of position. My point is that we shouldn't be. We should always look for ways that we could have played a hand differently, whether we won or not.
Seat 1: UTG ($38.10 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($36.01 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($42.17 in chips)
Seat 5: Donzo ($32.20 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($18.20 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ks Ah]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
Dealer: folds
Donzo: raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind: folds
UTGplus1: raises $5 to $5.25
Donzo: raises $13.72 to $14.72
UTGplus1: calls $9.47
We're dealt AK in the small blind and raise the only limper for value. Surprisingly, the limper 3-bets for over 5x my bet. While I'm a little concerned about AA or KK, we're still ahead or flipping with most of the villain's range. I 4-bet for a little under 3x and the villain calls.
*** FLOP *** [Qh Ad 8c]
We flop the ace and it's our action first. At the time, my thought process was something along the lines of "I've been playing aggressively and if I had been bluffing and an ace flopped I would bet, therefore I should also bet with my made hands for balance." This was the completely wrong line of thinking for a couple of reasons:
1) Anonymous Players. On Bovada, there are no player names--players only have the designation of Player 1, Player 2, etc. What that means is that (so far as I know) no one can have any stats or notes on the player other than what they've noted during that session. So while I might run into this player again, I won't know it because they'll be indicated as "Player ___." Therefore, there is little benefit to worrying about "meta game" considerations whereby it would be useful for my opponents to know I will bet or bluff in the same spot.
2) The villain's calling range that we can beat is extremely narrow and possibly non-existent. Unless the villain has reason to think that I'm a player willing to 4-bet and then shove with nothing, he/she is probably not going to call a shove with worse than an ace here. AK is never folding, we're crushed by AQ, and worse aces like AJ or AT would have to put serious thought into calling a raise here, as those hands are effectively bluff catchers, as is any (improbable) weaker ace. As for plausible hands that beat us, we are crushed by the one combination of AA in the deck as well as QQ and 88. Any other pocket pair is almost certainly folding (unless the villain is capable of making a very light call down for a lot of money, which is unlikely at these stakes) as are oddly-played hands with a Q (KQ, QJ, QT, etc). So we're left with a couple of worse hands that might call and everything else folding.
Unfortunately, I didn't go through all of that in my head at the time. All I was thinking was "blah blah, meta game, blah blah." I bet and the the villain folded:
Donzo: bets $17.48 and is all-in
UTGplus1: folds
Uncalled bet ($17.48) returned to Donzo
Donzo: shows [Ks Ah]
Donzo collected $28.21 from pot
In other words, I did exactly what I spoke against doing a couple posts ago: I made a bet that virtually ensured all worse hands would fold and all better hands would call.
Plenty of people would be happy to take down a 112 big blind pot with AK out of position. My point is that we shouldn't be. We should always look for ways that we could have played a hand differently, whether we won or not.
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Tricky Spots and Timing Tells
Few things in NLHE are less fun than being put to a decision knowing you're either crushed or slightly ahead of your opponent. At such times my inclination is usually to fold and "wait for a better spot." While that is often the correct course of action, there are times when a call or raise with a made hand is the most profitable choice. Let's look at a hand I played last week where I was faced with just such a decision:
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($24.03 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($20.33 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($28.97 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($15.79 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($72.39 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
UTGplus1: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Jd]
Donzo: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: calls $0.75
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2s 6s Ad]
Donzo: bets $1.50
UTGplus1: raises $6.85 to $6.85
I'm UTG with AJ and raise to 4x due to the UTG+1 player (hereafter "villain") who posted their blind out of position. The villain calls and everyone else folds. The flop is good for me, as I flop top pair and am usually going to have the best hand. I bet $1.50 and it takes the villain less than a second to raise to $6.85. At this point, I'm going to say that there are a couple of different probable ranges for the villain to have. If we give the villain a range of two pair, a set, and any flush draw (including flush draws with a gutshot straight draw), Equilab tells us that our equity is 54%. If we expand the villain's range to include AK and AQ, our equity drops to 40%. I'm more inclined to drop AK and AQ out of the villain's range considering the lack of a 3bet, but it's not inconceivable.
We're now faced with what is essentially an all-in decision. I say that because if we call the villain's raise of $6.85, after rake we'll be looking at a pot of around $15 and the villain will have about $16 behind, leaving enough for roughly a pot-size bet on the turn, which considering the raise on the flop we have to expect on the turn the majority of the time. Therefore, in a vacuum, we might be inclined to fold here.
However, let's take a look at the raise again, which is notable for a couple of reasons. First, the size of the raise is large; the villain has made it about 4.5x my bet. Second, the raise was put in extremely quickly. What that means is that the villain had already made the decision about what to do prior to me putting in my bet. They had their mouse cursor waiting to hit the "pot" button to make a pot-size raise and then clicked raise.
Timing Tells
Donzo: raises $21.40 to $22.90
UTGplus1: raises $0.13 to $23.03 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $0.13
*** TURN *** [2s 6s Ad] [4s]
*** RIVER *** [2s 6s Ad 4s] [4h]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [7s As] (a flush, Ace high)
Donzo: shows [Ac Jd] (two pair, Aces and Jacks)
UTGplus1 collected $46.41 from pot
I shove all-in, the villain calls and shows an ace with a flush draw and turns the 4 of spades for the flush. Going back to Equilab, my equity at the time of the shove was 52%, giving me the slight edge in EV. But again, the correctness (or incorrectness) of the decision lies with the pre-conclusion analysis.
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($24.03 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($20.33 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($28.97 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($15.79 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($72.39 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
UTGplus1: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Jd]
Donzo: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: calls $0.75
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2s 6s Ad]
Donzo: bets $1.50
UTGplus1: raises $6.85 to $6.85
I'm UTG with AJ and raise to 4x due to the UTG+1 player (hereafter "villain") who posted their blind out of position. The villain calls and everyone else folds. The flop is good for me, as I flop top pair and am usually going to have the best hand. I bet $1.50 and it takes the villain less than a second to raise to $6.85. At this point, I'm going to say that there are a couple of different probable ranges for the villain to have. If we give the villain a range of two pair, a set, and any flush draw (including flush draws with a gutshot straight draw), Equilab tells us that our equity is 54%. If we expand the villain's range to include AK and AQ, our equity drops to 40%. I'm more inclined to drop AK and AQ out of the villain's range considering the lack of a 3bet, but it's not inconceivable.
We're now faced with what is essentially an all-in decision. I say that because if we call the villain's raise of $6.85, after rake we'll be looking at a pot of around $15 and the villain will have about $16 behind, leaving enough for roughly a pot-size bet on the turn, which considering the raise on the flop we have to expect on the turn the majority of the time. Therefore, in a vacuum, we might be inclined to fold here.
However, let's take a look at the raise again, which is notable for a couple of reasons. First, the size of the raise is large; the villain has made it about 4.5x my bet. Second, the raise was put in extremely quickly. What that means is that the villain had already made the decision about what to do prior to me putting in my bet. They had their mouse cursor waiting to hit the "pot" button to make a pot-size raise and then clicked raise.
Timing Tells
So, what do those two pieces of information tell us? In my experience, a
rapidly executed, large raise is usually the online version of aggressive
table talk and false bravado. It's saying (loudly), "I am so strong
here that I was ready to raise you instantly, so you'd better fold if
you know what's good for you." Of course we all know poker players
are a bunch of liars, so to quote Mike Caro, as players we should "figure out what your opponent wants you to do and disappoint them." If we're right about the range indicated by the size and speed of the raise, this increases the likelihood of a flush draw, combo draw, or pair+draw, while still allowing for a number of combinations of stronger made hands that are afraid to let draws chase. Consequently, I decide to shove all-in to get value out of all the hands I'm beating here, while still acknowledging and being fine with the fact that sometimes the villain will have me crushed. It's important to note that I am raising almost exclusively for value here, not as a bluff, as I expect the villain to call close to 100% of the time with all his/her hands. While it's possible that the villain would fold to a shove holding AK or AQ, the aggression of the flop raise and possibility that I could also be on a draw makes that highly unlikely.
Donzo: raises $21.40 to $22.90
UTGplus1: raises $0.13 to $23.03 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $0.13
*** TURN *** [2s 6s Ad] [4s]
*** RIVER *** [2s 6s Ad 4s] [4h]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [7s As] (a flush, Ace high)
Donzo: shows [Ac Jd] (two pair, Aces and Jacks)
UTGplus1 collected $46.41 from pot
I shove all-in, the villain calls and shows an ace with a flush draw and turns the 4 of spades for the flush. Going back to Equilab, my equity at the time of the shove was 52%, giving me the slight edge in EV. But again, the correctness (or incorrectness) of the decision lies with the pre-conclusion analysis.
Monday, June 3, 2013
Optimistic Overweighting
I want to talk about an important phenomenon I call "optimistic overweighting." Whether they realize it or not, this is something that almost every poker player does and some do it constantly, to the detriment of their game. By optimistic overweighting, I'm referring to the practice of believing your opponent has more bluffs in his or her range than they actually do. To illustrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:
Seat 2: Small Blind [ME] ($32.09 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($20.96 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($11.64 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($28.33 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Small Blind [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd Ah]
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [4s 9h]
UTG : Card dealt to a spot [Jh 5h]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [Qc 5c]
UTG : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.25
Small Blind [ME] : Raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.75
Preflop is pretty standard, we're 4-handed and the dealer limps on the button, so I raise to 4x for value and get called.
*** FLOP *** [9d Tc Ac]
Small Blind [ME] : Bets $1.50
Dealer : Calls $1.50
Flop is perfectly fine, as I flop top pair and the board has a lot of potential draws in addition to inferior aces. The 9 and T are slightly concerning, as they fill in A9 and AT, which would have been good hands from which to extract value, but those hands are still a small part of the villain's range. I bet $1.50 into $2 and get called.
*** TURN *** [9d Tc Ac] [2d]
Small Blind [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $2.62
Small Blind [ME] : Calls $2.62
I don't like my check here. I sometimes will check the turn after betting the flop because it's a line that says "I took a stab at it and you didn't fold, so now I'm showing weakness." Such a line can often get you a second street of value on the river when a bet on the turn might have persuaded a lower limit player to fold what had been an optimistic hand on the flop. However, in retrospect there are still a ton of draws on the turn, including some suited straight draws and suited aces with diamonds that picked up flush draws with the 2, that I should have bet again for value. In any event, the villain bets about 1/2 pot after I check. This doesn't give me much information, as they could be betting any of their draws, a set, or two pair. It does reduce the likelihood of a weak ace with or without a flush draw, as those hands will usually get checked behind if the villain isn't spewy. I assigned the villain a range of any club draw, a set that isn't 22, any open ended straight draw (OESD) or double belly buster draw, any two pair (although I took out about 2/3 of the combinations of 92 and T2 because those are less likely), and any ace high diamond draw.
*** RIVER *** [9d Tc Ac 2d] [9c]
Small Blind [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $5.24
The 9 brings in the club flush and creates a bit of a pickle. On one hand the flush has come in, which was the most logical hand to which the villain could be drawing. On the other hand the villain has missed all of their straight draws. To figure out the best course of action, I went back to Equilab to take out all combinations that had just an A (with the exception of AK) as well as A2 and T2 on account of getting counterfeited (since those hands would almost certainly check behind). That leaves us with a range of AA, 99, TT, AT, a flush, or a missed straight draw. There are a total of 44 missed straight draws and 71 made hands that beat us. Taken as a straight percentage, that means we beat 38% of the combinations that could logically be betting here. As the villain bet $5.24 into about $9.50 after rake, we need to win a little over 26% of the time for our call to be profitable. Since the villain has 38% bluffs in his/her range, that should make this an easy call, right?
Weighting the Range
Not so fast. The call is only correct if we are right in thinking that the villain is equally likely to bet all of those missed draws as to value bet all those made hands. Against all but the most aggressive opponents, this is not the case. Sometimes they are going to bet their missed draws and sometimes they're going to check behind. The key is figuring out how often they bet those draws. So if our target percentage to make the call is 26%, that means that the villain needs to be bluffing with 26% of their total range, or 30 combinations: (44+71)*(.26) = 29.9 combinations
We then take that number of combinations and divide it by the total number of missed draws: 29.9/44 = 68%. Therefore, if the villain is bluffing about 2/3 of the time with a missed straight draw, we call. If they are bluffing less often than that, we fold.
So how often is the villain bluffing with a missed draw? Well that's where things get tricky. Playing on Bovada, there is no ability to save notes due to playing with random players, so it's difficult to know how aggressive your opponents are at betting draws. Furthermore, there's no HUD to use for tracking players, so I don't have stats on this opponent's aggression level. The best we can do is extrapolate based on the tendencies shown up to this point at the table as well as any other information. In that vein, there are two pieces of information that I neglected to adequately factor into my decision. First, that I had lost a hand to this villain earlier in the session in which he/she was making a modest bet for value. Second, I have yet to see this villain bet or raise without a strong hand.
If I had taken the time to lay it out in those explicit terms, I might have decided to fold. As it is, I called and the villain showed Q5 of clubs for a rivered flush. That said, I started this post with the intent of showing what a bad decision I made, but after running through the numbers it's not as bad as I thought. Without access to solid stats it's difficult to say definitely how good or bad the call was, but the important takeaway is that it's useful to play with ranges to figure out how likely it is that your opponent is bluffing on the river and what circumstances are necessary to make a profitable call.
Seat 2: Small Blind [ME] ($32.09 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($20.96 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($11.64 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($28.33 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Small Blind [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd Ah]
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [4s 9h]
UTG : Card dealt to a spot [Jh 5h]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [Qc 5c]
UTG : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.25
Small Blind [ME] : Raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.75
Preflop is pretty standard, we're 4-handed and the dealer limps on the button, so I raise to 4x for value and get called.
*** FLOP *** [9d Tc Ac]
Small Blind [ME] : Bets $1.50
Dealer : Calls $1.50
Flop is perfectly fine, as I flop top pair and the board has a lot of potential draws in addition to inferior aces. The 9 and T are slightly concerning, as they fill in A9 and AT, which would have been good hands from which to extract value, but those hands are still a small part of the villain's range. I bet $1.50 into $2 and get called.
*** TURN *** [9d Tc Ac] [2d]
Small Blind [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $2.62
Small Blind [ME] : Calls $2.62
I don't like my check here. I sometimes will check the turn after betting the flop because it's a line that says "I took a stab at it and you didn't fold, so now I'm showing weakness." Such a line can often get you a second street of value on the river when a bet on the turn might have persuaded a lower limit player to fold what had been an optimistic hand on the flop. However, in retrospect there are still a ton of draws on the turn, including some suited straight draws and suited aces with diamonds that picked up flush draws with the 2, that I should have bet again for value. In any event, the villain bets about 1/2 pot after I check. This doesn't give me much information, as they could be betting any of their draws, a set, or two pair. It does reduce the likelihood of a weak ace with or without a flush draw, as those hands will usually get checked behind if the villain isn't spewy. I assigned the villain a range of any club draw, a set that isn't 22, any open ended straight draw (OESD) or double belly buster draw, any two pair (although I took out about 2/3 of the combinations of 92 and T2 because those are less likely), and any ace high diamond draw.
*** RIVER *** [9d Tc Ac 2d] [9c]
Small Blind [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $5.24
The 9 brings in the club flush and creates a bit of a pickle. On one hand the flush has come in, which was the most logical hand to which the villain could be drawing. On the other hand the villain has missed all of their straight draws. To figure out the best course of action, I went back to Equilab to take out all combinations that had just an A (with the exception of AK) as well as A2 and T2 on account of getting counterfeited (since those hands would almost certainly check behind). That leaves us with a range of AA, 99, TT, AT, a flush, or a missed straight draw. There are a total of 44 missed straight draws and 71 made hands that beat us. Taken as a straight percentage, that means we beat 38% of the combinations that could logically be betting here. As the villain bet $5.24 into about $9.50 after rake, we need to win a little over 26% of the time for our call to be profitable. Since the villain has 38% bluffs in his/her range, that should make this an easy call, right?
Weighting the Range
Not so fast. The call is only correct if we are right in thinking that the villain is equally likely to bet all of those missed draws as to value bet all those made hands. Against all but the most aggressive opponents, this is not the case. Sometimes they are going to bet their missed draws and sometimes they're going to check behind. The key is figuring out how often they bet those draws. So if our target percentage to make the call is 26%, that means that the villain needs to be bluffing with 26% of their total range, or 30 combinations: (44+71)*(.26) = 29.9 combinations
We then take that number of combinations and divide it by the total number of missed draws: 29.9/44 = 68%. Therefore, if the villain is bluffing about 2/3 of the time with a missed straight draw, we call. If they are bluffing less often than that, we fold.
So how often is the villain bluffing with a missed draw? Well that's where things get tricky. Playing on Bovada, there is no ability to save notes due to playing with random players, so it's difficult to know how aggressive your opponents are at betting draws. Furthermore, there's no HUD to use for tracking players, so I don't have stats on this opponent's aggression level. The best we can do is extrapolate based on the tendencies shown up to this point at the table as well as any other information. In that vein, there are two pieces of information that I neglected to adequately factor into my decision. First, that I had lost a hand to this villain earlier in the session in which he/she was making a modest bet for value. Second, I have yet to see this villain bet or raise without a strong hand.
If I had taken the time to lay it out in those explicit terms, I might have decided to fold. As it is, I called and the villain showed Q5 of clubs for a rivered flush. That said, I started this post with the intent of showing what a bad decision I made, but after running through the numbers it's not as bad as I thought. Without access to solid stats it's difficult to say definitely how good or bad the call was, but the important takeaway is that it's useful to play with ranges to figure out how likely it is that your opponent is bluffing on the river and what circumstances are necessary to make a profitable call.
Sunday, May 19, 2013
Overly Optimistic Range Analysis
As I said in my initial post, part of the point of this blog is accountability. With that in mind, I'll make my first "real" post a critique of a hand I played and hopefully explain how I made a pretty poor decision.
A few nights ago I played a quick session (about an hour) of $.10/25 and finished down about a buy-in and a half. I lost a flip and got unlucky in a couple other hands, but I also made some hasty decisions and didn't maximize value in a couple spots. My most egregious error came almost immediately, in my 3rd hand (which is usually an indication that a player didn't sit down completely mentally ready to play):
Bovada Hand #2702260454 TBL#4149508 HOLDEM No Limit - 2013-05-15 20:57:54
Seat 1: Big Blind ($14.83 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG [ME] ($25 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG+1 ($38.84 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG+2 ($29.59 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($32.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($28.74 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd As]
UTG+1 : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG+2 : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
Small Blind : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG [ME] : Raises $0.75 to $0.75
UTG+1 : Folds
UTG+2 : Calls $0.75
Dealer : Folds
Small Blind : Calls $0.65
Big Blind : Calls $0.50
Pre-flop is standard--I have AQ off-suit UTG and am obviously raising. I get three callers, on two of whom I have position post-flop.
*** FLOP *** [3h Ah Qh]
Small Blind : Checks
Big Blind : Checks
UTG [ME] : Bets $2.50
UTG+2 : Folds
Small Blind : Calls $2.50
Big Blind : Folds
The flop is great for me as I flop top two and the monotone board with two face cards means that my opponents potentially have some draws with which to continue. The blinds check to me and I bet $2.50 into just under $3 after rake, which is about 85% of the pot and a perfectly reasonable bet size for getting value. I get one caller and am perfectly happy with the situation going into the turn.
*** TURN *** [3h Ah Qh] [Jd]
Small Blind : Checks
UTG [ME] : Bets $7
Small Blind : All-in(raise) $25.49 to $25.49
The turn brings in a couple hands, mostly just KT with the K of hearts and perhaps very rarely JJ with the J of hearts, but overall I'm not concerned that it has changed the hand. I bet $7 into a little under $8. Then the needle scratches the record. The villain check/raises all-in and in short order I need to analyze his range and figure out whether I'm getting appropriate odds to call. That brings me to the title of the post and what I think is sometimes a leak in my game: putting too many bluffs or semi-bluffs in my opponents' range.
For those who aren't familiar, there's a neat little program called EquiLab that allows you to customize your opponent's hand range in order to figure out your likely equity in any given spot. You can choose to assign your opponent a range like "AJ+ and QQ+" or you can get specific and choose individual cards. With that in mind, I came up with the following:
For anyone who finds that too hard to look at, what the above screenshot shows is a range of AA, QQ, 33, rarely JJ and KK with the K of hearts, AQ and A3, a number of possible flushes, and hands that were combo draws on the flop and are either a straight or a draw with a pair on the turn. I will call the above the villain's "possible range." Against that range on the turn, EquiLab calculates that we have 32.93% equity.
Possible vs. Probable Range
All the hands I just listed are what it's possible that the villain has. However, at the end of the day we are most concerned with what is probable. The check/call, check/shove line is usually an indication of a strong hand when there is no history between the players, so we should weight our analysis of range accordingly.
It's possible that the villain played AA or QQ this way, but the lack of a preflop re-raise, particularly considering the fact that they were out of position and there was already one caller, makes both hands extremely unlikely. Consequently, I'm going to remove them from the "probable range." For similar reasons I'm going to do the same with KK. A3 is also possible, but in my opinion less likely because it's vulnerable to being counterfeited and most villains would want to maximize value by leading or check/raising the flop, so I'll take out four of the possible six combinations. As for KT, unless one of the cards is a heart (more likely the K), the line looks overly optimistic from all but the fishiest players, so I'll remove all combinations that don't have a heart. AJ with the J of hearts is also somewhat unlikely, if only because the J on the turn gives the villain excellent showdown value and he doesn't want to shove me off a hand like AK or turn AJ into a bluff against AQ or a set. So, while I still think it's possible, I'll remove one of the two combinations of AJ. Finally, KJ with at least one heart has a large number of combinations, but I'm skeptical of it being played this way a majority of the time and so I'll include just the combinations with the K of hearts.
Where it gets tricky is how many flushes to put in the villain's range. I happened to choose 9, but it could easily be more depending on how wide his calling range is with suited connectors/gappers from the small blind. But if we assume my randomly assigned distribution, we have 26.59% equity. In other words, the difference between the possible and probably range is almost the difference between getting 2-to-1 and 3-to-1 on our money.
So to go back to our decision based on the odds, I'd bet $7 into about $8, after which he put me all-in. I had just under $15 to call a pot of $30, so I needed to be getting odds of 2-to-1 or 33.3%. If my "possible" range is accurate, I'm about even money to call. But if my "probable" range is correct, it's a fold, and a pretty clear one at that.
To look at it another way, the hands that are betting for value are as follows: AQ, A3, 33, and a flush. Hands that are bluffing: pretty much just KJ or perhaps very rarely KK. In other words, I can beat everything but a flush or 33, but the likelihood is that he has one of those hands. As is probably evident by now, I called the shove, the villain showed 33 for a flopped se and the river was a blank.
So why did I call? Two (bad) reasons:
1) I over-weighted the possibility of a bluff. Having taken the time to analyze possible hands, it now seems obvious to me that there were very few possible bluffs in his range. But at the time, I persuaded myself that while I expected to be beaten a majority of the time, there were enough times he had KK, KJ, or some other random draw to substantiate making the call. Furthermore, I was seduced by the possibility of almost always having 4 outs to make the nuts.
2) The last couple years of live play have led me to make faulty assumptions. One thing I've noticed playing almost exclusively live the past couple of years is that players with strong made hands are afraid to check/call on a draw-ish board. While this may be an idiosyncacy of the players I've known, it became such a clear and obvious pattern that I could hardly remember an instance when a player slow played a hand like two pair or a set when there was significant potential for their opponent to improve. But different players play differently and of course online is more solid, and so combined with Reason #1, I took the in-the-moment position that "there was no way he/she wouldn't have raised the flop with a set or weak flush." Which was of course wrong and a good reminder of the need to constantly challenge my assumptions and re-adjust.
TL;DR - Don't persuade yourself that your opponent's range is something other than what it is.
A few nights ago I played a quick session (about an hour) of $.10/25 and finished down about a buy-in and a half. I lost a flip and got unlucky in a couple other hands, but I also made some hasty decisions and didn't maximize value in a couple spots. My most egregious error came almost immediately, in my 3rd hand (which is usually an indication that a player didn't sit down completely mentally ready to play):
Bovada Hand #2702260454 TBL#4149508 HOLDEM No Limit - 2013-05-15 20:57:54
Seat 1: Big Blind ($14.83 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG [ME] ($25 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG+1 ($38.84 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG+2 ($29.59 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($32.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($28.74 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd As]
UTG+1 : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG+2 : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
Small Blind : Card dealt to a spot [xx]
UTG [ME] : Raises $0.75 to $0.75
UTG+1 : Folds
UTG+2 : Calls $0.75
Dealer : Folds
Small Blind : Calls $0.65
Big Blind : Calls $0.50
Pre-flop is standard--I have AQ off-suit UTG and am obviously raising. I get three callers, on two of whom I have position post-flop.
*** FLOP *** [3h Ah Qh]
Small Blind : Checks
Big Blind : Checks
UTG [ME] : Bets $2.50
UTG+2 : Folds
Small Blind : Calls $2.50
Big Blind : Folds
The flop is great for me as I flop top two and the monotone board with two face cards means that my opponents potentially have some draws with which to continue. The blinds check to me and I bet $2.50 into just under $3 after rake, which is about 85% of the pot and a perfectly reasonable bet size for getting value. I get one caller and am perfectly happy with the situation going into the turn.
*** TURN *** [3h Ah Qh] [Jd]
Small Blind : Checks
UTG [ME] : Bets $7
Small Blind : All-in(raise) $25.49 to $25.49
The turn brings in a couple hands, mostly just KT with the K of hearts and perhaps very rarely JJ with the J of hearts, but overall I'm not concerned that it has changed the hand. I bet $7 into a little under $8. Then the needle scratches the record. The villain check/raises all-in and in short order I need to analyze his range and figure out whether I'm getting appropriate odds to call. That brings me to the title of the post and what I think is sometimes a leak in my game: putting too many bluffs or semi-bluffs in my opponents' range.
For those who aren't familiar, there's a neat little program called EquiLab that allows you to customize your opponent's hand range in order to figure out your likely equity in any given spot. You can choose to assign your opponent a range like "AJ+ and QQ+" or you can get specific and choose individual cards. With that in mind, I came up with the following:
For anyone who finds that too hard to look at, what the above screenshot shows is a range of AA, QQ, 33, rarely JJ and KK with the K of hearts, AQ and A3, a number of possible flushes, and hands that were combo draws on the flop and are either a straight or a draw with a pair on the turn. I will call the above the villain's "possible range." Against that range on the turn, EquiLab calculates that we have 32.93% equity.
Possible vs. Probable Range
All the hands I just listed are what it's possible that the villain has. However, at the end of the day we are most concerned with what is probable. The check/call, check/shove line is usually an indication of a strong hand when there is no history between the players, so we should weight our analysis of range accordingly.
It's possible that the villain played AA or QQ this way, but the lack of a preflop re-raise, particularly considering the fact that they were out of position and there was already one caller, makes both hands extremely unlikely. Consequently, I'm going to remove them from the "probable range." For similar reasons I'm going to do the same with KK. A3 is also possible, but in my opinion less likely because it's vulnerable to being counterfeited and most villains would want to maximize value by leading or check/raising the flop, so I'll take out four of the possible six combinations. As for KT, unless one of the cards is a heart (more likely the K), the line looks overly optimistic from all but the fishiest players, so I'll remove all combinations that don't have a heart. AJ with the J of hearts is also somewhat unlikely, if only because the J on the turn gives the villain excellent showdown value and he doesn't want to shove me off a hand like AK or turn AJ into a bluff against AQ or a set. So, while I still think it's possible, I'll remove one of the two combinations of AJ. Finally, KJ with at least one heart has a large number of combinations, but I'm skeptical of it being played this way a majority of the time and so I'll include just the combinations with the K of hearts.
Where it gets tricky is how many flushes to put in the villain's range. I happened to choose 9, but it could easily be more depending on how wide his calling range is with suited connectors/gappers from the small blind. But if we assume my randomly assigned distribution, we have 26.59% equity. In other words, the difference between the possible and probably range is almost the difference between getting 2-to-1 and 3-to-1 on our money.
So to go back to our decision based on the odds, I'd bet $7 into about $8, after which he put me all-in. I had just under $15 to call a pot of $30, so I needed to be getting odds of 2-to-1 or 33.3%. If my "possible" range is accurate, I'm about even money to call. But if my "probable" range is correct, it's a fold, and a pretty clear one at that.
To look at it another way, the hands that are betting for value are as follows: AQ, A3, 33, and a flush. Hands that are bluffing: pretty much just KJ or perhaps very rarely KK. In other words, I can beat everything but a flush or 33, but the likelihood is that he has one of those hands. As is probably evident by now, I called the shove, the villain showed 33 for a flopped se and the river was a blank.
So why did I call? Two (bad) reasons:
1) I over-weighted the possibility of a bluff. Having taken the time to analyze possible hands, it now seems obvious to me that there were very few possible bluffs in his range. But at the time, I persuaded myself that while I expected to be beaten a majority of the time, there were enough times he had KK, KJ, or some other random draw to substantiate making the call. Furthermore, I was seduced by the possibility of almost always having 4 outs to make the nuts.
2) The last couple years of live play have led me to make faulty assumptions. One thing I've noticed playing almost exclusively live the past couple of years is that players with strong made hands are afraid to check/call on a draw-ish board. While this may be an idiosyncacy of the players I've known, it became such a clear and obvious pattern that I could hardly remember an instance when a player slow played a hand like two pair or a set when there was significant potential for their opponent to improve. But different players play differently and of course online is more solid, and so combined with Reason #1, I took the in-the-moment position that "there was no way he/she wouldn't have raised the flop with a set or weak flush." Which was of course wrong and a good reminder of the need to constantly challenge my assumptions and re-adjust.
TL;DR - Don't persuade yourself that your opponent's range is something other than what it is.
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