Why We 3-Bet

For once I won't bore people with a discussion of a specific hand and would instead like to bore people by discussing the practice of preflop 3-betting, or re-raising the initial preflop raiser. Before I do so, please note that I don't pretend to be the originator of any of these ideas and you could probably find a more sophisticated explanation elsewhere, so...thanks for reading anyway. :p

Why We 3-Bet

We generally want to 3-bet our opponents for one or more of five reasons:

1) To get value from worse hands when we have a strong hand.
2) To steal money from players who fold often to 3-bets.
3) To discourage players from stealing our blinds or button.
4) To take the betting lead or "initiative" in the hand, which allows us to represent a stronger hand on the flop and continue applying pressure.
5) For "balance," i.e. to show that we can raise without a big hand so that our bigger hands can get paid off and it's more difficult for our opponents to read us. 

For obvious reasons, if we're holding a premium hand like AA it makes sense to raise to get more money in the pot with the best hand. While it's sometimes appropriate to just flat call with a big hand, the notion of "not wanting to scare away hands" is misguided and misses the main purpose of raising--to indicate a big hand. If a player only flat calls with big hands and raises everything else, they are playing an extremely exploitable game, as it allows observant opponents to effectively take premium hands out of their range when they raise.

Regarding #2 and #3, if a player raises frequently and folds to a sufficient percentage of 3-bets, our 3-bet is immediately a profitable play, not factoring in any subsequent action if our opponent calls. Our formula for determining profitability should look something like this:

(size of the pot)*(frequency with which opponent folds) - (size of our raise)*(frequency with which opponent calls)

So let's say we're playing $.50/$1.00 and are in the big blind and it folds around to the button, who raises to $3 and the small blind folds. Let's say we know that our opponent folds to 3-bets 65%
of the time. We're holding any two cards in the big blind and are trying to decide if it's profitable to 3-bet. If we make a standard 3-bet to $9, the size of the pot is $4.50 due to the blinds (including ours) and the size of the raise is $8 (because our $1 blind is considered part of the pot). So let's plug that information in to see the expected value from our play:

($4.50)*(.65) - ($8)*(.35)
$2.925 - $2.80
EV = $0.13

Looked at another way, if we want to discover how often the opponent needs to fold for it to be a break even play, we can set it up like this (sorry if my rudimentary math is off):

4.5x = 8
x = 1.7777778
1.778 / 2.778 = .64

In other words, given the scenario above the button needs to fold 1.778 times for every one time he or she calls, or 64% of the time in order for the 3-bet to be profitable by itself.

If we're playing live or playing on Bovada (as I do), there's no access to real-time stats. Instead, it's necessary to estimate the likelihood of a fold based on our image and the villain's tendencies. If a player likes to steal from the button, but has to worry about being 3-bet frequently from the big blind, they'll be less likely to attempt future steals and we're in effect protecting our blind now and later. Finally, for the same reason that we want to raise our big hands (to get value), we need to 3-bet at least some weaker hands so that our opponent can't put us on an an extremely narrow range when we do.


3-Betting Range

I won't argue that there is an ideal 3-betting range because that depends on the type of player one is as well as opponent skill and table dynamics. That said, I can use my own limited data set to illustrate how one might look at a 3-betting range. Over a sample size of about 15.5k hands at $.50/$1.00, I'm 3-betting 6.91% of the time that I have the option. That doesn't sound like a lot, but using Equilab I can get a good idea of exactly which hands I'm 3-betting:

If I were player who hand an extremely narrow 3-bet range of QQ+ and AK that would represent only 2.56% of all potential hands. Instead, my 3-betting range looks something like this:

Raising for value almost all of the time: AA, KK, QQ, AK
Raising for value the majority of the time: AQ, JJ
Sometimes raising for value: AJ, KQ, TT (and occasionally 99, and AT)
Raising as a bluff: QJ, JT, T9, 98, and some other connectors and gappers (e.g. 97) depending on how likely my opponent is to fold.

That doesn't mean I'm always 3-betting hands like JT and 98--against some players I'd do it frequently and against others I never would.

While it's certainly feasible to 3-bet a much wider range than this, given the generally low quality of play on Bovada and the fact that players are random and there's therefore no "history" that can exist between players, this is about as wide a range as I see being necessary. Regardless of where you're playing, if you can find the right circumstances and know your opponents and your own image, expanding your 3-betting range can be an important change to your game and new source of profit.

In a subsequent post, I'll talk a bit more about looking for ways to improve our 3-betting hand selection and identifying possible leaks.

Respecting the Process, Not the Results

Pardon the delay, I've been moving the last week or so and have had spotty internet and as a result haven't played much. Plus laziness.

I don't know who coined the phrase, but something that's been uttered many times by far better poker players than myself is, "Be process-oriented, not results-oriented." I'm unsure if the ad still runs, but when you see Doyle Brunson on TV saying that it's not about winning or losing, it's about making the right play, that's what he's talking about. Part of one's evolution as a poker player is looking at how a hand was played and not deciding that the play was correct or incorrect based on whether the hand was won, but whether one's logic was good at the time. The following is a hand where one might be tempted to second-guess the process based on the results, but I believe to do so would be a mistake:

Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($104.20 in chips)
Seat 2: Dealer ($163.49 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($130.65 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($68.50 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($183.45 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Jh Jd]
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
UTGplus1: folds
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: raises $13.50 to $14
Big Blind: folds

We're playing 5-handed and are first to act holding JJ. We make a standard raise and get 3-bet large by the small blind. The villain makes it almost 5 times our initial raise, which is not always a tell, but in my experience often indicates some form of a hand that feels scared and/or vulnerable, particularly out of position. This tends to mean either a mid-pocket pair or AT+ sort of hand. Folding would be an atrociously tight play and raising is a legitimate option, but we have the ability to play a strong hand in position against a range that we have already narrowed down a lot, so we elect to call.

Donzo: calls $11
Dealer: folds
*** FLOP *** [6h 4d 4s]
Small Blind: checks

The flop comes 644 rainbow and the villain checks. If our range analysis is correct, the only hands that are a concern are 66, QQ, the small chance of KK or AA, and the very small chance that the villain was getting tricky holding a 4. We therefore bet to get value from 77-TT as well as a lighter calling A high, and also to get those same hands with substantial equity due to over cards to fold. We bet a little over half pot and the villain calls.

Donzo: bets $17
Small Blind: calls $17
*** TURN *** [6h 4d 4s] [Kc]
Small Blind: bets $22

The turn brings a K and the villain makes a very strange bet of $22 into about $66, or 1/3 pot. There are several possible rationales for this:

1) The villain check/called the flop with AK and is betting small to get value from 77-QQ hands that were betting the flop.
2) The villain has a hand in the 77-QQ range and is making a blocking bet with the expectation of folding to a raise and probably shutting down on the river in the event of a call.
3) The villain called with a hand like AT-AQ and is now deciding to turn the hand into a bluff because there aren't that many kings in our range.

In the moment, it's difficult to know what to make of the bet or how much weight to give to each of the preceding three possibilities. As the bet is so small and we only need to have the best hand 20% of the time for it to be a profitable call ((($22 / ($66+22+22)) = 20%), we elect to do so with the intent of evaluating the river.

Donzo: calls $22
*** RIVER *** [6h 4d 4s Kc] [Qs]
Small Blind: checks

The river brings a Q, a pretty terrible card, and the villain checks. Because the villain didn't bet the river, that makes it fairly unlikely that he or she has QQ or AK (unless they're paranoid that we hit QQ) and if they are holding 77-TT it's going to be almost impossible to get value from a value bet. In the event that the villain has AJ/AT they're obviously also folding and AQ has now gotten there. Without a stronger read on the villain, we can't expect them to make a fold with AQ or a call with 77-TT and therefore check behind. The villain shows AQ for the rivered pair.

Donzo: checks
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Small Blind: shows [As Qh] (two pair, Queens and Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Jh Jd] (Two pair)
Small Blind collected $108 from pot

While in hindsight we might consider whether we could have represented a K with a bet on the river to get AQ to fold, that is far too specific a read given the information we had available at the time and it might not have worked anyway.

The important takeaway is that we bet when we were ahead, called when we were ahead (and a raise would've been counter-productive), and checked behind when we couldn't get value from worse. In other words, we did everything right and the villain hit a 6-outer on the river. No biggie. Next hand.

Floating the Flop to Bluff the Turn

A play often employed by professionals (and one I don't use enough) is "floating" (i.e. calling with air) to bluff a later street. If done selectively and intelligently, it can turn profit out of seemingly nothing, make it extremely difficult for opponents to put you on a hand, and discourage future aggression. Here's a hand from a few days ago where I floated with essentially nothing and accomplished at least two of the above goals:

Seat 1: Small Blind ($142.65 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($87 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($32.40 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($109.85 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.90 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6h 8h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Small Blind: raises $9.50 to $10
Big Blind: folds

We're dealt 86 of hearts on the button and it folds around to us. Unless the blinds are calling stations, this is a hand we should normally be opening and we do so. The villain in the small blind raises to $10 and the big blind folds. This is the third opening raise out of my last four that the villain has 3bet (re-raised) me. And while that's a small sample size, chances are good that they're raising a reasonably wide range because I'm opening a wide range. Consequently, while a fold is a perfectly acceptable option as we're only holding 8 high, we have the choice to play a versatile hand in position against an aggressive villain. A re-raise is also valid, but if we face a shove we're always going to have to fold, plus our raise is less likely to be given credence due to the aforementioned couple hands we'd recently folded to the villain's raises, as the likelihood that we are raising "in frustration" inevitably comes into play. A call, on the other hand, keeps the pot size more manageable while allowing us to play the hand in position and indicate we're willing to see a flop.

Donzo: calls $7
*** FLOP *** [5c 9s Ac]
Small Blind: bets $12.50

The flop comes A95 with two clubs and the villain bets $12.50 into $21, or about 60% of the pot. At this point we have absolutely nothing except a gut shot straight draw to the 7. The most obvious choice here is to fold, considering how far behind most of the villain's range we are. However, if this villain is as loose as our limited sample size has led us to believe, we have to think that they're betting most of their preflop 3betting range here. We might therefore be inclined to use our position to raise, but again, if hypothetically we're holding a strong hand here like AJ+ or a set or two pair, we want to keep all his weaker hands in the pot. Therefore, a raise by definition keeps more bluffs in our range and might compel the villain to either call or re-raise. A call, by contrast, effectively indicates our range to be a flush draw, a pair, or better. Factoring in the recent history with the villain, a call is paradoxically the more "passive" and yet stronger play. We call, with the intent to bluff the turn if the villain checks (and possibly raise a second bet).

Donzo: calls $12.50
*** TURN *** [5c 9s Ac] [2d]
Small Blind: checks

The turn brings a blank 2 and the villain checks. As we'd planned, we bet $30 into $46 and the villain quickly folds.

Donzo: bets $30
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($30) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $44 from pot

In this example, our play accomplished exactly what we were hoping for despite the fact that we were drawing to four outs on the turn. Furthermore, for the rest of the session the villain didn't re-raise me, as he/she probably decided that there was less profit in it than they originally thought. It's important to realize that sometimes the above play isn't going to work and that players should not just start floating flops left and right. But if used sparingly, it can be a valuable tool against the right kind of villain.

Low Risk, High % Bluffs

When looking for bluff opportunities, we should identify situations where our hand looks "inevitably" strong and our opponents will therefore have an extremely difficult time making a call. Sometimes we can accomplish this by taking a hand that we assumed was a lost cause and using a favorable board texture to represent a hand we wouldn't otherwise have been able to. Just such a scenario happened for me a few days ago:

Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($116.90 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($101.20 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($179.45 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($74.95 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($100 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($117.30 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Kd Js]
UTG: folds (timeout)
UTGplus1: folds
UTG: Seat re-join
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2h 7h 7d]

We're dealt KJ in the cutoff and open to $3. The villain calls on the button and the blinds fold. The flop is 772 with two hearts. As this flop misses most of the villain's button calling range, we make a standard continuation bet and the villain calls.

Donzo: bets $5
Dealer: calls $5
*** TURN *** [2h 7h 7d] [8h]

The turn brings an 8 and a 3rd heart. While we could continue betting here, we really aren't sure what the villain has. They could have called the flop with a 7, a 2, an overpair, a flush draw, or ace high. If they have an overpair, they're likely to call at least one more bet and they're never folding a 7. And if they were just calling with a hand like AT-AK and are holding a heart, they're likely going to at least call one more street to try and hit. Consequently we check, expecting to fold if the villain bets, but they check behind.

Donzo: checks
Dealer: checks
*** RIVER *** [2h 7h 7d 8h] [6h]

The river brings a 6 and a 4th heart. At this point we could check and give up, as there's almost no chance that we can have the best hand here after the villain's flop call. However, we can consider a bet here due to the information given to us by the villain's turn check. In a situation that brings a 3rd heart, an overpair is almost always going to bet the turn to get value from single heart flush draws, as is a 7. There's a small chance of 88 for a turned boat, but not enough to be worrisome. Furthermore, if the villain had called the flop with just ace high while also holding a strong heart, it's likely (though not guaranteed) that they would use that extra equity to bet the turn, rather then letting the river come for free. As a result, the likelihood of the villain having trips, a boat, or a strong flush is significantly diminished. We decide to make a small bet of $7 into $17.50.

Donzo: bets $7

The size of our bet accomplishes two things: 1) The bet size is very small and consequently looks like an an enticement to call a flush. 2) Due to the small size of our bet, we don't need the villain to fold that often for the bet to be profitable. In fact, our bluff only needs to work about 28.5% of the time to be profitable:

$7 / ($7 + $17.50) = 28.5%

At these stakes particularly, unless a player just feels like donking off money it is going to be very difficult for them to make a call here without a flush and possibly difficult even with a weak flush. As a result we can feel confident that our bluff is going to work here often enough to make it profitable. The bet does work and the villain folds.

Dealer: folds
Uncalled bet ($7) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $16.65 from pot

Rather than being intimidated by "scary" boards like the one above, we can figure out how likely they are to help our opponent and then use them to our advantage to pick up some money that might have seemed impossible to win.

When a Bet Is Both a Bluff AND for Value

As I discussed awhile ago in this post, when we make a bet we should have an understanding of why we're betting. This generally means that we are either betting to get our opponent to call with a worse hand or fold a better hand. Sometimes, though, we can make a bet that serves both functions at once and ends up being profitable as a result. Here's a hand I played last week where that was the case:

Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks

We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.

Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks

The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:

Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66

Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.

*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.

**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.

Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight. 

The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.

In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.

Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot

Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine.  But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D

The Mistake of Overbetting to Fold Out Draws

To show the other side of my post from yesterday, I want to briefly discuss the folly of overbetting the pot out of fear. This is a play and mindset that's common with some amateur players and effectively causes them to bleed money. I'll use an example from a hand I played last week that's a bit over-the-top, but still demonstrates what I'm talking about:

Seat 1: Dealer ($78.51 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($166.05 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($199.74 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($88 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($122.75 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus2 ($96.45 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [7h 7s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Donzo: calls $2.50
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [Qd 8h 7c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: checks
Dealer: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds

We're dealt 77 in the small blind and have a raise and call when it gets to us. Raising here is sometimes legitimate, but we decide to just flat and the big blind folds. Q87 is a semi-drawish flop, so leading out is an option, but if no one has a Q, overpair, or OESD, it will be difficult to get called. We check with the hope that we can call a bet and decide the best course of action on the turn. The villain (the button) bets $3 into $9. While that's a smaller bet than we'd like, it's possible that they are betting air or betting tentatively with either a Q, 7, or 8. Or conversely, they're betting small because they (think) they're big and don't want to scare everyone out of the pot. Consequently, we want to keep all those hands in and therefor elect to just call.

*** TURN *** [Qd 8h 7c] [2d]
Donzo: checks
Dealer: bets $72.51 and is all-in

A 2 comes on the turn which changes nothing and we check again. Inexplicably, the villain shoves all-in for $72, which is 4.5 times the size of the pot, and we're all like, "Christmas came early." Yeah yeah, it's theoretically possible that the villain has QQ or 88, but the 4.5x is so absurdly large that almost no player, without a prior read, is going to bet that much with those hands when they're hoping to extract maximum value. We call and the villain shows QJ.

Donzo: calls $72.51
*** RIVER *** [Qd 8h 7c 2d] [Kc]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Dealer: shows [Jd Qs] (a pair of Queens)
Donzo: shows [7h 7s] (three of a kind, Sevens)
Donzo collected $158.02 from pot

The villain's shove is a perfect demonstration of fearful, fishy thinking. All the villain's thinking is: "People always outdraw on me, there are two cards to a straight out there and now two diamonds as well?! Screw this guy, no way am I letting that happen again, all-in!" What fish never seem to realize is that you want people to call you when they're drawing. Getting people to call with inferior equity is how money is made in poker and getting calls from straight draws and flush draws is part of that. But the fish was so afraid of the possibility that he/she might see a 3rd diamond or straight card come and be put to a decision that they made a bet that almost always gets inferior hands to fold and superior hands to call. Nevermind the fact that the only information the villain has about our range is a $3 check/call on the flop and a check on the turn, which gives us a far wider range of hands than a straight or flush draw. As if that wasn't bad enough, the flush draw didn't come until the turn, making a turned flush draw an incidental occurrence. It's possible that such a huge overbet could compel a fold from a hand like KQ or AQ, but that isn't why the fish made the bet and it would have been a bad reason anyway.

When holding a decent hand (like TP) for which one hopes to get value, it's imperative not to allow fear of hypotheticals to compel terrible decisions like the one above. Learn to live with the fact that sometimes people will outdraw you and that's ok and that it doesn't mean that you "didn't bet enough." If you make more reasonable bets and allow some of those hands to draw on you, you'll play a more profitable game and become more accustomed to being put to decisions and the reality that having an opponent outdraw you is just part of poker.

Overbetting the Pot

Overbetting the pot (betting more than the size of the pot) is a play that has become more popular in recent years, particularly with extremely lose-aggressive players like Tom Dwan and Victor Blom. It's not a play that I employ in my game particularly often, so I won't pretend to be an authority, but every now and then a situation presents itself where it's easily the most ideal play to be made. Usually this is either when bluffing a player who you don't think will have the ability to make a lighter call for a large amount of money, or you have the nuts (or close) and don't think your opponent can lay down a slightly weaker hand. An example of the latter happened for me a few days ago:

Seat 1: Dealer ($27.65 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($91.50 in chips)
Seat 4: Big Blind ($41.30 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($144.83 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.10 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6c 6h]
UTG: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: raises $4 to $5
Donzo: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [5h 3c 4h]
Big Blind: bets $5.25
Donzo: calls $5.25

We're dealt 66 in the cutoff and raise and the big blind min-3bets us. A preflop min-3bet is almost always the sign of a weak player, as it serves only the function of taking the betting lead (which is not useless, mind you) and applies no "real" pressure on the original raiser. It's still something to watch closely, as it's sometimes a play made with a premium hand, but for only a $2 re-raise there are few regular poker players in the world who are folding. We call and the flop comes 345, an excellent flop for our hand. There are no overs to our pair and we have an OESD, so even if the villain has a big pocket pair like KK, we still have 37% equity in the hand. Furthermore, if the villain has either AA or Ax and a 2 hits, we're guaranteed to take the rest of their stack. The villain bets about half the size of the pot and we make an easy call. While raising is a valid option, the fact that this is such a low board makes it unlikely that we're getting value from worse hands, as the only hands that would call a re-raise are likely 56, 25, and A3-A5 (and of those possibly only A5).

*** TURN *** [5h 3c 4h] [2d]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: checks

The turn is money and the villain checks. The problem with betting here is that there are also a significant number of aces in our range, so if the villain doesn't have an ace or an overpair, it's likely they're folding to a bet here. We check behind with the intention of sizing our bet or raise on the river for maximum value, if there's any to be had.

*** RIVER *** [5h 3c 4h 2d] [Ac]
Big Blind: checks

The best card in the deck hits (a non-heart ace), putting a straight on the board. The villain checks and we're left to decide how much we can get paid here by a hand that's playing the board. The current pot size is $21 and the villain has $31 left. The fact that the villain checked both the turn and the river means that he/she never, ever has a 6. More importantly, the villain knows that we know that. Consequently, there's no reason for us not to shove the river here, knowing that at worst
we're going to split the pot. It's a no-risk, high-reward play.

Donzo: bets $32

If the villain had a chance to win the pot outright (not chop), they would be calling $31 to win $52, giving them pot odds of about 37% or 1.68:1. But they're not calling to win, they're calling to split the pot, meaning that they stand to win only half of that, so they're actually calling $31 to win $26, giving them pot odds of about 54% or 0.84:1. In other words, if the villain determines that we could be bluffing here 46% of the time or more, he/she has to call. More important than the numbers (since the villain's likely not working those out at the time) is the truism that most players, amateur or professional, have an aversion to looking foolish. And folding on the river to a bluffy-looking bet when there's a straight on the board would leave most players wondering if they'd made a horrible decision, particularly with how the action has gone down. Players are far more likely to want to live with losing the money and knowing, rather than feeling incredibly stupid. As expected, the villain calls and we scoop the pot.

Big Blind: calls $31.05 and is all-in
Uncalled bet ($0.95) returned to Donzo
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [6c 6h] (a straight, Deuce to Six)
Big Blind: Mucks [Jh Ks] (Straight)
Donzo collected $81.10 from pot


When holding the effective nuts, it's tempting to make a small river bet to induce a call from a weaker hand, rather than "scaring off" potential calls with a large bet. But in situations like the above, when it's evident that our opponent can almost never bring him/herself to fold, an overbet may be the best way to extract max value.