A play often employed by professionals (and one I don't use enough) is "floating" (i.e. calling with air) to bluff a later street. If done selectively and intelligently, it can turn profit out of seemingly nothing, make it extremely difficult for opponents to put you on a hand, and discourage future aggression. Here's a hand from a few days ago where I floated with essentially nothing and accomplished at least two of the above goals:
Seat 1: Small Blind ($142.65 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($87 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($32.40 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($109.85 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.90 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6h 8h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Small Blind: raises $9.50 to $10
Big Blind: folds
We're dealt 86 of hearts on the button and it folds around to us. Unless the blinds are calling stations, this is a hand we should normally be opening and we do so. The villain in the small blind raises to $10 and the big blind folds. This is the third opening raise out of my last four that the villain has 3bet (re-raised) me. And while that's a small sample size, chances are good that they're raising a reasonably wide range because I'm opening a wide range. Consequently, while a fold is a perfectly acceptable option as we're only holding 8 high, we have the choice to play a versatile hand in position against an aggressive villain. A re-raise is also valid, but if we face a shove we're always going to have to fold, plus our raise is less likely to be given credence due to the aforementioned couple hands we'd recently folded to the villain's raises, as the likelihood that we are raising "in frustration" inevitably comes into play. A call, on the other hand, keeps the pot size more manageable while allowing us to play the hand in position and indicate we're willing to see a flop.
Donzo: calls $7
*** FLOP *** [5c 9s Ac]
Small Blind: bets $12.50
The flop comes A95 with two clubs and the villain bets $12.50 into $21, or about 60% of the pot. At this point we have absolutely nothing except a gut shot straight draw to the 7. The most obvious choice here is to fold, considering how far behind most of the villain's range we are. However, if this villain is as loose as our limited sample size has led us to believe, we have to think that they're betting most of their preflop 3betting range here. We might therefore be inclined to use our position to raise, but again, if hypothetically we're holding a strong hand here like AJ+ or a set or two pair, we want to keep all his weaker hands in the pot. Therefore, a raise by definition keeps more bluffs in our range and might compel the villain to either call or re-raise. A call, by contrast, effectively indicates our range to be a flush draw, a pair, or better. Factoring in the recent history with the villain, a call is paradoxically the more "passive" and yet stronger play. We call, with the intent to bluff the turn if the villain checks (and possibly raise a second bet).
Donzo: calls $12.50
*** TURN *** [5c 9s Ac] [2d]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a blank 2 and the villain checks. As we'd planned, we bet $30 into $46 and the villain quickly folds.
Donzo: bets $30
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($30) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $44 from pot
In this example, our play accomplished exactly what we were hoping for despite the fact that we were drawing to four outs on the turn. Furthermore, for the rest of the session the villain didn't re-raise me, as he/she probably decided that there was less profit in it than they originally thought. It's important to realize that sometimes the above play isn't going to
work and that players should not just start floating flops left and
right. But if used sparingly, it can be a valuable tool against the right kind of villain.
Sunday, July 28, 2013
Saturday, July 27, 2013
Low Risk, High % Bluffs
When looking for bluff opportunities, we should identify situations where our hand looks "inevitably" strong and our opponents will therefore have an extremely difficult time making a call. Sometimes we can accomplish this by taking a hand that we assumed was a lost cause and using a favorable board texture to represent a hand we wouldn't otherwise have been able to. Just such a scenario happened for me a few days ago:
Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($116.90 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($101.20 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($179.45 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($74.95 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($100 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($117.30 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Kd Js]
UTG: folds (timeout)
UTGplus1: folds
UTG: Seat re-join
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2h 7h 7d]
We're dealt KJ in the cutoff and open to $3. The villain calls on the button and the blinds fold. The flop is 772 with two hearts. As this flop misses most of the villain's button calling range, we make a standard continuation bet and the villain calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Dealer: calls $5
*** TURN *** [2h 7h 7d] [8h]
The turn brings an 8 and a 3rd heart. While we could continue betting here, we really aren't sure what the villain has. They could have called the flop with a 7, a 2, an overpair, a flush draw, or ace high. If they have an overpair, they're likely to call at least one more bet and they're never folding a 7. And if they were just calling with a hand like AT-AK and are holding a heart, they're likely going to at least call one more street to try and hit. Consequently we check, expecting to fold if the villain bets, but they check behind.
Donzo: checks
Dealer: checks
*** RIVER *** [2h 7h 7d 8h] [6h]
The river brings a 6 and a 4th heart. At this point we could check and give up, as there's almost no chance that we can have the best hand here after the villain's flop call. However, we can consider a bet here due to the information given to us by the villain's turn check. In a situation that brings a 3rd heart, an overpair is almost always going to bet the turn to get value from single heart flush draws, as is a 7. There's a small chance of 88 for a turned boat, but not enough to be worrisome. Furthermore, if the villain had called the flop with just ace high while also holding a strong heart, it's likely (though not guaranteed) that they would use that extra equity to bet the turn, rather then letting the river come for free. As a result, the likelihood of the villain having trips, a boat, or a strong flush is significantly diminished. We decide to make a small bet of $7 into $17.50.
Donzo: bets $7
The size of our bet accomplishes two things: 1) The bet size is very small and consequently looks like an an enticement to call a flush. 2) Due to the small size of our bet, we don't need the villain to fold that often for the bet to be profitable. In fact, our bluff only needs to work about 28.5% of the time to be profitable:
$7 / ($7 + $17.50) = 28.5%
At these stakes particularly, unless a player just feels like donking off money it is going to be very difficult for them to make a call here without a flush and possibly difficult even with a weak flush. As a result we can feel confident that our bluff is going to work here often enough to make it profitable. The bet does work and the villain folds.
Dealer: folds
Uncalled bet ($7) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $16.65 from pot
Rather than being intimidated by "scary" boards like the one above, we can figure out how likely they are to help our opponent and then use them to our advantage to pick up some money that might have seemed impossible to win.
Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($116.90 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($101.20 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($179.45 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($74.95 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($100 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($117.30 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Kd Js]
UTG: folds (timeout)
UTGplus1: folds
UTG: Seat re-join
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2h 7h 7d]
We're dealt KJ in the cutoff and open to $3. The villain calls on the button and the blinds fold. The flop is 772 with two hearts. As this flop misses most of the villain's button calling range, we make a standard continuation bet and the villain calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Dealer: calls $5
*** TURN *** [2h 7h 7d] [8h]
The turn brings an 8 and a 3rd heart. While we could continue betting here, we really aren't sure what the villain has. They could have called the flop with a 7, a 2, an overpair, a flush draw, or ace high. If they have an overpair, they're likely to call at least one more bet and they're never folding a 7. And if they were just calling with a hand like AT-AK and are holding a heart, they're likely going to at least call one more street to try and hit. Consequently we check, expecting to fold if the villain bets, but they check behind.
Donzo: checks
Dealer: checks
*** RIVER *** [2h 7h 7d 8h] [6h]
The river brings a 6 and a 4th heart. At this point we could check and give up, as there's almost no chance that we can have the best hand here after the villain's flop call. However, we can consider a bet here due to the information given to us by the villain's turn check. In a situation that brings a 3rd heart, an overpair is almost always going to bet the turn to get value from single heart flush draws, as is a 7. There's a small chance of 88 for a turned boat, but not enough to be worrisome. Furthermore, if the villain had called the flop with just ace high while also holding a strong heart, it's likely (though not guaranteed) that they would use that extra equity to bet the turn, rather then letting the river come for free. As a result, the likelihood of the villain having trips, a boat, or a strong flush is significantly diminished. We decide to make a small bet of $7 into $17.50.
Donzo: bets $7
The size of our bet accomplishes two things: 1) The bet size is very small and consequently looks like an an enticement to call a flush. 2) Due to the small size of our bet, we don't need the villain to fold that often for the bet to be profitable. In fact, our bluff only needs to work about 28.5% of the time to be profitable:
$7 / ($7 + $17.50) = 28.5%
At these stakes particularly, unless a player just feels like donking off money it is going to be very difficult for them to make a call here without a flush and possibly difficult even with a weak flush. As a result we can feel confident that our bluff is going to work here often enough to make it profitable. The bet does work and the villain folds.
Dealer: folds
Uncalled bet ($7) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $16.65 from pot
Rather than being intimidated by "scary" boards like the one above, we can figure out how likely they are to help our opponent and then use them to our advantage to pick up some money that might have seemed impossible to win.
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
When a Bet Is Both a Bluff AND for Value
As I discussed awhile ago in this post, when we make a bet we should have an understanding of why we're betting. This generally means that we are either betting to get our opponent to call with a worse hand or fold a better hand. Sometimes, though, we can make a bet that serves both functions at once and ends up being profitable as a result. Here's a hand I played last week where that was the case:
Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:
Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66
Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.
*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight.
The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.
In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.
Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot
Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine. But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D
Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.
Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks
The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:
Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66
Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.
*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.
Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight.
The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.
In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.
Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot
Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine. But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D
Saturday, July 20, 2013
The Mistake of Overbetting to Fold Out Draws
To show the other side of my post from yesterday, I want to briefly discuss the folly of overbetting the pot out of fear. This is a play and mindset that's common with some amateur players and effectively causes them to bleed money. I'll use an example from a hand I played last week that's a bit over-the-top, but still demonstrates what I'm talking about:
Seat 1: Dealer ($78.51 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($166.05 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($199.74 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($88 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($122.75 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus2 ($96.45 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [7h 7s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Donzo: calls $2.50
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [Qd 8h 7c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: checks
Dealer: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds
We're dealt 77 in the small blind and have a raise and call when it gets to us. Raising here is sometimes legitimate, but we decide to just flat and the big blind folds. Q87 is a semi-drawish flop, so leading out is an option, but if no one has a Q, overpair, or OESD, it will be difficult to get called. We check with the hope that we can call a bet and decide the best course of action on the turn. The villain (the button) bets $3 into $9. While that's a smaller bet than we'd like, it's possible that they are betting air or betting tentatively with either a Q, 7, or 8. Or conversely, they're betting small because they (think) they're big and don't want to scare everyone out of the pot. Consequently, we want to keep all those hands in and therefor elect to just call.
*** TURN *** [Qd 8h 7c] [2d]
Donzo: checks
Dealer: bets $72.51 and is all-in
A 2 comes on the turn which changes nothing and we check again. Inexplicably, the villain shoves all-in for $72, which is 4.5 times the size of the pot, and we're all like, "Christmas came early." Yeah yeah, it's theoretically possible that the villain has QQ or 88, but the 4.5x is so absurdly large that almost no player, without a prior read, is going to bet that much with those hands when they're hoping to extract maximum value. We call and the villain shows QJ.
Donzo: calls $72.51
*** RIVER *** [Qd 8h 7c 2d] [Kc]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Dealer: shows [Jd Qs] (a pair of Queens)
Donzo: shows [7h 7s] (three of a kind, Sevens)
Donzo collected $158.02 from pot
The villain's shove is a perfect demonstration of fearful, fishy thinking. All the villain's thinking is: "People always outdraw on me, there are two cards to a straight out there and now two diamonds as well?! Screw this guy, no way am I letting that happen again, all-in!" What fish never seem to realize is that you want people to call you when they're drawing. Getting people to call with inferior equity is how money is made in poker and getting calls from straight draws and flush draws is part of that. But the fish was so afraid of the possibility that he/she might see a 3rd diamond or straight card come and be put to a decision that they made a bet that almost always gets inferior hands to fold and superior hands to call. Nevermind the fact that the only information the villain has about our range is a $3 check/call on the flop and a check on the turn, which gives us a far wider range of hands than a straight or flush draw. As if that wasn't bad enough, the flush draw didn't come until the turn, making a turned flush draw an incidental occurrence. It's possible that such a huge overbet could compel a fold from a hand like KQ or AQ, but that isn't why the fish made the bet and it would have been a bad reason anyway.
When holding a decent hand (like TP) for which one hopes to get value, it's imperative not to allow fear of hypotheticals to compel terrible decisions like the one above. Learn to live with the fact that sometimes people will outdraw you and that's ok and that it doesn't mean that you "didn't bet enough." If you make more reasonable bets and allow some of those hands to draw on you, you'll play a more profitable game and become more accustomed to being put to decisions and the reality that having an opponent outdraw you is just part of poker.
Seat 1: Dealer ($78.51 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($166.05 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($199.74 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($88 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($122.75 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus2 ($96.45 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [7h 7s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Donzo: calls $2.50
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [Qd 8h 7c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: checks
Dealer: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds
We're dealt 77 in the small blind and have a raise and call when it gets to us. Raising here is sometimes legitimate, but we decide to just flat and the big blind folds. Q87 is a semi-drawish flop, so leading out is an option, but if no one has a Q, overpair, or OESD, it will be difficult to get called. We check with the hope that we can call a bet and decide the best course of action on the turn. The villain (the button) bets $3 into $9. While that's a smaller bet than we'd like, it's possible that they are betting air or betting tentatively with either a Q, 7, or 8. Or conversely, they're betting small because they (think) they're big and don't want to scare everyone out of the pot. Consequently, we want to keep all those hands in and therefor elect to just call.
*** TURN *** [Qd 8h 7c] [2d]
Donzo: checks
Dealer: bets $72.51 and is all-in
A 2 comes on the turn which changes nothing and we check again. Inexplicably, the villain shoves all-in for $72, which is 4.5 times the size of the pot, and we're all like, "Christmas came early." Yeah yeah, it's theoretically possible that the villain has QQ or 88, but the 4.5x is so absurdly large that almost no player, without a prior read, is going to bet that much with those hands when they're hoping to extract maximum value. We call and the villain shows QJ.
Donzo: calls $72.51
*** RIVER *** [Qd 8h 7c 2d] [Kc]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Dealer: shows [Jd Qs] (a pair of Queens)
Donzo: shows [7h 7s] (three of a kind, Sevens)
Donzo collected $158.02 from pot
The villain's shove is a perfect demonstration of fearful, fishy thinking. All the villain's thinking is: "People always outdraw on me, there are two cards to a straight out there and now two diamonds as well?! Screw this guy, no way am I letting that happen again, all-in!" What fish never seem to realize is that you want people to call you when they're drawing. Getting people to call with inferior equity is how money is made in poker and getting calls from straight draws and flush draws is part of that. But the fish was so afraid of the possibility that he/she might see a 3rd diamond or straight card come and be put to a decision that they made a bet that almost always gets inferior hands to fold and superior hands to call. Nevermind the fact that the only information the villain has about our range is a $3 check/call on the flop and a check on the turn, which gives us a far wider range of hands than a straight or flush draw. As if that wasn't bad enough, the flush draw didn't come until the turn, making a turned flush draw an incidental occurrence. It's possible that such a huge overbet could compel a fold from a hand like KQ or AQ, but that isn't why the fish made the bet and it would have been a bad reason anyway.
When holding a decent hand (like TP) for which one hopes to get value, it's imperative not to allow fear of hypotheticals to compel terrible decisions like the one above. Learn to live with the fact that sometimes people will outdraw you and that's ok and that it doesn't mean that you "didn't bet enough." If you make more reasonable bets and allow some of those hands to draw on you, you'll play a more profitable game and become more accustomed to being put to decisions and the reality that having an opponent outdraw you is just part of poker.
Friday, July 19, 2013
Overbetting the Pot
Overbetting the pot (betting more than the size of the pot) is a play that has become more popular in recent years, particularly with extremely lose-aggressive players like Tom Dwan and Victor Blom. It's not a play that I employ in my game particularly often, so I won't pretend to be an authority, but every now and then a situation presents itself where it's easily the most ideal play to be made. Usually this is either when bluffing a player who you don't think will have the ability to make a lighter call for a large amount of money, or you have the nuts (or close) and don't think your opponent can lay down a slightly weaker hand. An example of the latter happened for me a few days ago:
Seat 1: Dealer ($27.65 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($91.50 in chips)
Seat 4: Big Blind ($41.30 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($144.83 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.10 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6c 6h]
UTG: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: raises $4 to $5
Donzo: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [5h 3c 4h]
Big Blind: bets $5.25
Donzo: calls $5.25
We're dealt 66 in the cutoff and raise and the big blind min-3bets us. A preflop min-3bet is almost always the sign of a weak player, as it serves only the function of taking the betting lead (which is not useless, mind you) and applies no "real" pressure on the original raiser. It's still something to watch closely, as it's sometimes a play made with a premium hand, but for only a $2 re-raise there are few regular poker players in the world who are folding. We call and the flop comes 345, an excellent flop for our hand. There are no overs to our pair and we have an OESD, so even if the villain has a big pocket pair like KK, we still have 37% equity in the hand. Furthermore, if the villain has either AA or Ax and a 2 hits, we're guaranteed to take the rest of their stack. The villain bets about half the size of the pot and we make an easy call. While raising is a valid option, the fact that this is such a low board makes it unlikely that we're getting value from worse hands, as the only hands that would call a re-raise are likely 56, 25, and A3-A5 (and of those possibly only A5).
*** TURN *** [5h 3c 4h] [2d]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: checks
The turn is money and the villain checks. The problem with betting here is that there are also a significant number of aces in our range, so if the villain doesn't have an ace or an overpair, it's likely they're folding to a bet here. We check behind with the intention of sizing our bet or raise on the river for maximum value, if there's any to be had.
*** RIVER *** [5h 3c 4h 2d] [Ac]
Big Blind: checks
The best card in the deck hits (a non-heart ace), putting a straight on the board. The villain checks and we're left to decide how much we can get paid here by a hand that's playing the board. The current pot size is $21 and the villain has $31 left. The fact that the villain checked both the turn and the river means that he/she never, ever has a 6. More importantly, the villain knows that we know that. Consequently, there's no reason for us not to shove the river here, knowing that at worst
we're going to split the pot. It's a no-risk, high-reward play.
Donzo: bets $32
If the villain had a chance to win the pot outright (not chop), they would be calling $31 to win $52, giving them pot odds of about 37% or 1.68:1. But they're not calling to win, they're calling to split the pot, meaning that they stand to win only half of that, so they're actually calling $31 to win $26, giving them pot odds of about 54% or 0.84:1. In other words, if the villain determines that we could be bluffing here 46% of the time or more, he/she has to call. More important than the numbers (since the villain's likely not working those out at the time) is the truism that most players, amateur or professional, have an aversion to looking foolish. And folding on the river to a bluffy-looking bet when there's a straight on the board would leave most players wondering if they'd made a horrible decision, particularly with how the action has gone down. Players are far more likely to want to live with losing the money and knowing, rather than feeling incredibly stupid. As expected, the villain calls and we scoop the pot.
Big Blind: calls $31.05 and is all-in
Uncalled bet ($0.95) returned to Donzo
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [6c 6h] (a straight, Deuce to Six)
Big Blind: Mucks [Jh Ks] (Straight)
Donzo collected $81.10 from pot
When holding the effective nuts, it's tempting to make a small river bet to induce a call from a weaker hand, rather than "scaring off" potential calls with a large bet. But in situations like the above, when it's evident that our opponent can almost never bring him/herself to fold, an overbet may be the best way to extract max value.
Seat 1: Dealer ($27.65 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($91.50 in chips)
Seat 4: Big Blind ($41.30 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($144.83 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.10 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6c 6h]
UTG: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: raises $4 to $5
Donzo: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [5h 3c 4h]
Big Blind: bets $5.25
Donzo: calls $5.25
We're dealt 66 in the cutoff and raise and the big blind min-3bets us. A preflop min-3bet is almost always the sign of a weak player, as it serves only the function of taking the betting lead (which is not useless, mind you) and applies no "real" pressure on the original raiser. It's still something to watch closely, as it's sometimes a play made with a premium hand, but for only a $2 re-raise there are few regular poker players in the world who are folding. We call and the flop comes 345, an excellent flop for our hand. There are no overs to our pair and we have an OESD, so even if the villain has a big pocket pair like KK, we still have 37% equity in the hand. Furthermore, if the villain has either AA or Ax and a 2 hits, we're guaranteed to take the rest of their stack. The villain bets about half the size of the pot and we make an easy call. While raising is a valid option, the fact that this is such a low board makes it unlikely that we're getting value from worse hands, as the only hands that would call a re-raise are likely 56, 25, and A3-A5 (and of those possibly only A5).
*** TURN *** [5h 3c 4h] [2d]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: checks
The turn is money and the villain checks. The problem with betting here is that there are also a significant number of aces in our range, so if the villain doesn't have an ace or an overpair, it's likely they're folding to a bet here. We check behind with the intention of sizing our bet or raise on the river for maximum value, if there's any to be had.
*** RIVER *** [5h 3c 4h 2d] [Ac]
Big Blind: checks
The best card in the deck hits (a non-heart ace), putting a straight on the board. The villain checks and we're left to decide how much we can get paid here by a hand that's playing the board. The current pot size is $21 and the villain has $31 left. The fact that the villain checked both the turn and the river means that he/she never, ever has a 6. More importantly, the villain knows that we know that. Consequently, there's no reason for us not to shove the river here, knowing that at worst
we're going to split the pot. It's a no-risk, high-reward play.
Donzo: bets $32
If the villain had a chance to win the pot outright (not chop), they would be calling $31 to win $52, giving them pot odds of about 37% or 1.68:1. But they're not calling to win, they're calling to split the pot, meaning that they stand to win only half of that, so they're actually calling $31 to win $26, giving them pot odds of about 54% or 0.84:1. In other words, if the villain determines that we could be bluffing here 46% of the time or more, he/she has to call. More important than the numbers (since the villain's likely not working those out at the time) is the truism that most players, amateur or professional, have an aversion to looking foolish. And folding on the river to a bluffy-looking bet when there's a straight on the board would leave most players wondering if they'd made a horrible decision, particularly with how the action has gone down. Players are far more likely to want to live with losing the money and knowing, rather than feeling incredibly stupid. As expected, the villain calls and we scoop the pot.
Big Blind: calls $31.05 and is all-in
Uncalled bet ($0.95) returned to Donzo
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [6c 6h] (a straight, Deuce to Six)
Big Blind: Mucks [Jh Ks] (Straight)
Donzo collected $81.10 from pot
When holding the effective nuts, it's tempting to make a small river bet to induce a call from a weaker hand, rather than "scaring off" potential calls with a large bet. But in situations like the above, when it's evident that our opponent can almost never bring him/herself to fold, an overbet may be the best way to extract max value.
Tuesday, July 16, 2013
Turning Trips and Bad Aspirational Thinking
There is often a sense of relief or quiet elation when, after calling a bet or a raise with a pair that may or may not be good, that card pairs the board, giving the player trips. More often than not that means the player is going to win the hand, but sometimes it's a figurative death sentence. Here's a hand I played a few days ago where that was the case:
Seat 1: UTG ($30.81 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($16.94 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($117.95 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($97.50 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($202.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($103.47 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Js]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $1
Donzo: raises $4 to $4
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds
*** FLOP *** [As 8h 9c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $6
Big Blind: raises $12 to $12
Donzo: calls $6
Preflop is normal, as we're dealt AJ on the button , raise to 4x with one limper and get a caller in the big blind. The flop comes A89 rainbow and we bet $6 for value. The villain then min raises to $12. At this point we should be somewhat concerned, as the size of the raise is small and gives us roughly 4.5:1 odds to call. There are a lot of plausible hands here, from A8-AK, 88-99, and an open-ended straight draw. However, the likelihood of a straight draw, particularly considering the bet sizing, is low. Regardless, because of the cheap price we decide to call and reevaluate on the turn.
*** TURN *** [As 8h 9c] [Ah]
Big Blind: bets $33.50
Donzo: calls $33.50
The turn brings another ace and the villain bets the size of the pot. At this point we have to think about both the likelihood of a bluff and whether the villain would ever be betting an inferior ace like this for value. It's conceivable that the villain could have AT or AJ, but beyond that there isn't much that makes sense. A min-raise on the flop with A7 or worse would be an odd play, but not unprecedented. There is still a chance that the villain could have 67 or JT for the straight draw and be attempting to bet us off an 8, 9, or larger pocket pair, but in truth, that's aspirational thinking.We have no notes or indication that the player was extremely aggressive and thus likely to play a straight draw in such a way. And while all that occurred to me at the time, I allowed the mere fact that I had improved so much on the turn to blind me to the truth that I could only rarely have the best hand. We end up calling with the assumption that we'll probably have to call a shove on the river.
*** RIVER *** [As 8h 9c Ah] [5d]
Big Blind: bets $53.97 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $48.00 and is all-in
A 5 comes on the river, which brings in one of the two possible straights. The villain shoves for $54 and, getting about 3:1 on a call and ignoring the glaring reality that the only possible hands we can beat are JT and AT, we call and the villain shows AQ.
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Big Blind: shows [Ad Qs] (three of a kind, Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Ac Js] (Three of a kind)
It's easy to look at a hand like this and say, "I had trips and just ran into a slightly bigger hand, no big deal." To do so is a mistake and fails to recognize that AQ is one of the weakest hands in the villain's range with how the action went down. Remember, not only is the villain's line strong in a vacuum, but the way we've played the hand indicates that we have at least an ace, or perhaps occasionally a straight draw for a very bad player. Therefore, the villain's actions become that much stronger and decrease the likelihood of a bluff or a value bet with a weaker ace. But at the time, I convinced myself that this player might be bad enough to play a weaker ace this way, or just be donking off money on a draw.
The key is not to allow oneself to be seduced by the absolute value of a hand; when we play NLHE, we're not playing video poker, and it doesn't matter what we have if our opponent almost always has us beat.
Seat 1: UTG ($30.81 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($16.94 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($117.95 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($97.50 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($202.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($103.47 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Js]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $1
Donzo: raises $4 to $4
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds
*** FLOP *** [As 8h 9c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $6
Big Blind: raises $12 to $12
Donzo: calls $6
Preflop is normal, as we're dealt AJ on the button , raise to 4x with one limper and get a caller in the big blind. The flop comes A89 rainbow and we bet $6 for value. The villain then min raises to $12. At this point we should be somewhat concerned, as the size of the raise is small and gives us roughly 4.5:1 odds to call. There are a lot of plausible hands here, from A8-AK, 88-99, and an open-ended straight draw. However, the likelihood of a straight draw, particularly considering the bet sizing, is low. Regardless, because of the cheap price we decide to call and reevaluate on the turn.
*** TURN *** [As 8h 9c] [Ah]
Big Blind: bets $33.50
Donzo: calls $33.50
The turn brings another ace and the villain bets the size of the pot. At this point we have to think about both the likelihood of a bluff and whether the villain would ever be betting an inferior ace like this for value. It's conceivable that the villain could have AT or AJ, but beyond that there isn't much that makes sense. A min-raise on the flop with A7 or worse would be an odd play, but not unprecedented. There is still a chance that the villain could have 67 or JT for the straight draw and be attempting to bet us off an 8, 9, or larger pocket pair, but in truth, that's aspirational thinking.We have no notes or indication that the player was extremely aggressive and thus likely to play a straight draw in such a way. And while all that occurred to me at the time, I allowed the mere fact that I had improved so much on the turn to blind me to the truth that I could only rarely have the best hand. We end up calling with the assumption that we'll probably have to call a shove on the river.
*** RIVER *** [As 8h 9c Ah] [5d]
Big Blind: bets $53.97 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $48.00 and is all-in
A 5 comes on the river, which brings in one of the two possible straights. The villain shoves for $54 and, getting about 3:1 on a call and ignoring the glaring reality that the only possible hands we can beat are JT and AT, we call and the villain shows AQ.
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Big Blind: shows [Ad Qs] (three of a kind, Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Ac Js] (Three of a kind)
It's easy to look at a hand like this and say, "I had trips and just ran into a slightly bigger hand, no big deal." To do so is a mistake and fails to recognize that AQ is one of the weakest hands in the villain's range with how the action went down. Remember, not only is the villain's line strong in a vacuum, but the way we've played the hand indicates that we have at least an ace, or perhaps occasionally a straight draw for a very bad player. Therefore, the villain's actions become that much stronger and decrease the likelihood of a bluff or a value bet with a weaker ace. But at the time, I convinced myself that this player might be bad enough to play a weaker ace this way, or just be donking off money on a draw.
The key is not to allow oneself to be seduced by the absolute value of a hand; when we play NLHE, we're not playing video poker, and it doesn't matter what we have if our opponent almost always has us beat.
Saturday, July 13, 2013
Self-Analysis and Tracking Programs
One of the most crucial keys to improving one's game is taking a critical eye and searching for "leaks" that can cut into winnings. Many pros use what's known as poker tracking software to review their game as well as the stats and tendencies of their opponents. I use Hold'em Manager 2 (HEM2), one of the more popular tools available. Unfortunately, because I play on Bovada, the use of "anonymous" players makes it impossible to review specific players' stats, as well as use the HUD (heads-up display) that displays players' stats on the table in real time. However, HEM2 is still an extremely useful means to analyzing one's own game and identifying areas for improvement.
For an idea of what the program looks like, here are two images, one displaying a handful of my stats on a per stakes basis along with a list of all hands played below, and the other a graph of my cash results (actual dollar amounts are blacked out, sorry):
There are a few things to bear in mind when looking at the above images: 1) The sample size is very small (only about 13,000 hands), so there simply isn't enough data to say whether the results accurately reflect the quality of the player's game. 2) For about the last 3k hands or so I've broken even, partially due to running bad and partially due to some questionable decisions on my part. 3) The first image shows some examples of some basic stats that can be examined:
VPIP (Voluntarily Put $ In Pot) - This indicates what % of hands the player put money in the pot when it wasn't a requirement. This would include any call or raise in a hand, but excludes posted blinds not followed by further action.
PFR (Preflop Raise %) - This is the % of hands the player raises before the flop
3Bet - This is the % of hands the player re-raises preflop.
WTSD% and W$SD% (Went to Showdown % and Won $ at Showdown %) - These indicate what % of the time that a player got to the showdown with their cards and then how often they had the best hand at showdown.
And so forth. Depending on what stats are relevant or wish to be examined, one can look at anything from the frequency and success rate of continuation bets to the success of steal attempts to the overall level of aggression. It's up to you how much information you want and what's relevant. Going forward, I'm excited about the possibilities that HEM2 will present for improving my play and will see about coming up with some good examples of stuff I've been doing wrong.
For an idea of what the program looks like, here are two images, one displaying a handful of my stats on a per stakes basis along with a list of all hands played below, and the other a graph of my cash results (actual dollar amounts are blacked out, sorry):
VPIP (Voluntarily Put $ In Pot) - This indicates what % of hands the player put money in the pot when it wasn't a requirement. This would include any call or raise in a hand, but excludes posted blinds not followed by further action.
PFR (Preflop Raise %) - This is the % of hands the player raises before the flop
3Bet - This is the % of hands the player re-raises preflop.
WTSD% and W$SD% (Went to Showdown % and Won $ at Showdown %) - These indicate what % of the time that a player got to the showdown with their cards and then how often they had the best hand at showdown.
And so forth. Depending on what stats are relevant or wish to be examined, one can look at anything from the frequency and success rate of continuation bets to the success of steal attempts to the overall level of aggression. It's up to you how much information you want and what's relevant. Going forward, I'm excited about the possibilities that HEM2 will present for improving my play and will see about coming up with some good examples of stuff I've been doing wrong.
Thursday, July 11, 2013
I'm Still Here
To the half dozen or however many people read my blog, sorry for the hiatus. I was on vacation for a week and beyond that have just been generally lazy about analyzing my game and finding interesting hands to discuss. My free trial to Hold Em Manager 2 (poker tracking software) just expired and my payment got rejected for some reason, so once I figure that out I'll be back with something that's hopefully interesting.
Monday, July 1, 2013
Managing Tilt and Knowing When To Quit
I am the first to admit that there are many flaws in my poker game and my abilities are nowhere near those of the best in the world. But one aspect of my game on which I have always prided myself is tilt control ("tilt," for those who don't know, being the colloquial term for the state of making decisions emotionally, though it usually means playing angry and/or frustrated). For the most part, the last month or so I've been pleased with my tilt control and ability to maintain a calm, objective approach to playing. A couple nights ago I sat down to play a lengthy session, eager for the opportunity to sit with the generally weaker weekend players.
And then I started running bad. Any poker player who has played a decent amount experiences it and sometimes it's worse than you ever thought possible. And that night, boy was it ever. Getting outflopped over and over, specific players catching multiple hands against me, etc. But it quickly turned into more than running bad. I was making poor decisions with flimsy rationales: c-betting bad flops, calling down too light, etc. A few decent hands were saving me from completely hemorrhaging money, but I was allowing frustration to affect my play. In other words, I had no business playing poker right then. Aaaaaaaaaand then this happened (presented without comment):
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($54.30 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($178.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($52.25 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($99 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($229.53 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qs Qc]
UTG: raises $2 to $2
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $6 to $6
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
UTG: calls $4
*** FLOP *** [Ad 9s Qd]
UTG: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
*** TURN *** [Ad 9s Qd] [Ts]
UTG: bets $19.50
Donzo: raises $54 to $54
UTG: calls $34.50
*** RIVER *** [Ad 9s Qd Ts] [Tc]
UTG: checks
Donzo: bets $115.90 and is all-in
UTG: calls $115.90
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qs Qc] (a full house, Queens full of Tens)
UTG: shows [Td Th] (four of a kind, Tens)
UTG collected $357.30 from pot
That was my cue to get out of there immediately, and I did. But in truth, I should've quit well before then. The moment I felt my anger and frustration rising was when I needed to at minimum step away from the tables for 10 minutes and potentially take the evening off and start fresh the next day. But instead, like a big dumb idiot, I was all like "RAAHHHHH, I'M A MAN!!!" and was set on proving that these nameless yahoos weren't gonna outplay ME.
For most poker players, our egos are a dangerous thing, and we must take care to both realize when we're slipping into a tilted mindset and immediately stop playing when we do.
And then I started running bad. Any poker player who has played a decent amount experiences it and sometimes it's worse than you ever thought possible. And that night, boy was it ever. Getting outflopped over and over, specific players catching multiple hands against me, etc. But it quickly turned into more than running bad. I was making poor decisions with flimsy rationales: c-betting bad flops, calling down too light, etc. A few decent hands were saving me from completely hemorrhaging money, but I was allowing frustration to affect my play. In other words, I had no business playing poker right then. Aaaaaaaaaand then this happened (presented without comment):
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($54.30 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($178.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($52.25 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($99 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($229.53 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qs Qc]
UTG: raises $2 to $2
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $6 to $6
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
UTG: calls $4
*** FLOP *** [Ad 9s Qd]
UTG: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
*** TURN *** [Ad 9s Qd] [Ts]
UTG: bets $19.50
Donzo: raises $54 to $54
UTG: calls $34.50
*** RIVER *** [Ad 9s Qd Ts] [Tc]
UTG: checks
Donzo: bets $115.90 and is all-in
UTG: calls $115.90
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qs Qc] (a full house, Queens full of Tens)
UTG: shows [Td Th] (four of a kind, Tens)
UTG collected $357.30 from pot
That was my cue to get out of there immediately, and I did. But in truth, I should've quit well before then. The moment I felt my anger and frustration rising was when I needed to at minimum step away from the tables for 10 minutes and potentially take the evening off and start fresh the next day. But instead, like a big dumb idiot, I was all like "RAAHHHHH, I'M A MAN!!!" and was set on proving that these nameless yahoos weren't gonna outplay ME.
For most poker players, our egos are a dangerous thing, and we must take care to both realize when we're slipping into a tilted mindset and immediately stop playing when we do.
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