Why We 3-Bet

For once I won't bore people with a discussion of a specific hand and would instead like to bore people by discussing the practice of preflop 3-betting, or re-raising the initial preflop raiser. Before I do so, please note that I don't pretend to be the originator of any of these ideas and you could probably find a more sophisticated explanation elsewhere, so...thanks for reading anyway. :p

Why We 3-Bet

We generally want to 3-bet our opponents for one or more of five reasons:

1) To get value from worse hands when we have a strong hand.
2) To steal money from players who fold often to 3-bets.
3) To discourage players from stealing our blinds or button.
4) To take the betting lead or "initiative" in the hand, which allows us to represent a stronger hand on the flop and continue applying pressure.
5) For "balance," i.e. to show that we can raise without a big hand so that our bigger hands can get paid off and it's more difficult for our opponents to read us. 

For obvious reasons, if we're holding a premium hand like AA it makes sense to raise to get more money in the pot with the best hand. While it's sometimes appropriate to just flat call with a big hand, the notion of "not wanting to scare away hands" is misguided and misses the main purpose of raising--to indicate a big hand. If a player only flat calls with big hands and raises everything else, they are playing an extremely exploitable game, as it allows observant opponents to effectively take premium hands out of their range when they raise.

Regarding #2 and #3, if a player raises frequently and folds to a sufficient percentage of 3-bets, our 3-bet is immediately a profitable play, not factoring in any subsequent action if our opponent calls. Our formula for determining profitability should look something like this:

(size of the pot)*(frequency with which opponent folds) - (size of our raise)*(frequency with which opponent calls)

So let's say we're playing $.50/$1.00 and are in the big blind and it folds around to the button, who raises to $3 and the small blind folds. Let's say we know that our opponent folds to 3-bets 65%
of the time. We're holding any two cards in the big blind and are trying to decide if it's profitable to 3-bet. If we make a standard 3-bet to $9, the size of the pot is $4.50 due to the blinds (including ours) and the size of the raise is $8 (because our $1 blind is considered part of the pot). So let's plug that information in to see the expected value from our play:

($4.50)*(.65) - ($8)*(.35)
$2.925 - $2.80
EV = $0.13

Looked at another way, if we want to discover how often the opponent needs to fold for it to be a break even play, we can set it up like this (sorry if my rudimentary math is off):

4.5x = 8
x = 1.7777778
1.778 / 2.778 = .64

In other words, given the scenario above the button needs to fold 1.778 times for every one time he or she calls, or 64% of the time in order for the 3-bet to be profitable by itself.

If we're playing live or playing on Bovada (as I do), there's no access to real-time stats. Instead, it's necessary to estimate the likelihood of a fold based on our image and the villain's tendencies. If a player likes to steal from the button, but has to worry about being 3-bet frequently from the big blind, they'll be less likely to attempt future steals and we're in effect protecting our blind now and later. Finally, for the same reason that we want to raise our big hands (to get value), we need to 3-bet at least some weaker hands so that our opponent can't put us on an an extremely narrow range when we do.


3-Betting Range

I won't argue that there is an ideal 3-betting range because that depends on the type of player one is as well as opponent skill and table dynamics. That said, I can use my own limited data set to illustrate how one might look at a 3-betting range. Over a sample size of about 15.5k hands at $.50/$1.00, I'm 3-betting 6.91% of the time that I have the option. That doesn't sound like a lot, but using Equilab I can get a good idea of exactly which hands I'm 3-betting:

If I were player who hand an extremely narrow 3-bet range of QQ+ and AK that would represent only 2.56% of all potential hands. Instead, my 3-betting range looks something like this:

Raising for value almost all of the time: AA, KK, QQ, AK
Raising for value the majority of the time: AQ, JJ
Sometimes raising for value: AJ, KQ, TT (and occasionally 99, and AT)
Raising as a bluff: QJ, JT, T9, 98, and some other connectors and gappers (e.g. 97) depending on how likely my opponent is to fold.

That doesn't mean I'm always 3-betting hands like JT and 98--against some players I'd do it frequently and against others I never would.

While it's certainly feasible to 3-bet a much wider range than this, given the generally low quality of play on Bovada and the fact that players are random and there's therefore no "history" that can exist between players, this is about as wide a range as I see being necessary. Regardless of where you're playing, if you can find the right circumstances and know your opponents and your own image, expanding your 3-betting range can be an important change to your game and new source of profit.

In a subsequent post, I'll talk a bit more about looking for ways to improve our 3-betting hand selection and identifying possible leaks.

Respecting the Process, Not the Results

Pardon the delay, I've been moving the last week or so and have had spotty internet and as a result haven't played much. Plus laziness.

I don't know who coined the phrase, but something that's been uttered many times by far better poker players than myself is, "Be process-oriented, not results-oriented." I'm unsure if the ad still runs, but when you see Doyle Brunson on TV saying that it's not about winning or losing, it's about making the right play, that's what he's talking about. Part of one's evolution as a poker player is looking at how a hand was played and not deciding that the play was correct or incorrect based on whether the hand was won, but whether one's logic was good at the time. The following is a hand where one might be tempted to second-guess the process based on the results, but I believe to do so would be a mistake:

Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($104.20 in chips)
Seat 2: Dealer ($163.49 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($130.65 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($68.50 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($183.45 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Jh Jd]
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
UTGplus1: folds
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: raises $13.50 to $14
Big Blind: folds

We're playing 5-handed and are first to act holding JJ. We make a standard raise and get 3-bet large by the small blind. The villain makes it almost 5 times our initial raise, which is not always a tell, but in my experience often indicates some form of a hand that feels scared and/or vulnerable, particularly out of position. This tends to mean either a mid-pocket pair or AT+ sort of hand. Folding would be an atrociously tight play and raising is a legitimate option, but we have the ability to play a strong hand in position against a range that we have already narrowed down a lot, so we elect to call.

Donzo: calls $11
Dealer: folds
*** FLOP *** [6h 4d 4s]
Small Blind: checks

The flop comes 644 rainbow and the villain checks. If our range analysis is correct, the only hands that are a concern are 66, QQ, the small chance of KK or AA, and the very small chance that the villain was getting tricky holding a 4. We therefore bet to get value from 77-TT as well as a lighter calling A high, and also to get those same hands with substantial equity due to over cards to fold. We bet a little over half pot and the villain calls.

Donzo: bets $17
Small Blind: calls $17
*** TURN *** [6h 4d 4s] [Kc]
Small Blind: bets $22

The turn brings a K and the villain makes a very strange bet of $22 into about $66, or 1/3 pot. There are several possible rationales for this:

1) The villain check/called the flop with AK and is betting small to get value from 77-QQ hands that were betting the flop.
2) The villain has a hand in the 77-QQ range and is making a blocking bet with the expectation of folding to a raise and probably shutting down on the river in the event of a call.
3) The villain called with a hand like AT-AQ and is now deciding to turn the hand into a bluff because there aren't that many kings in our range.

In the moment, it's difficult to know what to make of the bet or how much weight to give to each of the preceding three possibilities. As the bet is so small and we only need to have the best hand 20% of the time for it to be a profitable call ((($22 / ($66+22+22)) = 20%), we elect to do so with the intent of evaluating the river.

Donzo: calls $22
*** RIVER *** [6h 4d 4s Kc] [Qs]
Small Blind: checks

The river brings a Q, a pretty terrible card, and the villain checks. Because the villain didn't bet the river, that makes it fairly unlikely that he or she has QQ or AK (unless they're paranoid that we hit QQ) and if they are holding 77-TT it's going to be almost impossible to get value from a value bet. In the event that the villain has AJ/AT they're obviously also folding and AQ has now gotten there. Without a stronger read on the villain, we can't expect them to make a fold with AQ or a call with 77-TT and therefore check behind. The villain shows AQ for the rivered pair.

Donzo: checks
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Small Blind: shows [As Qh] (two pair, Queens and Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Jh Jd] (Two pair)
Small Blind collected $108 from pot

While in hindsight we might consider whether we could have represented a K with a bet on the river to get AQ to fold, that is far too specific a read given the information we had available at the time and it might not have worked anyway.

The important takeaway is that we bet when we were ahead, called when we were ahead (and a raise would've been counter-productive), and checked behind when we couldn't get value from worse. In other words, we did everything right and the villain hit a 6-outer on the river. No biggie. Next hand.

Floating the Flop to Bluff the Turn

A play often employed by professionals (and one I don't use enough) is "floating" (i.e. calling with air) to bluff a later street. If done selectively and intelligently, it can turn profit out of seemingly nothing, make it extremely difficult for opponents to put you on a hand, and discourage future aggression. Here's a hand from a few days ago where I floated with essentially nothing and accomplished at least two of the above goals:

Seat 1: Small Blind ($142.65 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($87 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($32.40 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($109.85 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.90 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6h 8h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Small Blind: raises $9.50 to $10
Big Blind: folds

We're dealt 86 of hearts on the button and it folds around to us. Unless the blinds are calling stations, this is a hand we should normally be opening and we do so. The villain in the small blind raises to $10 and the big blind folds. This is the third opening raise out of my last four that the villain has 3bet (re-raised) me. And while that's a small sample size, chances are good that they're raising a reasonably wide range because I'm opening a wide range. Consequently, while a fold is a perfectly acceptable option as we're only holding 8 high, we have the choice to play a versatile hand in position against an aggressive villain. A re-raise is also valid, but if we face a shove we're always going to have to fold, plus our raise is less likely to be given credence due to the aforementioned couple hands we'd recently folded to the villain's raises, as the likelihood that we are raising "in frustration" inevitably comes into play. A call, on the other hand, keeps the pot size more manageable while allowing us to play the hand in position and indicate we're willing to see a flop.

Donzo: calls $7
*** FLOP *** [5c 9s Ac]
Small Blind: bets $12.50

The flop comes A95 with two clubs and the villain bets $12.50 into $21, or about 60% of the pot. At this point we have absolutely nothing except a gut shot straight draw to the 7. The most obvious choice here is to fold, considering how far behind most of the villain's range we are. However, if this villain is as loose as our limited sample size has led us to believe, we have to think that they're betting most of their preflop 3betting range here. We might therefore be inclined to use our position to raise, but again, if hypothetically we're holding a strong hand here like AJ+ or a set or two pair, we want to keep all his weaker hands in the pot. Therefore, a raise by definition keeps more bluffs in our range and might compel the villain to either call or re-raise. A call, by contrast, effectively indicates our range to be a flush draw, a pair, or better. Factoring in the recent history with the villain, a call is paradoxically the more "passive" and yet stronger play. We call, with the intent to bluff the turn if the villain checks (and possibly raise a second bet).

Donzo: calls $12.50
*** TURN *** [5c 9s Ac] [2d]
Small Blind: checks

The turn brings a blank 2 and the villain checks. As we'd planned, we bet $30 into $46 and the villain quickly folds.

Donzo: bets $30
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($30) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $44 from pot

In this example, our play accomplished exactly what we were hoping for despite the fact that we were drawing to four outs on the turn. Furthermore, for the rest of the session the villain didn't re-raise me, as he/she probably decided that there was less profit in it than they originally thought. It's important to realize that sometimes the above play isn't going to work and that players should not just start floating flops left and right. But if used sparingly, it can be a valuable tool against the right kind of villain.

Low Risk, High % Bluffs

When looking for bluff opportunities, we should identify situations where our hand looks "inevitably" strong and our opponents will therefore have an extremely difficult time making a call. Sometimes we can accomplish this by taking a hand that we assumed was a lost cause and using a favorable board texture to represent a hand we wouldn't otherwise have been able to. Just such a scenario happened for me a few days ago:

Seat 1: UTGplus1 ($116.90 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($101.20 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($179.45 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($74.95 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($100 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($117.30 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Kd Js]
UTG: folds (timeout)
UTGplus1: folds
UTG: Seat re-join
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2h 7h 7d]

We're dealt KJ in the cutoff and open to $3. The villain calls on the button and the blinds fold. The flop is 772 with two hearts. As this flop misses most of the villain's button calling range, we make a standard continuation bet and the villain calls.

Donzo: bets $5
Dealer: calls $5
*** TURN *** [2h 7h 7d] [8h]

The turn brings an 8 and a 3rd heart. While we could continue betting here, we really aren't sure what the villain has. They could have called the flop with a 7, a 2, an overpair, a flush draw, or ace high. If they have an overpair, they're likely to call at least one more bet and they're never folding a 7. And if they were just calling with a hand like AT-AK and are holding a heart, they're likely going to at least call one more street to try and hit. Consequently we check, expecting to fold if the villain bets, but they check behind.

Donzo: checks
Dealer: checks
*** RIVER *** [2h 7h 7d 8h] [6h]

The river brings a 6 and a 4th heart. At this point we could check and give up, as there's almost no chance that we can have the best hand here after the villain's flop call. However, we can consider a bet here due to the information given to us by the villain's turn check. In a situation that brings a 3rd heart, an overpair is almost always going to bet the turn to get value from single heart flush draws, as is a 7. There's a small chance of 88 for a turned boat, but not enough to be worrisome. Furthermore, if the villain had called the flop with just ace high while also holding a strong heart, it's likely (though not guaranteed) that they would use that extra equity to bet the turn, rather then letting the river come for free. As a result, the likelihood of the villain having trips, a boat, or a strong flush is significantly diminished. We decide to make a small bet of $7 into $17.50.

Donzo: bets $7

The size of our bet accomplishes two things: 1) The bet size is very small and consequently looks like an an enticement to call a flush. 2) Due to the small size of our bet, we don't need the villain to fold that often for the bet to be profitable. In fact, our bluff only needs to work about 28.5% of the time to be profitable:

$7 / ($7 + $17.50) = 28.5%

At these stakes particularly, unless a player just feels like donking off money it is going to be very difficult for them to make a call here without a flush and possibly difficult even with a weak flush. As a result we can feel confident that our bluff is going to work here often enough to make it profitable. The bet does work and the villain folds.

Dealer: folds
Uncalled bet ($7) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $16.65 from pot

Rather than being intimidated by "scary" boards like the one above, we can figure out how likely they are to help our opponent and then use them to our advantage to pick up some money that might have seemed impossible to win.

When a Bet Is Both a Bluff AND for Value

As I discussed awhile ago in this post, when we make a bet we should have an understanding of why we're betting. This generally means that we are either betting to get our opponent to call with a worse hand or fold a better hand. Sometimes, though, we can make a bet that serves both functions at once and ends up being profitable as a result. Here's a hand I played last week where that was the case:

Seat 1: UTG ($28.80 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($107.10 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($98.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($120.80 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($46.90 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($126.70 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [8d 8s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $2.50
Big Blind: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [9d Kd 6c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks

We're dealt 88 in the cutoff and raise and both the blinds call. The flop is 9K6 with two diamonds and the blinds check to us. At this point checking behind is a valid option, as there are two overcards and we're unlikely to get a call from a pair worse than 88. However, if we check behind we are advertising that it's extremely unlikely that we are holding a K or better, thereby effectively limiting our hand representation to a bluff catcher on subsequent streets. If, however, we bet, we can rep a much stronger range and apply more pressure to the blinds while still getting value from drawing hands against which we're currently ahead. There is a wide range of drawing hands and combo draw hands on this board, from a simple diamond draw to JT or QJ with or without diamonds. If we're going to make this bet, we need to A) be prepared to fire more than one barrel to get opponents to fold a 9 or weaker K's and B) have a reasonable expectation that our opponents are not going to play their draws aggressively (i.e. check-raise us). We bet $5 into $9 and the small blind calls.

Donzo: bets $5
Small Blind: calls $5
Big Blind: folds
*** TURN *** [9d Kd 6c] [Th]
Small Blind: checks

The turn brings a T, which completes the QJ straight as well as two pair with T9 and KT and a few combinations that were drawing to the flush with the T of diamonds, but is otherwise a card that misses the range of flush draws and Kx and 9x hands that would have conceivably check/called the flop. Consequently, we can expect that more often than not the T is a card that reduces the strength of the villain's hand, rather than increases it. The villain checks again and, armed with the above knowledge, we can once again bet with the confidence that A) we can still get value from hands that have a flush and/or straight draw without a pair, and B) that our continued aggression on this scary, drawish board is going to be too much for anything worse than a K to call and may also compel the fold of a weaker K. The fact that we're undeterred by the T when it fills in a number of hands is a de facto argument for a strong hand when we bet. More specifically, we might break down the villain's continuance range as follows:

Villain's Value Continuance Range: KQ**, KJ**, KT, K9, 99, TT, QJ, T9, 66

Villain's Drawing and Semi-Drawing (e.g. pairs with a draw) Continuance Range: J9*, Q9*, all diamond draws (including diamonds that picked up a T on the turn)*.

*Hand that folds to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.

**Hand that might fold to a river bet if draws miss and the hand doesn't hit trips or two pair.

Although there is a small chance of the villain having AA, KK, QQ, JJ, or AK, the absence of a preflop 3bet makes the possibility of those hands rather small. For the category of hands that have a weaker pair with a draw, we may have to be prepared to fire a third barrel on the river (assuming the draws miss). We should also know that if we bet the turn and get raised, we're always folding, as it's possible that the villain would do that with a draw, but far more likely that they're showing aggression on the turn with two pairs, trips, or a straight. 

The final complicating factor is, if the villain calls the turn and the river brings a 3rd diamond and the villain checks, do we fire a 3rd barrel to represent the flush and attempt to get the villain to fold all Kx hands, two pairs, and sets, or do we give up? I'm inclined to say the answer is to check behind, as many villains will make a "crying call" on a 3rd diamond if they're holding two pair, a straight, or a set, but the answer is probably dependent on the villain and whether the diamond that completes the flush is low or high.

In any event the point is moot in this example, as we bet $11 into $19 and the villain folds.

Donzo: bets $11
Small Blind: folds
Uncalled bet ($11) returned to Donzo
Donzo collected $18.05 from pot

Often our bets are for a single purpose and that's totally fine.  But sometimes we're presented with situations where we can attack different parts of the villain's range with entirely different purposes and they're both profitable. And when we recognize those scenarios and play accordingly, we're on the road to Money City. :D

The Mistake of Overbetting to Fold Out Draws

To show the other side of my post from yesterday, I want to briefly discuss the folly of overbetting the pot out of fear. This is a play and mindset that's common with some amateur players and effectively causes them to bleed money. I'll use an example from a hand I played last week that's a bit over-the-top, but still demonstrates what I'm talking about:

Seat 1: Dealer ($78.51 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($166.05 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($199.74 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($88 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($122.75 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus2 ($96.45 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [7h 7s]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: calls $3
Donzo: calls $2.50
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [Qd 8h 7c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: checks
Dealer: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds

We're dealt 77 in the small blind and have a raise and call when it gets to us. Raising here is sometimes legitimate, but we decide to just flat and the big blind folds. Q87 is a semi-drawish flop, so leading out is an option, but if no one has a Q, overpair, or OESD, it will be difficult to get called. We check with the hope that we can call a bet and decide the best course of action on the turn. The villain (the button) bets $3 into $9. While that's a smaller bet than we'd like, it's possible that they are betting air or betting tentatively with either a Q, 7, or 8. Or conversely, they're betting small because they (think) they're big and don't want to scare everyone out of the pot. Consequently, we want to keep all those hands in and therefor elect to just call.

*** TURN *** [Qd 8h 7c] [2d]
Donzo: checks
Dealer: bets $72.51 and is all-in

A 2 comes on the turn which changes nothing and we check again. Inexplicably, the villain shoves all-in for $72, which is 4.5 times the size of the pot, and we're all like, "Christmas came early." Yeah yeah, it's theoretically possible that the villain has QQ or 88, but the 4.5x is so absurdly large that almost no player, without a prior read, is going to bet that much with those hands when they're hoping to extract maximum value. We call and the villain shows QJ.

Donzo: calls $72.51
*** RIVER *** [Qd 8h 7c 2d] [Kc]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Dealer: shows [Jd Qs] (a pair of Queens)
Donzo: shows [7h 7s] (three of a kind, Sevens)
Donzo collected $158.02 from pot

The villain's shove is a perfect demonstration of fearful, fishy thinking. All the villain's thinking is: "People always outdraw on me, there are two cards to a straight out there and now two diamonds as well?! Screw this guy, no way am I letting that happen again, all-in!" What fish never seem to realize is that you want people to call you when they're drawing. Getting people to call with inferior equity is how money is made in poker and getting calls from straight draws and flush draws is part of that. But the fish was so afraid of the possibility that he/she might see a 3rd diamond or straight card come and be put to a decision that they made a bet that almost always gets inferior hands to fold and superior hands to call. Nevermind the fact that the only information the villain has about our range is a $3 check/call on the flop and a check on the turn, which gives us a far wider range of hands than a straight or flush draw. As if that wasn't bad enough, the flush draw didn't come until the turn, making a turned flush draw an incidental occurrence. It's possible that such a huge overbet could compel a fold from a hand like KQ or AQ, but that isn't why the fish made the bet and it would have been a bad reason anyway.

When holding a decent hand (like TP) for which one hopes to get value, it's imperative not to allow fear of hypotheticals to compel terrible decisions like the one above. Learn to live with the fact that sometimes people will outdraw you and that's ok and that it doesn't mean that you "didn't bet enough." If you make more reasonable bets and allow some of those hands to draw on you, you'll play a more profitable game and become more accustomed to being put to decisions and the reality that having an opponent outdraw you is just part of poker.

Overbetting the Pot

Overbetting the pot (betting more than the size of the pot) is a play that has become more popular in recent years, particularly with extremely lose-aggressive players like Tom Dwan and Victor Blom. It's not a play that I employ in my game particularly often, so I won't pretend to be an authority, but every now and then a situation presents itself where it's easily the most ideal play to be made. Usually this is either when bluffing a player who you don't think will have the ability to make a lighter call for a large amount of money, or you have the nuts (or close) and don't think your opponent can lay down a slightly weaker hand. An example of the latter happened for me a few days ago:

Seat 1: Dealer ($27.65 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($91.50 in chips)
Seat 4: Big Blind ($41.30 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($144.83 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($132.10 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [6c 6h]
UTG: folds
Donzo: raises $3 to $3
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: raises $4 to $5
Donzo: calls $2
*** FLOP *** [5h 3c 4h]
Big Blind: bets $5.25
Donzo: calls $5.25

We're dealt 66 in the cutoff and raise and the big blind min-3bets us. A preflop min-3bet is almost always the sign of a weak player, as it serves only the function of taking the betting lead (which is not useless, mind you) and applies no "real" pressure on the original raiser. It's still something to watch closely, as it's sometimes a play made with a premium hand, but for only a $2 re-raise there are few regular poker players in the world who are folding. We call and the flop comes 345, an excellent flop for our hand. There are no overs to our pair and we have an OESD, so even if the villain has a big pocket pair like KK, we still have 37% equity in the hand. Furthermore, if the villain has either AA or Ax and a 2 hits, we're guaranteed to take the rest of their stack. The villain bets about half the size of the pot and we make an easy call. While raising is a valid option, the fact that this is such a low board makes it unlikely that we're getting value from worse hands, as the only hands that would call a re-raise are likely 56, 25, and A3-A5 (and of those possibly only A5).

*** TURN *** [5h 3c 4h] [2d]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: checks

The turn is money and the villain checks. The problem with betting here is that there are also a significant number of aces in our range, so if the villain doesn't have an ace or an overpair, it's likely they're folding to a bet here. We check behind with the intention of sizing our bet or raise on the river for maximum value, if there's any to be had.

*** RIVER *** [5h 3c 4h 2d] [Ac]
Big Blind: checks

The best card in the deck hits (a non-heart ace), putting a straight on the board. The villain checks and we're left to decide how much we can get paid here by a hand that's playing the board. The current pot size is $21 and the villain has $31 left. The fact that the villain checked both the turn and the river means that he/she never, ever has a 6. More importantly, the villain knows that we know that. Consequently, there's no reason for us not to shove the river here, knowing that at worst
we're going to split the pot. It's a no-risk, high-reward play.

Donzo: bets $32

If the villain had a chance to win the pot outright (not chop), they would be calling $31 to win $52, giving them pot odds of about 37% or 1.68:1. But they're not calling to win, they're calling to split the pot, meaning that they stand to win only half of that, so they're actually calling $31 to win $26, giving them pot odds of about 54% or 0.84:1. In other words, if the villain determines that we could be bluffing here 46% of the time or more, he/she has to call. More important than the numbers (since the villain's likely not working those out at the time) is the truism that most players, amateur or professional, have an aversion to looking foolish. And folding on the river to a bluffy-looking bet when there's a straight on the board would leave most players wondering if they'd made a horrible decision, particularly with how the action has gone down. Players are far more likely to want to live with losing the money and knowing, rather than feeling incredibly stupid. As expected, the villain calls and we scoop the pot.

Big Blind: calls $31.05 and is all-in
Uncalled bet ($0.95) returned to Donzo
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [6c 6h] (a straight, Deuce to Six)
Big Blind: Mucks [Jh Ks] (Straight)
Donzo collected $81.10 from pot


When holding the effective nuts, it's tempting to make a small river bet to induce a call from a weaker hand, rather than "scaring off" potential calls with a large bet. But in situations like the above, when it's evident that our opponent can almost never bring him/herself to fold, an overbet may be the best way to extract max value.

Turning Trips and Bad Aspirational Thinking

There is often a sense of relief or quiet elation when, after calling a bet or a raise with a pair that may or may not be good, that card pairs the board, giving the player trips. More often than not that means the player is going to win the hand, but sometimes it's a figurative death sentence. Here's a hand I played a few days ago where that was the case:

Seat 1: UTG ($30.81 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($16.94 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($117.95 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($97.50 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($202.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($103.47 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Js]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $1
Donzo: raises $4 to $4
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $3
UTGplus2: folds
*** FLOP *** [As 8h 9c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $6
Big Blind: raises $12 to $12
Donzo: calls $6

Preflop is normal, as we're dealt AJ on the button , raise to 4x with one limper and get a caller in the big blind. The flop comes A89 rainbow and we bet $6 for value. The villain then min raises to $12. At this point we should be somewhat concerned, as the size of the raise is small and gives us roughly 4.5:1 odds to call. There are a lot of plausible hands here, from A8-AK, 88-99, and an open-ended straight draw. However, the likelihood of a straight draw, particularly considering the bet sizing, is low. Regardless, because of the cheap price we decide to call and reevaluate on the turn.

*** TURN *** [As 8h 9c] [Ah]
Big Blind: bets $33.50
Donzo: calls $33.50

The turn brings another ace and the villain bets the size of the pot. At this point we have to think about both the likelihood of a bluff and whether the villain would ever be betting an inferior ace like this for value. It's conceivable that the villain could have AT or AJ, but beyond that there isn't much that makes sense. A min-raise on the flop with A7 or worse would be an odd play, but not unprecedented. There is still a chance that the villain could have 67 or JT for the straight draw and be attempting to bet us off an 8, 9, or larger pocket pair, but in truth, that's aspirational thinking.We have no notes or indication that the player was extremely aggressive and thus likely to play a straight draw in such a way. And while all that occurred to me at the time, I allowed the mere fact that I had improved so much on the turn to blind me to the truth that I could only rarely have the best hand. We end up calling with the assumption that we'll probably have to call a shove on the river.

*** RIVER *** [As 8h 9c Ah] [5d]
Big Blind: bets $53.97 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $48.00 and is all-in

 A 5 comes on the river, which brings in one of the two possible straights. The villain shoves for $54 and, getting about 3:1 on a call and ignoring the glaring reality that the only possible hands we can beat are JT and AT, we call and the villain shows AQ.

*** SHOW DOWN ***
Big Blind: shows [Ad Qs] (three of a kind, Aces)
Donzo: Mucks [Ac Js] (Three of a kind)

It's easy to look at a hand like this and say, "I had trips and just ran into a slightly bigger hand, no big deal." To do so is a mistake and fails to recognize that AQ is one of the weakest hands in the villain's range with how the action went down. Remember, not only is the villain's line strong in a vacuum, but the way we've played the hand indicates that we have at least an ace, or perhaps occasionally a straight draw for a very bad player. Therefore, the villain's actions become that much stronger and decrease the likelihood of a bluff or a value bet with a weaker ace. But at the time, I convinced myself that this player might be bad enough to play a weaker ace this way, or just be donking off money on a draw.

The key is not to allow oneself to be seduced by the absolute value of a hand; when we play NLHE, we're not playing video poker, and it doesn't matter what we have if our opponent almost always has us beat.

Self-Analysis and Tracking Programs

One of the most crucial keys to improving one's game is taking a critical eye and searching for "leaks" that can cut into winnings. Many pros use what's known as poker tracking software to review their game as well as the stats and tendencies of their opponents. I use Hold'em Manager 2 (HEM2), one of the more popular tools available. Unfortunately, because I play on Bovada, the use of "anonymous" players makes it impossible to review specific players' stats, as well as use the HUD (heads-up display) that displays players' stats on the table in real time. However, HEM2 is still an extremely useful means to analyzing one's own game and identifying areas for improvement.

For an idea of what the program looks like, here are two images, one displaying a handful of my stats on a per stakes basis along with a list of all hands played below, and the other a graph of my cash results (actual dollar amounts are blacked out, sorry):

There are a few things to bear in mind when looking at the above images: 1) The sample size is very small (only about 13,000 hands), so there simply isn't enough data to say whether the results accurately reflect the quality of the player's game. 2) For about the last 3k hands or so I've broken even, partially due to running bad and partially due to some questionable decisions on my part. 3) The first image shows some examples of some basic stats that can be examined:

VPIP (Voluntarily Put $ In Pot) - This indicates what % of hands the player put money in the pot when it wasn't a requirement. This would include any call or raise in a hand, but excludes posted blinds not followed by further action.

PFR (Preflop Raise %) - This is the % of hands the player raises before the flop

3Bet - This is the % of hands the player re-raises preflop.

WTSD% and W$SD% (Went to Showdown % and Won $ at Showdown %) - These indicate what % of the time that a player got to the showdown with their cards and then how often they had the best hand at showdown.

And so forth. Depending on what stats are relevant or wish to be examined, one can look at anything from the frequency and success rate of continuation bets to the success of steal attempts to the overall level of aggression. It's up to you how much information you want and what's relevant. Going forward, I'm excited about the possibilities that HEM2 will present for improving my play and will see about coming up with some good examples of stuff I've been doing wrong.

I'm Still Here

To the half dozen or however many people read my blog, sorry for the hiatus. I was on vacation for a week and beyond that have just been generally lazy about analyzing my game and finding interesting hands to discuss. My free trial to Hold Em Manager 2 (poker tracking software) just expired and my payment got rejected for some reason, so once I figure that out I'll be back with something that's hopefully interesting.

Managing Tilt and Knowing When To Quit

I am the first to admit that there are many flaws in my poker game and my abilities are nowhere near those of the best in the world. But one aspect of my game on which I have always prided myself is tilt control ("tilt," for those who don't know, being the colloquial term for the state of making decisions emotionally, though it usually means playing angry and/or frustrated). For the most part, the last month or so I've been pleased with my tilt control and ability to maintain a calm, objective approach to playing. A couple nights ago I sat down to play a lengthy session, eager for the opportunity to sit with the generally weaker weekend players.

And then I started running bad. Any poker player who has played a decent amount experiences it and sometimes it's worse than you ever thought possible. And that night, boy was it ever. Getting outflopped over and over, specific players catching multiple hands against me, etc. But it quickly turned into more than running bad. I was making poor decisions with flimsy rationales: c-betting bad flops, calling down too light, etc. A few decent hands were saving me from completely hemorrhaging money, but I was allowing frustration to affect my play. In other words, I had no business playing poker right then. Aaaaaaaaaand then this happened (presented without comment):

Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($54.30 in chips)
Seat 3: Donzo ($178.90 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($52.25 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($99 in chips)
Seat 6: UTG ($229.53 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.50
Big Blind: posts big blind $1
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qs Qc]
UTG: raises $2 to $2
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $6 to $6
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
UTG: calls $4
*** FLOP *** [Ad 9s Qd]
UTG: bets $3
Donzo: calls $3
*** TURN *** [Ad 9s Qd] [Ts]
UTG: bets $19.50
Donzo: raises $54 to $54
UTG: calls $34.50
*** RIVER *** [Ad 9s Qd Ts] [Tc]
UTG: checks
Donzo: bets $115.90 and is all-in
UTG: calls $115.90
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qs Qc] (a full house, Queens full of Tens)
UTG: shows [Td Th] (four of a kind, Tens)
UTG collected $357.30 from pot

That was my cue to get out of there immediately, and I did. But in truth, I should've quit well before then. The moment I felt my anger and frustration rising was when I needed to at minimum step away from the tables for 10 minutes and potentially take the evening off and start fresh the next day. But instead, like a big dumb idiot, I was all like "RAAHHHHH, I'M A MAN!!!" and was set on proving that these nameless yahoos weren't gonna outplay ME.

For most poker players, our egos are a dangerous thing, and we must take care to both realize when we're slipping into a tilted mindset and immediately stop playing when we do.

Facing Check-Raises and Examining Continuance Ranges

A powerful-yet-underused play at micro/small stakes is the check-raise. I'll talk about employing check-raises at some point in the future, but for now I'll talk about responding to them. For many amateurs, being check-raised is a thoroughly unpleasant experience that puts them off their game and propels them toward mistakes in both the current and ensuing hands. When facing a check-raise, it's important to review board texture, villain tendencies, and any other game implications. Here's a brief example from a hand I played on Sunday:

Seat 1: Big Blind ($23.79 in chips)
Seat 2: UTG ($41.54 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus1 ($74.20 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($51.80 in chips)
Seat 6: Small Blind ($74.36 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [4s 3h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [2h 2c 6c]
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $2

The action folds around to us and we're holding 43 on the button. We make a standard raise hoping to steal, but also prepared to play the hand in position. The big blind calls and the flop is pretty dry with 226 and two clubs. The big blind checks and we bet $2 because A) we have 4 high and can't win this hand unless we improve, B) we have a gut shot straight draw, and C) that flop misses almost all of the big blind's calling range.

Big Blind: raises $5 to $5

The villain check-raises and we're left with a decision. The most obvious play is to fold, as we are guaranteed to be way behind no matter what the villain has and we could simply write it off as a continuation bet that didn't work. Calling is a legitimate option, as it indicates a lot of strength, implying that we have either a 2, a 6, an overpair, or at worst a flush draw. If we call, it's with the intent to bluff the turn (assuming the villain checks). Finally, we can re-raise in order to get the villain to fold out all of their bluffs that were bluffing us on the flop, as well as the occasional underpair to the 6. Whereas it might be appropriate to call here with just ace high for value, as that would be ahead of much of the villain's bluffing range, our 43 can only function as a bluff if we don't improve.

We unfortunately don't have any stats or other reads on the villain and therefore can't say how often he/she check-raises. Consequently, our decision has to be based on how the board connects with the villain's range and how it connects with our perceived range.

Our Perceived Range
Using Hold Em Manager 2 (which I'll discuss in a future post), I can isolate my stats for just the session in which I was playing. For the amount of time I'd sat at the table, I'd been raising on the button 50% of the time. If the villain had been paying attention, he/she is likely to notice that and consequently assume that I'm opening an extremely wide range of hands on the button. Furthermore, because the board is so dry the villain has to expect us to be betting with most of our bluffs. As a result, our post-bet perceived range on the flop is huge, which means we must expect the villain's check-raise to be a bluff a substantial percentage of the time.

Villain's Continuance Range
For the sake of argument, let's say that the villain was calling preflop with ATC (any two cards). Let's also say that the villain check-raises his/her entire range on the flop. If that's the case, and we're attempting to discern the viability of a raise, we need to determine the villain's continuance range, or the hands with which they would continue in the hand in the face of a re-raise from us. To do that, we can use Equilab to separate all the combinations of hands that fit that criteria. If we say that the villain continues with quads, a boat, any 2, any 6, any overpair, or a flush draw, that makes up about 30% of all possible hands. In other words, unless the villain has the capacity for a 4bet flop bluff, which is a very aggressive and rarely-seen play at these stakes, they are folding 70% of their hands to a raise. 

However, remember that those numbers are based on the assumption that the villain called with ATC and is playing all the "continuing" hands for a check-raise followed by a call. In reality, the villain's continuance range is almost certainly lower than 30% because even after accounting for a smaller total number of original hands from which to select, if you look at the image above you'll see that there are a lot more combinations of hands with a 2 than we would expect all but the loosest villain to play, e.g. T2, 72, etc. Furthermore, the villain is less likely to call a re-raise with a weak 6 than with a 2, overpair, or flush draw. Finally, the villain would probably just check-call with some of their bigger hands (trip 2s, a boat, etc), especially knowing that I'm bluffing a significant portion of the time, as they wouldn't want me to fold all my air. 

Armed with the above information, we need to determine the profitability of a raise. After the villain's check-raise, the pot stands at $10.25. We raise to $10.50, which is the equivalent of betting $8.50 (because our $2 is already out there) into $10.25 (the pot including our $2 and the villain's $5 raise). If we do a little basic math, we'll see that we need our bluff to work 45.33% of the time to be profitable:

($8.50) / ($8.50+$10.25)
($8.50) / ($18.75) = 45.33%

If our evaluation of the villain's continuance range is even remotely in the ballpark, and they're folding over 45.33% of their hands, then it's a profitable raise. The villain does fold, and we take down the hand with 4 high.

Donzo: raises $8.50 to $10.50
Big Blind: folds

To phrase the idea of bet profitability more simply, think of a hand in which there's a $100 pot on the river and the action is on us holding nothing. If we bet $100 (the size of the pot), we need our bluff to work 50% of the time to break even, as 50% of the time the villain will call and we'll lose our $100 bet and 50% of the time the villain will fold and we'll win the $100 in the pot.

Estimating a villain's continuance range can be a difficult task in the moment, but in fairly clear cut situations like the one I've outlined here, having a healthy grasp of the likelihood of a fold is crucial to maximizing profit.

Big Hands and Keeping a Clear Head

One of the biggest challenges for amateur players is maintaining an emotionless approach when picking up a huge hand. I cannot count how many times I've seen someone pick up a premium hand and play with little to no regard for the actions of the other players at the table. Playing live gives some insight into the mental state of these players and their thought process goes something like this:

To piggyback on my post from Tuesday, if and when they end up losing their loss is often followed by a lamentation about one or more of A) their terrible luck, B) the inconceivable play of their opponent(s), and C) how they had "no choice" but to play the hand the way they did. "C" is where large amounts of money are needlessly lost. To demonstrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 1: Donzo ($50.85 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($39.82 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($70.73 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($52.99 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($68.21 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50.50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Ah]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus1: calls $1.50
UTGplus2: calls $1.50
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: calls $1.25
Big Blind: calls $1
*** FLOP *** [3s 7d 4c]
Small Blind: checks
Big Blind: checks
Donzo: bets $4.50
UTGplus1: folds
UTGplus2: calls $4.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds

We're dealt aces UTG and make a standard 3x raise. Four people call, which is more than we're hoping to see, but we're still the overwhelming favorite heading into the flop.

The flop comes 374 rainbow (all different suits) and the blinds check to us. Although this is a low flop that initially looks ideal, it's actually not great for our hand because A) there are no larger pairs that could have hit, meaning hands that pair the board are going to have a hard time paying us off, B) there are no potential flush draws, and C) there are only gut shot straight draws, as 56 already has a straight on the flop. That said, we're still usually going to have the best hand and want to bet to get value from hands like A7, a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45), and inferior overpairs to the board. We bet $4.50 into $7.50 for 60% pot and get one caller.

*** TURN *** [3s 7d 4c] [2s]
Donzo: bets $8.50
UTGplus2: raises $17 to $17

Unless the villain floated us with A5 or 22 (or inexplicably was in the hand with 72), the turn is effectively a blank. We again bet for value and are quickly min-raised.

At this point it's helpful to talk about the Baluga Whale Theorem. If you don't want to click the link, it's the idea that when faced with a turn raise, the strength of single pair hands must be seriously reevaluated. When an opponent just calls the flop and raises the turn, they're saying "my hand was strong enough on the flop that I wasn't scared of anything and was willing to let another card come so that I could win more money from you firing a second barrel." It is of course possible that some villains will float with air on the flop and raise the turn, but that's generally a more sophisticated play and not one that you see often at lower limits. Do some players know the Baluga Whale Theorem and use it to bluff? Absolutely, and it's something I expect to see more as I move up in stakes.

Furthermore, if a player is on a draw and is inclined toward playing draws more aggressively, the likelihood of a raise happening on the flop is much greater because A) there is less money invested on the flop than the turn, making a bluff attempt less costly, and B) a raise on the flop, if called, has a strong chance to induce a check on the turn from the original bettor (particularly if the original bettor is first to act), leading to the option for a free card for the raiser.

So, to return to our hand and our villain, what are the reasonable hands for him/her to have? If we consider the hands that had us beat on the flop, there are 9 possible set combinations and 16 straight combinations. Let's also include the 1 combination of A7 of spades, as that's a hand that might've originally called for value, but wants to turn the hand into a bluff now that we've fired a second barrel. If we assume that the villain is only raising those hands and we plug them into Equilab, we have an atrocious 7.5% equity with one card to come. But what if they're sometimes raising worse overpairs for value? If we add 88-KK into the villain's range, our equity skyrockets to 58.6%. But if we just take a moment to review the preflop action, we will see how unlikely most of those hands are. The villain is in the cutoff and there was a caller prior to the action getting to him/her. While a flat call with a big pocket pair sometimes happens in response to just the original raiser, it's something one rarely sees when a third person is involved in a pot, not to mention the dealer and blinds who have yet to act. Consequently, the likelihood of KK or QQ is slim to none, as is the likelihood of JJ or TT, although I'll leave a slightly possibility for those to the arbitrary tune of 25% of the time. 99 and 88 are believable calling hands both preflop and on the flop, but what would the purpose of the turn raise be? Value raising my extremely specific UTG betting range of A7, or just hoping for a tilted call with AK? It doesn't make much sense, but allowing the possibility that the villain also plays those hands that way 25% of the time, and factoring in our removal of KK and QQ and the reduced likelihood of JJ and TT, we come up with equity of 24%.

The last factors to take into account are the raise size and pot odds. As the villain min-raised, we are getting excellent pot odds of 17%. However, considering the strength indicated by the villain's line, we are looking at a strong-to-inevitable chance of facing an all-in on the river. That means that we're not actually looking at calling $8.50 to win $42, we're calling $36.35 (our current stack size) to win $69.85 (what the pot will be after the villain's shove for my remaining $27.85 after I call $8.50). That gives us odds of 34%. If our above range assignment is accurate (or close to it), we don't have the right odds to make the call and should therefore fold, which I did.

Donzo: folds
*** SUMMARY ***
Seat 3: UTGplus2 showed [3d 3h] and won ($31.85)

The villain didn't show at the time, but we can see now that he/she had 33 for a flopped set. Does that mean that the villain will NEVER have a worse hand? No, but the point is to determine how likely that is, and without a read that the villain is extremely aggressive or willing to raise lighter for value, we can't assume that they're taking that line with only a single pair. And because we didn't allow ourselves to become emotionally invested in our aces and left our brain in the "On" position, we were able to escape the hand losing only 29 big blinds instead of 100.

Avoiding the Blame Game and Taking the Opportunity to Learn

A hallmark of the fish's mindset is the belief that everyone is terrible and the only reason they are losing money is because no one except them knows how to play poker. The most vocal complaints usually come after losing a hand in which their opponent either A) called preflop with a weak hand that then outdrew them or B) called a bet on the river with a weaker hand than they "should" have. The irony of accusing players of being "too bad to beat" is usually lost on these types. Rather than simplifying their game against a player that "can't fold" and taking most bluffs off the table, they instead insist on playing a tone deaf game that doesn't take into account differing circumstances, such as calling station opponents or the implausibility of the "story" they're telling with their bet(s). I love seeing players freak out in such a way, both because it's amusing and because it reveals them for the inferior players that they are. These players are determined to make sure you know that they know how to play, it's everyone else's fault for being too stupid to know what they're supposed to do.

Watch the best players in the world--guys like Ivey, Galfond, Dwan--and you'll notice that they never complain about the way their opponent plays a hand. When they lose, if they say anything at all it's usually "nice hand" and then they move on. I can think of three reasons that all aspiring poker players should emulate that approach:

1) You won't look like a whiny asshole and will demonstrate that you have the confidence to allow your play to speak for itself.

2) The act of getting upset about a hand is by definition an aggravation of one's emotions, so the more one allows oneself to get upset or vocal or complain, the more likely it is to put you in a tilted or sub-optimal state of mind for playing.

3) If a player is insistent that the fault lies with the other player for how they played the hand, then that player is depriving him/herself of the chance to learn something. Rather than saying to oneself, "could I have played that hand differently?" the player is too absorbed with preserving their ego to use the experience as an opportunity to get better.

To illustrate reason #3, let's look at a hand I played last week (my explanation of how I played the hand will be brief):

Seat 1: Small Blind ($60.81 in chips)
Seat 2: Donzo ($53.30 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($61.60 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus1 ($63.86 in chips)
Seat 6: Dealer ($32.43 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2d 5h]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.50
Dealer: calls $0.50
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: checks
*** FLOP *** [3c 7h 3h]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: checks
Dealer: checks
*** TURN *** [3c 7h 3h] [5c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $1.50
Dealer: folds
Donzo: calls $1.50
*** RIVER *** [3c 7h 3h 5c] [Kh]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus1: bets $4.75
Donzo: calls $4.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [4c Qc] (a pair of Threes)
Donzo: shows [2d 5h] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo collected $13.55 from pot

We're dealt 52 in the big blind and we see a free flop 3-handed. The 373 flop is dry and everyone checks. The turn gives us a 5 and also puts a club flush draw out there. We check again and the villain bets the size of the pot. The other player folds and we call. Although it's possible that the villain was slow-playing trip 3s or has a better 5, they're most likely betting either a club flush draw or air. The river brings the K and a third heart. We check and the villain again bets the size of the pot. While it's a scary card, it's important to remember that the villain didn't bet on the flop, which, if he/she were holding two hearts, is almost a mandatory bet on such an otherwise dry board. Consequently, a flush is extremely unlikely. It's possible that the K hit a part of the villain's bluffing range, but it still missed most of his air hands. We make the call and the villain shows Q4 of clubs for a missed flush.

After I called, the villain and I had a brief chat...

Villain: Really?
Me: Yes, really.
Villain: When I die, I'm going to ask God if people cheated at online poker, or if they were really just that bad.
Me: Then you're asking the wrong question.

My meaning was probably lost on the player, but what he should be asking God (or himself) is, "Why didn't I try to figure out what I did wrong in poker, rather than blaming anyone but myself?" Instead, the villain's thought process amounted to, "He only had a pair of fives, how the hell could he call me with a K and three hearts out there?!?!?!"

Don't play the blame game and don't be a whiny player. Always, always, always try to learn something.

Premium Hands and Not Being Ruled By Fear

When many amateurs pick up a premium hand, they don't know any other way to play it than "fast," i.e. raising at every opportunity and/or betting large whenever possible. In reality, it is a slightly different manifestation of the fear I talked about in this post. Players are afraid that if they have to make a post-flop decision they will make the wrong one and don't want to deal with the discomfort of such a decision. Therefore, they raise, period. While such "fast playing" is sometimes the best way to play a big hand, it is not always the most profitable. As an example, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 2: Donzo ($62.87 in chips)
Seat 3: UTGplus2 ($47.27 in chips)
Seat 5: Small Blind ($71.73 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($50 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Qh Qd]
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
UTGplus2: raises $4.75 to $4.75
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds

We're playing 4-handed and are dealt QQ in the cutoff (to the right of the button) and make a standard 3x raise. The button (identified above as UTGplus2 because it was technically a dead button) 3-bets us to $4.75 and the blinds fold. At this point we need to figure out our best course of action. Unless we have a crazy read and know that this player is only 3-betting AA and KK, there's no way we can fold here, particularly 4-handed. A raise is a definite possibility for a few reasons:

1) The villain's range is inherently wider because of the fact that we're raising from the cutoff, which means the villain knows our range is wider than it would be from an earlier position, and therefore their 3-betting range should be wider.

2) We want to get maximum value for our big hand and the villain may not be able to fold a strong-but-inferior hand.

3) We are content to potentially fold out some hands that are behind, but have significant equity against us, particularly as we are out of position.

However, some of those reasons are exactly why we shouldn't raise. If the villain is raising with a hand like, say, T9 or AJ, we don't want those hands to fold. By just calling out of position, we can appear the reluctant/passive player and present the opportunity for the villain to bluff with all hands that miss. We definitely want to avoid folding out hands like 99-JJ, which are way behind us but will find some of the same flops attractive/non-scary. Even if we assign a fairly conservative range of 99+ and AJ+ (leaving out plausible hands like KQ, JT, or T9), our equity against the villain's range is about 61%. If we were to raise, the plausible calling/re-raising range shrinks to about 51%, a virtual coin flip. With that in mind, we just call.

Donzo: calls $3.25
*** FLOP *** [8h 2h 8s]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $10.25

The flop is excellent for us, as it all but assures we have the best hand so long as our opponent doesn't have AA or KK (or an aggressively played mid-range hand like 98). We could bet here to get value out of hands like the aforementioned 99-JJ, but then we've caused all the ace high hands (and potential other missed hands) to fold. Instead we check, and the villain bets the size of the pot. This is interesting for two reasons: 1) it's a large bet on an extremely dry board; except for the flush draw, there is no reason for the villain to be concerned about all the combinations to which we might hypothetically be drawing. In other words, if the villain had KK or AA, he virtually assures I'm folding everything from which he wants to get value, except for 99-QQ, and is therefore not extracting maximum value. While there are some players who bet the size of the pot just as a regular matter of course, they are in the minority. 2) If I call, there will be about $31 in the pot and the villain will have $32 remaining, meaning that I may need to deal with an all-in on the turn or river. While there is some concern that this could be an aggressively-played KK or AA, we should be happy about the spot we're in and likely prepared to call such an all-in depending on the card(s) that come.

Donzo: calls $10.25
*** TURN *** [8h 2h 8s] [4c]
Donzo: checks
UTGplus2: bets $32.27 and is all-in

We check and, as anticipated, the villain moves all-in. While it's a large, potentially intimidating bet, the important thing to remember is that nothing has changed--the villain is still making a large bet on a dry board and the likelihood of him holding a hand like AK, AQ, or a random worse hand is still the same, as our actions have done nothing to indicate that we have a hand as strong as QQ. We call and the villain shows AK.

Donzo: calls $32.27
*** RIVER *** [8h 2h 8s 4c] [6s]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Donzo: shows [Qh Qd] (two pair, Queens and Eights)
UTGplus2: shows [Ac Kh] (a pair of Eights)
Donzo collected $93.29 from pot

If we had re-raised preflop, the villain likely would have shoved, and we'd have called and been a slight favorite with 57% equity. Instead, because we were prepared to deal with a somewhat difficult decision, we gave the villain the opportunity to bluff off his entire stack and got it all-in with the villain drawing to 6 outs on the river, giving us 86% equity.

Will the villain show up with AA or KK sometimes? Of course. But again, we should be happy with our decision regardless of the outcome, if our logic is good.

Calling Light and Feeling Slightly Awesome

It's crucial for poker players to avoid making a big play--whether a call, raise, or fold--for the sake of proving that they're capable of making such plays and/or looking cool. However, if one can make such a play AND have a good reason for doing so, every now and then it's ok to pat yourself on the back about it. For example, I felt pretty good about the following hand from a few days ago (please note I moved up in stakes to $0.25/$0.50):

Seat 2: Dealer ($50 in chips)
Seat 3: Small Blind ($49.55 in chips)
Seat 4: Donzo ($50.10 in chips)
Seat 5: UTG ($15.60 in chips)
Seat 6: UTGplus1 ($18.44 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.25
Donzo: posts big blind $0.50
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [2s 2c]
UTG: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: folds
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Donzo: calls $0.50
*** FLOP *** [3c 7c 6h]
Donzo: checks
UTG: bets $2.25

We're playing 5-handed and the villain min raises from UTG, which doesn't tell us a lot about their range except they don't have complete trash like Q4 or 93. As it only costs us $.50 to see the flop and we're holding a pair, a call is perfectly appropriate. The flop hits a low-mid range pretty hard, but also misses a ton of hands. I check and the villain bets the pot. At this point the villain could have everything from a straight to complete air, but remember that they are figuring that this flop missed most of my hands as well. Importantly, I also have a note on this player (based on a few dozen hands) that he/she may make pot size bets in spots where other players have indicated weakness. I call with the intention of re-evaluating on the turn.

Donzo: calls $2.25
*** TURN *** [3c 7c 6h] [9h]
Donzo: checks
UTG: checks

We check and the villain checks behind, which is important because it removes a TON of possible hands from his/her range. There are now two potential flush draws on the board and if we were drawing to the straight with 89, we've picked up top pair as well. As a result, if the villain had a strong hand like 45 (for the flopped straight), 67, a set, or a pocket pair larger than 99, he/she would want to bet for value on the turn as well. The check also reduces the likelihood of a 7, which might still want to go for value with only one overcard.

*** RIVER *** [3c 7c 6h 9h] [7d]
Donzo: checks
UTG: bets $6.75

The river pairs the 7 and we check, as the only reason to bet would be to get the villain to fold a 6, 3, 44, or 55, which is unlikely to work. The villain again bets the size of the pot, same as on the flop. At this point the villain's range is polarized between a strong hand or a bluff. They likely either have a 7 that they checked behind on the turn because they were scared of the 9 or a straight, or they don't have anything. Up to this point in the hand, our actions have indicated that we have a weak pair, ace high, or a missed draw. As a result, the villain has a reasonable expectation that we will fold many of those hands to a large bet. There is a small chance that the villain is value betting extremely thin with a 6 or 3, but in all likelihood those hands would be checked behind as well.

I put all of the above together and make the call. The villain shows A4 for ace high and a missed gutshot.

Donzo: calls $6.75
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTG: shows [Ah 4d] (a pair of Sevens)
Donzo: shows [2s 2c] (two pair, Sevens and Twos)
Donzo collected $19.25 from pot

While it's tempting to say "forget it, there's too much out there that beats me," if we take some time to logically construct our opponent's range based on their actions, we can make a call that looks ridiculous at first glance, but is actually supported by good logic. Only then do we get to brush that dirt off our shoulders and feel like a badass mofo. ;)

Recognizing Mistakes Despite Winning

Even for players who know that aptitude in poker cannot be tied to winning any particular hand or session, it's easy to forgo self-examination when making money. But it's crucial to examine hands where we made money, but played sub-optimally, to see if we could do something different in a similar situation in the future. To illustrate, let's look at a hand that I won, but involved a big mistake:

Seat 1: UTG ($38.10 in chips)
Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($36.01 in chips)
Seat 4: Dealer ($42.17 in chips)
Seat 5: Donzo ($32.20 in chips)
Seat 6: Big Blind ($18.20 in chips)
Donzo: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ks Ah]
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
Dealer: folds
Donzo: raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind: folds
UTGplus1: raises $5 to $5.25
Donzo: raises $13.72 to $14.72
UTGplus1: calls $9.47

We're dealt AK in the small blind and raise the only limper for value. Surprisingly, the limper 3-bets for over 5x my bet. While I'm a little concerned about AA or KK, we're still ahead or flipping with most of the villain's range. I 4-bet for a little under 3x and the villain calls.

*** FLOP *** [Qh Ad 8c]

We flop the ace and it's our action first. At the time, my thought process was something along the lines of "I've been playing aggressively and if I had been bluffing and an ace flopped I would bet, therefore I should also bet with my made hands for balance." This was the completely wrong line of thinking for a couple of reasons:

1) Anonymous Players. On Bovada, there are no player names--players only have the designation of Player 1, Player 2, etc. What that means is that (so far as I know) no one can have any stats or notes on the player other than what they've noted during that session. So while I might run into this player again, I won't know it because they'll be indicated as "Player ___." Therefore, there is little benefit to worrying about "meta game" considerations whereby it would be useful for my opponents to know I will bet or bluff in the same spot.

2) The villain's calling range that we can beat is extremely narrow and possibly non-existent. Unless the villain has reason to think that I'm a player willing to 4-bet and then shove with nothing, he/she is probably not going to call a shove with worse than an ace here. AK is never folding, we're crushed by AQ, and worse aces like AJ or AT would have to put serious thought into calling a raise here, as those hands are effectively bluff catchers, as is any (improbable) weaker ace. As for plausible hands that beat us, we are crushed by the one combination of AA in the deck as well as QQ and 88. Any other pocket pair is almost certainly folding (unless the villain is capable of making a very light call down for a lot of money, which is unlikely at these stakes) as are oddly-played hands with a Q (KQ, QJ, QT, etc). So we're left with a couple of worse hands that might call and everything else folding.

Unfortunately, I didn't go through all of that in my head at the time. All I was thinking was "blah blah, meta game, blah blah." I bet and the the villain folded:

Donzo: bets $17.48 and is all-in
UTGplus1: folds
Uncalled bet ($17.48) returned to Donzo
Donzo: shows [Ks Ah]
Donzo collected $28.21 from pot

In other words, I did exactly what I spoke against doing a couple posts ago: I made a bet that virtually ensured all worse hands would fold and all better hands would call.

Plenty of people would be happy to take down a 112 big blind pot with AK out of position. My point is that we shouldn't be. We should always look for ways that we could have played a hand differently, whether we won or not.

Tricky Spots and Timing Tells

Few things in NLHE are less fun than being put to a decision knowing you're either crushed or slightly ahead of your opponent. At such times my inclination is usually to fold and "wait for a better spot." While that is often the correct course of action, there are times when a call or raise with a made hand is the most profitable choice. Let's look at a hand I played last week where I was faced with just such a decision:


Seat 2: UTGplus1 ($24.03 in chips)
Seat 3: Dealer ($20.33 in chips)
Seat 4: Small Blind ($28.97 in chips)
Seat 5: Big Blind ($15.79 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($72.39 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
UTGplus1: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [Ac Jd]
Donzo: raises $1 to $1
UTGplus1: calls $0.75
Dealer: folds
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: folds
*** FLOP *** [2s 6s Ad]
Donzo: bets $1.50
UTGplus1: raises $6.85 to $6.85

I'm UTG with AJ and raise to 4x due to the UTG+1 player (hereafter "villain") who posted their blind out of position. The villain calls and everyone else folds. The flop is good for me, as I flop top pair and am usually going to have the best hand. I bet $1.50 and it takes the villain less than a second to raise to $6.85. At this point, I'm going to say that there are a couple of different probable ranges for the villain to have. If we give the villain a range of two pair, a set, and any flush draw (including flush draws with a gutshot straight draw), Equilab tells us that our equity is 54%. If we expand the villain's range to include AK and AQ, our equity drops to 40%. I'm more inclined to drop AK and AQ out of the villain's range considering the lack of a 3bet, but it's not inconceivable.

We're now faced with what is essentially an all-in decision. I say that because if we call the villain's raise of $6.85, after rake we'll be looking at a pot of around $15 and the villain will have about $16 behind, leaving enough for roughly a pot-size bet on the turn, which considering the raise on the flop we have to expect on the turn the majority of the time. Therefore, in a vacuum, we might be inclined to fold here.

However, let's take a look at the raise again, which is notable for a couple of reasons. First, the size of the raise is large; the villain has made it about 4.5x my bet. Second, the raise was put in extremely quickly. What that means is that the villain had already made the decision about what to do prior to me putting in my bet. They had their mouse cursor waiting to hit the "pot" button to make a pot-size raise and then clicked raise.

Timing Tells

So, what do those two pieces of information tell us? In my experience, a rapidly executed, large raise is usually the online version of aggressive table talk and false bravado. It's saying (loudly), "I am so strong here that I was ready to raise you instantly, so you'd better fold if you know what's good for you." Of course we all know poker players are a bunch of liars, so to quote Mike Caro, as players we should "figure out what your opponent wants you to do and disappoint them." If we're right about the range indicated by the size and speed of the raise, this increases the likelihood of a flush draw, combo draw, or pair+draw, while still allowing for a number of combinations of stronger made hands that are afraid to let draws chase. Consequently, I decide to shove all-in to get value out of all the hands I'm beating here, while still acknowledging and being fine with the fact that sometimes the villain will have me crushed. It's important to note that I am raising almost exclusively for value here, not as a bluff, as I expect the villain to call close to 100% of the time with all his/her hands. While it's possible that the villain would fold to a shove holding AK or AQ, the aggression of the flop raise and possibility that I could also be on a draw makes that highly unlikely.

Donzo: raises $21.40 to $22.90
UTGplus1: raises $0.13 to $23.03 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $0.13
*** TURN *** [2s 6s Ad] [4s]
*** RIVER *** [2s 6s Ad 4s] [4h]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
UTGplus1: shows [7s As] (a flush, Ace high)
Donzo: shows [Ac Jd] (two pair, Aces and Jacks)
UTGplus1 collected $46.41 from pot

I shove all-in, the villain calls and shows an ace with a flush draw and turns the 4 of spades for the flush. Going back to Equilab, my equity at the time of the shove was 52%, giving me the slight edge in EV. But again, the correctness (or incorrectness) of the decision lies with the pre-conclusion analysis.

Resisting the Urge to Bet for Information

"I wanted to see where I was at" is a phrase I hear from a lot of amateur players. This is typically after the conclusion of a hand in which they were holding a medium to strong pocket pair, an overcard came on the flop (often an ace), and they bet. Whether the player realizes it or not, this is fear talking--fear of uncertainty, fear of the unknown, fear of being forced to make a decision. When someone bets "for information," what they're usually doing is attempting to absolve themselves of the burden of thinking. They're saying to themselves, "If I bet and get called here, I can then confidently check/fold in my knowledge that the the other player paired that overcard." The problem is that "betting for information" in that scenario is burning money. Whenever a bet is made, we should be aware of what the bet's purpose is. Are we betting to get value from worse hands? Are we betting to get better hands to fold? A combination of both? Or just to "take it down?" To illustrate, let's look at a hand I played last week (I'm using a different export format for the hand history, hopefully it's a little easier to read):


Seat 1: Small Blind ($24.75 in chips)
Seat 2: Big Blind ($32.75 in chips)
Seat 3: UTG ($22.18 in chips)
Seat 4: UTGplus1 ($30.37 in chips)
Seat 5: UTGplus2 ($15.81 in chips)
Seat 6: Donzo ($38.29 in chips)
Small Blind: posts small blind $0.10
Big Blind: posts big blind $0.25
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to Donzo [9c 9d]
UTG: calls $0.25
UTGplus1: calls $0.25
UTGplus2: calls $0.25
Donzo: raises $1.50 to $1.50
Small Blind: folds
Big Blind: calls $1.25
UTG: calls $1.25
UTGplus1: calls $1.25
UTGplus2: folds
*** FLOP *** [5c Ac 3h]
Big Blind: checks
UTG: checks
UTGplus1: checks

Preflop is straightforward, as I'm dealt 99 on the button and there are three limpers when it gets to me. In retrospect I should've made it 7-8x instead of 6x, but I get three callers and the flop comes A53 with two clubs. It checks around to me and we're presented with a situation like I described above. So if we were going to bet, what is the purpose of our bet?

1) Value. I can reasonably expect to be called by flush draws and perhaps sometimes a pair with a gutshot (e.g. 45). There is perhaps a chance that some players might call one street with 66-88, but in a 4-way pot at these stakes it's unlikely.

2) Bluff. My profitable bluffing range is EXTREMELY narrow here. Since no one raised preflop, I have no way of putting anyone on a pocket pair better than JJ (and probably no better than TT). No one is ever folding a set or two pair here and is probably not folding any ace, as all weak aces without a 3 or 5 give the player a wheel draw in addition to their pair. So we're left with the only superior hands that fold to us being TT and perhaps A6-A8 from a tight player.

3) Both for Value and as a Bluff. This sounds contradictory, but sometimes what you are doing with one or more opponents is betting to get value from part of their range (e.g. a flush draw) while bluffing the part of their range that beats you (e.g. TT). However, in this hand both ranges are too narrow to make this apply.

4) To Take It Down. Sometimes in a multiway pot we have reason to believe we have the best hand and that most inferior hands are going to fold to a bet, but our hand is vulnerable enough that we would prefer to bet to take it down now rather than risk another scary card coming. I am wary of this line of thinking because it often goes hand in hand with the "fear" of not knowing how to handle an uncertain situation, but it's sometimes an appropriate play. In this hand, all players checking indicates some weakness, but isn't enough information to conclude that no one is slow playing or that their ranges are heavily weighted toward hands that have a lot of equity against us.

I decide to check behind thinking that I probably have the best hand, but am prepared to re-evaluate on the turn.


Donzo: checks
*** TURN *** [5c Ac 3h] [9s]
Big Blind: bets $3.92
UTG: folds
UTGplus1: folds

Jackpot on the turn, as the 9 gives us the 2nd nuts and the big blind leads out for about 2/3 pot. Both other players fold and now we're left to ponder the villain's range and how to extract maximum value. The big blind leading the turn into three other players probably means that they flopped big and were slow playing. A5, A3, or a set of 5's or 3's is most likely, with a possibility of 53 and A9 as well. There's also a modest chance of something like a flopped flush draw that thinks the 9 probably didn't help anyone and is attempting to take down the pot.

We could just call here, but raising makes sense for two reasons:

1) We want to get value from the small number of flush draws in the villain's range while they're still drawing.

2) Our line looks extremely weak and it's almost impossible for the villain to put us on 99. Checking behind on the flop has essentially told our opponent that we didn't flop a strong ace, two pair, or a set, and a flush draw probably would've warranted a continuation bet as well. Consequently, unless we played A9 skittishly or were getting tricky with 55 or 33 (unlikely in a 4-way pot), the villain almost has to think we're bluffing here. I raise with the expectation that the villain will usually shove all-in, which is precisely what happens.


Donzo: raises $10.34 to $10.34
Big Blind: raises $20.91 to $31.25 and is all-in
Donzo: calls $20.91
*** RIVER *** [5c Ac 3h 9s] [Ks]
*** SHOW DOWN ***
Big Blind: shows [5h 3d] (two pair, Fives and Threes)
Donzo: shows [9c 9d] (three of a kind, Nines)
Donzo collected $66.85 from pot

The villain had 53 for a flopped two pair. To return the original point, if we'd bet the flop we'd have been called or raised by a better hand and gotten the other hands (which were QJ and T8) to fold, accomplishing the exact opposite of what we want: getting better hands to fold and worse hands to call. Instead, not betting emotionally and instead checking allowed us to control the hand and cash in (with a bit of help from Luck).

Optimistic Overweighting

I want to talk about an important phenomenon I call "optimistic overweighting." Whether they realize it or not, this is something that almost every poker player does and some do it constantly, to the detriment of their game. By optimistic overweighting, I'm referring to the practice of believing your opponent has more bluffs in his or her range than they actually do. To illustrate, let's look at a hand I played a few days ago:

Seat 2: Small Blind [ME] ($32.09 in chips)
Seat 3: Big Blind ($20.96 in chips)
Seat 4: UTG ($11.64 in chips)
Seat 5: Dealer ($28.33 in chips)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Small Blind  [ME] : Card dealt to a spot [Qd Ah]
Big Blind : Card dealt to a spot [4s 9h]
UTG : Card dealt to a spot [Jh 5h]
Dealer : Card dealt to a spot [Qc 5c]
UTG : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.25
Small Blind  [ME] : Raises $0.90 to $1
Big Blind : Folds
Dealer : Calls $0.75

Preflop is pretty standard, we're 4-handed and the dealer limps on the button, so I raise to 4x for value and get called.


*** FLOP *** [9d Tc Ac]
Small Blind  [ME] : Bets $1.50
Dealer : Calls $1.50

Flop is perfectly fine, as I flop top pair and the board has a lot of potential draws in addition to inferior aces. The 9 and T are slightly concerning, as they fill in A9 and AT, which would have been good hands from which to extract value, but those hands are still a small part of the villain's range. I bet $1.50 into $2 and get called. 


*** TURN *** [9d Tc Ac] [2d]
Small Blind  [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $2.62
Small Blind  [ME] : Calls $2.62

I don't like my check here. I sometimes will check the turn after betting the flop because it's a line that says "I took a stab at it and you didn't fold, so now I'm showing weakness." Such a line can often get you a second street of value on the river when a bet on the turn might have persuaded a lower limit player to fold what had been an optimistic hand on the flop. However, in retrospect there are still a ton of draws on the turn, including some suited straight draws and suited aces with diamonds that picked up flush draws with the 2, that I should have bet again for value. In any event, the villain bets about 1/2 pot after I check. This doesn't give me much information, as they could be betting any of their draws, a set, or two pair. It does reduce the likelihood of a weak ace with or without a flush draw, as those hands will usually get checked behind if the villain isn't spewy. I assigned the villain a range of any club draw, a set that isn't 22, any open ended straight draw (OESD) or double belly buster draw, any two pair (although I took out about 2/3 of the combinations of 92 and T2 because those are less likely), and any ace high diamond draw.



*** RIVER *** [9d Tc Ac 2d] [9c]
Small Blind  [ME] : Checks
Dealer : Bets $5.24

The 9 brings in the club flush and creates a bit of a pickle. On one hand the flush has come in, which was the most logical hand to which the villain could be drawing. On the other hand the villain has missed all of their straight draws. To figure out the best course of action, I went back to Equilab to take out all combinations that had just an A (with the exception of AK) as well as A2 and T2 on account of getting counterfeited (since those hands would almost certainly check behind). That leaves us with a range of AA, 99, TT, AT, a flush, or a missed straight draw. There are a total of 44 missed straight draws and 71 made hands that beat us. Taken as a straight percentage, that means we beat 38% of the combinations that could logically be betting here. As the villain bet $5.24 into about $9.50 after rake, we need to win a little over 26% of the time for our call to be profitable. Since the villain has 38% bluffs in his/her range, that should make this an easy call, right?

Weighting the Range

Not so fast. The call is only correct if we are right in thinking that the villain is equally likely to bet all of those missed draws as to value bet all those made hands. Against all but the most aggressive opponents, this is not the case. Sometimes they are going to bet their missed draws and sometimes they're going to check behind. The key is figuring out how often they bet those draws. So if our target percentage to make the call is 26%, that means that the villain needs to be bluffing with 26% of their total range, or 30 combinations: (44+71)*(.26) = 29.9 combinations

We then take that number of combinations and divide it by the total number of missed draws: 29.9/44 = 68%. Therefore, if the villain is bluffing about 2/3 of the time with a missed straight draw, we call. If they are bluffing less often than that, we fold.

So how often is the villain bluffing with a missed draw? Well that's where things get tricky. Playing on Bovada, there is no ability to save notes due to playing with random players, so it's difficult to know how aggressive your opponents are at betting draws. Furthermore, there's no HUD to use for tracking players, so I don't have stats on this opponent's aggression level. The best we can do is extrapolate based on the tendencies shown up to this point at the table as well as any other information. In that vein, there are two pieces of information that I neglected to adequately factor into my decision. First, that I had lost a hand to this villain earlier in the session in which he/she was making a modest bet for value. Second, I have yet to see this villain bet or raise without a strong hand.

If I had taken the time to lay it out in those explicit terms, I might have decided to fold. As it is, I called and the villain showed Q5 of clubs for a rivered flush. That said, I started this post with the intent of showing what a bad decision I made, but after running through the numbers it's not as bad as I thought. Without access to solid stats it's difficult to say definitely how good or bad the call was, but the important takeaway is that it's useful to play with ranges to figure out how likely it is that your opponent is bluffing on the river and what circumstances are necessary to make a profitable call.